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Structural Theory on Aligning Survival Strategies with Social Needs for Efficiency in Care of Internally Displaced Persons' Camps in Africa

Ruth Abiola Adimula* and Olugbenga Ayodeji Mokuolu**

Abstract

The recent unprecedented surge in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in African countries, particularly Nigeria resulting from insurgency, militant activities, natural disasters and several conflict-related displacements calls for well-coordinated national preparedness and response. This cross-sectional descriptive study, using focus group discussion, structured interview and key informants interview (KII) guides, was undertaken to understand better, the management of IDPs, and how camps can be structured for active management to overcome the identified challenges. It concludes that efficiency in the care of IDPs in camps is weak. In response, the researchers formulated a theory of a four-phased model of an IDP's transition to align survival strategies to social needs, as a way of promoting efficiency in the care of IDPs. The categorisation and targeted actions are (i) **After-Shock (IDP-phase-1)**: this is the immediate period after the occurrence of the event, characterised by a mixture of the emotion of gratitude for survival, that transit quickly to solitude following consciousness of severe human and material losses; (ii) **Stabilisation (IDP-phase-2)**: this is the phase of settlement into a camp routine with a predictable system of meeting basic needs, thus, reinforcing the sense of self-belief and potential for recovery; (iii) **Empowerment (IDP-phase-3)**: this is the stage of acquisition of vocational and necessary management skills towards economic independence; and (iv) **Re-integration (Post-IDP-phase)**: being the phase of coordinated exit from the camp and re-integration into the society as self-sustaining individuals. The recommendation is on the strengthening of IDP response, to facilitate the protection of their rights while allowing a systematic exit of IDPs instead of creating an IDP conundrum.

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Introduction

Displacement around the world has become a cankerworm eating deep into the fabrics of national, regional, and continental existence. It is a daily occurrence that stares the globe in the face, presenting itself in different dimensions: refugee crisis, forced migration, increasing number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) amongst other humanitarian challenges. Displacement occurs when people are unpreparedly removed from their traditional abode or established structure of existence (UNHCR, 2020). United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2019) has reported an unprecedented **79.5 million** people around the world who have been forced from home. IDPs just like refugees and asylum seekers, flee due to war, violence, persecution, or natural disasters, and face devastating hardships due to displacement (World101, 2020).

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been displaced from their homes and traditional structure but have not crossed an international border, while refugees are displaced persons who have crossed international borders and are managed on the basis of several international regulations (UNHCR, 2020). The IDPs care is the responsibility of the national government as provided for under the 1998 United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC 2019) reported that at the end of 2019, some 50.8 million people around the world were internally displaced due to armed conflict, generalized violence, or human rights violations. Although forced displacement is a global phenomenon, it is more pronounced in Africa. Africa hosts over one-third of the global forced displacement population (ReliefWeb 2019). Africa currently has more than 25 million people who are forcibly displaced (IDPs and Refugees) as a result of conflict and repression and 85% of them come from eight countries: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), South Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, the Central African Republic, and Cameroon.

According to ReliefWeb, (2018) on the updates of UNHCR operations, West Africa remains host to the largest number of persons of concern to UNHCR, particularly in the countries surrounding the Lake Chad Basin which was characterized by multiple armed conflicts, violent extremism and human

rights violations, coupled with growing poverty, severe food and water shortages, and drought. In Cameroon, population movements remained dynamic in the Far North region due to the activities of cross-border insurgents, as of the end of July 2018, some 239,000 people were internally displaced, and there were 24,000 Cameroonian refugees in Nigeria (ReliefWeb, 2018). In Mali, the volatile situation in the northern and central parts of the country, as well as insecurity in the border areas, led to continued displacement, as of June 2018, there were some 51,800 IDPs in the country and more than 130,000 refugees in Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger. In 2018, approximately 30,000 refugees were newly displaced, including 11,500 people who fled from Mali to the Tillabéri region of Niger. At the same time, the deterioration of the security situation in Burkina Faso has also led to the internal displacement of approximately 15,000 Burkinabé citizens as well as the flight of over 7,000 to Mali (ReliefWeb, 2018).

Nigeria has had an upsurge in the cases of IDPs with the proliferation of militia groups in the last one and half decades. Among these militias is the dreaded Boko Haram terrorist sect which violently undermines the territorial integrity and authority of the Nigerian state and engenders widespread internal displacement, human rights abuses, public safety, and humanitarian crises. Since 2009, Boko Haram has launched several attacks on lives and destruction of properties in Nigeria, leading to the death of several people and displacement of a considerable population of people, especially in Northeast Nigeria. According to Olufolahan (2015), Boko Haram had been the most complex, destructive, and mind-boggling security challenge Nigeria has ever faced. As of the end of July 2018, there were close to 2.4 million IDPs in Nigeria and over 227,000 Nigerian refugees in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger (ReliefWeb, 2018). Imasuen (2015), affirms that insurgency has become a threat to global peace and security in the 21st century. He attributed this threat to the fact that it is the highest contributor to humanitarian crises in the form of a rise in human casualties, internally displaced persons, refugee debacles, food insecurity and the spread of various diseases.

Statement of the Problem

Before the last one and half decades, Nigeria has had pockets of IDPs, though the recent escalation has made the challenges more formidable. For example, Olagunju (2006) found that the unleashing of terror by the dreaded Boko Haram group has left millions of Nigerians displaced, with varying degrees of scourges and injuries. Consequently, Nigeria particularly has been finding it increasingly difficult and is almost failing in its task to manage its

plethora of IDPs. Also, since IDPs and refugees as twins of common woes have similar experiences in the camp, Pittaway, (2004) reported that in Kakuma refugee camp, Kenya, the incidences of rape and sexual violence are extremely high and domestic violence is commonplace.

Under the 1998 Guidelines for Internal Displacement, the management of IDPs is under the national government. In Nigeria, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), is the government agency in charge of the management of IDPs, and the agency faces arrays of challenges, mainly because, the IDP camps lack structure. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) Country Director in Nigeria:

In north-east Nigeria today, at least 19 displacement sites are in areas that face a high risk of flooding. Few camps have anything like proper drainage. All the camps have too few latrines, and some have none. Sickness spreads – through faeces, fluids, fingers, flies and food. There were 10,000 cases of cholera last year. (Eric Batonon, 2019).

He noted that half of all the schools in Borno State have been destroyed or forced to close, and an already-weak health system has buckled even further, leaving millions of people without access to healthcare. At least 600,000 people are still living in congested camps and informal settlements with no SPHERE humanitarian standards of water supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion; food security and nutrition; shelter, settlement and non-food items; and health action; no food and children dying of malnutrition.

As part of measures to improve IDPs camp management, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) in their 2015 edition of the Camp Management Toolkit, noted the need for camp management to ensure services and protection provided are in line with national and international laws, guidelines and agreed standards. These guidelines and standards seek to end encampment of displaced persons through the promotion of durable solutions; based on the ethical foundation of humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality (RefWorld, 2015). The document stated that the toolkit applies to camp and camp-like settings, including refugee and IDP camps. It also discussed cross-cutting issues and topics on gender-based violence, protection, community participation, information management, environment, gender, age, HIV/AIDS, mental health and psychosocial support to camp residents.

Whereas these authors have discussed challenges associated with the

management of refugees and IDP camps, there is a dearth of literature on how the camps are to ensure efficiencies in their operations. This study, therefore, specifically discussed how camps can be structured in phases for effective management, to overcome the identified challenges of overcrowding, sexual and gender-based violence, insecurity, poverty, malnutrition, domestic violence, protracted displacement, among others. The objectives of this research, was to study the current management practices in selected IDP camps and to propose a conceptual framework that will align the survival strategies of IDPs to their social needs, for efficient management of the IDP camps in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Theoretical Underpinning

This study adopted the contingency theory of leadership to illustrate how structured management can enhance efficiency and productivity in an organisation or a setup. Here, the camp is the setup/organisation. The theory was proposed by the Austrian psychologist Fred Edward Fiedler in his landmark 1964 article, "*A Contingency Model of Leadership Effectiveness*." The contingency theory emphasises the importance of both the leader's personality and the situation in which that leader operates (Virkus, 2009). It holds that management techniques should be dependent upon the circumstances, that effectiveness is contingent, or dependent, upon the interplay between the application of management behaviours and specific situations. In other words, management should change depending on the circumstances. One size does not fit all.

In natural disasters or survival situations, tasks are not always well defined or prioritised well. Human relations are vital. In situations where tasks are structured, such as in most blue-collar environments or the military, a personable leader is not much of a requirement. Orders come to "do it, or else". However, in a displaced persons' camp in Africa, tasks are not usually structured; thus, we have inefficient management of people and resources. The task structure of contingency leadership factor relates to whether the structure of the work task is highly structured, subject to standard procedures and adequate measures of assessment that determines efficiency. When tasks are structured, standardised and assessed, this serves as a good strategy for efficient management to ensure the distribution of available resources to meet needs. Accordingly, structured management results in efficiency.

Root Causes of Displacement in Africa

Violent conflict, more than any other factor, leads to displacement in

Africa. Despite differences in ethnicities, religions and cultures of countries in the horn of Africa, people of the region are interconnected in one or other ways which contributed to the socio-economic unrest of the region-including. Areas of contests for the control of resources include the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, oil, agriculture and grazing lands and water resources like River Nile. The result has been chronic poverty, unemployment (especially youth), unfair distribution of resources and extreme contestation over decentralised resources, the colonial sentiments in the mindsets of the peoples, dictatorial and oppressive regimes supported and sustained by super nations, among others (Mengistu, 2015). IOM (2019) noted that population movements in the region remain incredibly dynamic as people moved in and out of situations of vulnerability; thus, an estimated 8.1 million remained internally displaced, and 3.5 million refugees and asylum-seekers hosted in the region during the first six months of 2019. It reported that while conflict-induced displacement decreased, intercommunal violence became more frequent in Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan. In Rwanda, UNHCR, (1994) reported that: *“ethnic conflict ignited by population pressure and diminishing land resources were the causes of strife”*. Since the 1994 genocide, in which up to two million people fled their homes, Rwanda has suffered repeated waves of displacement. Following the government's military victory over the perpetrators of the genocide in 1994, the majority of the population fled to Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), Burundi and Tanzania (Reliefweb, 2003).

The roots of conflict in West Africa are much more profound and complex; being embedded on the interplay of historical factors, socio-economic crisis, legacies of authoritarianism and the politics of exclusion, international forces, and local struggles (Obi, 2012). Additional factors contributing to conflicts include bad governance, corruption, human rights violations, poverty, ethnic marginalisation and small arms and light weapons proliferation, among others (Annan, 2014). UNHCR, (2020) noted that with the ongoing crises in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali and Nigeria, as well as increased insecurity in Burkina Faso, more than 3.7 million people are internally displaced across West African region. In Nigeria, the unending ethnoreligious and political unrest was the result of the consummation of the 1914 marriage of inconvenience between Nigeria's Southern and Northern Protectorates (Sagay 2016). Delineation of culturally knitted kin along state and international borders, and the question of the compatibility of the dissident ethnic groups on the one hand and religious divides on the other hand (Ugorji, 2016), with its effects on public safety, human security, demographic displacement and death tolls. Osagioduwa and Oluwakorede (2016) also noted that intra-state and

intra-regional armed conflicts have continued to result in substantial IDP movements in Africa.

Design and Methods

The study consisted of two phases. The first phase was that of conducting a Situation Analysis, assessing selected IDPs camp in order to evaluate their management practices in aligning the survival strategies to the social needs of the IDPs. The second phase was using the knowledge gathered to formulate a conceptual framework towards an improved efficiency in the management of IDP camps. The study adopted a qualitative research method with both primary and secondary research designs of gathering information in selected IDP and refugee camps visited in Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone between 2012 and 2016. A purposive sampling method for camp selection, based on language, access and population, was adopted. The camps visited in Nigeria were: Fulfore, Malkohi, NYSC IDP camps in Yola (Northeast), Bakassi Resettlement Camp Calabar, ICC IDP Camp, Benin (South-south), Oru Refugee Camp (Southwest). In Ghana, Budumburam Refugee Camp, Accra was visited, while in Sierra Leone the Grafton IDP (Amputees) Camp in Freetown was visited for data collection. For the primary data, it relied on focus group discussion, structured interview and key informants' interview (KII) guides administered and completed independently by the respondents. These instruments were considered most appropriate to generate qualitative data because it enabled the researchers to have face-to-face interaction with the camp management and IDPs officials to elicit in-depth responses from them. In Malkohi, Fufore and NYSC camps (government-owned), using simple random sampling technique, ten respondents each were selected through the assistance of the camp manager consisting of NEMA officials and the executive members of IDPs -Camp Residents Association. Seven camp officials in Benin camp responded to KII, while focus group discussions were conducted in Bakassi, Grafton, Budumberam and Oru camps. Researchers were conducted round camp facilities in the camps. The lead author with two research assistants each (who were familiar with respective camps) personally conducted the study, to generate responses from the respondents on IDPs reception practices, stabilisation responses, empowerment/skill acquisition practices and exit strategies from the camp. The data collected were used to analyse camp coordination and conditions of IDPs. The theoretical framework for the study was hinged on Austrian psychologist Fred Edward Fiedler Contingency Theory, which emphasises the importance of both the leader's personality and the situation in which that leader operates.

Findings and Discussion

Stage 1: Situation Analysis of Camp Management Practices

The three camps visited in Yola were populated with victims of Boko haram insurgency, and they were government-owned. Bakassi resettlement camp hosts Nigerian returnees from Bakassi Peninsula consequent upon the international court of Justice judgment between Nigeria and Cameroon. The IDPs in Benin camp were victims of Boko haram insurgency from Adamawa and Borno state Nigeria, while refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone resided in Oru camp. The Grafton camp in Sierra Leone hosted amputees and some victims of civil war. At the same time, survivors of violent conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and other African countries lived in Budumburam refugee camps. Researchers took note of the strength and weaknesses as applicable in each camp. In all the camps, the reception of IDPs to the camps was similar. The registers of in-takes were opened to record demographic details of camp residents and after that, accommodation is assigned based on gender. There were large population- overcrowded accommodation in tents, muds, bricks and wooden houses.

On responses to the daily routine of cleaning, personal hygiene, eating, and response to gender-based violence, findings showed that the camp managers and officers monitored the cleaning of premises, encouraged camp residents to keep personal hygiene and distribute food to IDPs based on availability. The study also found that IDPs were underserved in terms of facilities – leading to trauma, malnutrition and death of many children, poor health, unwanted pregnancies, poverty- idleness, diverse Gender-based violence (Rape, sexual assault, forced prostitution), lack of or low education and insecurity, among others. There was, however, no reporting system for GBV except in Budumburam refugee camp in Ghana, where the Ministry of Social welfare provided GBV reporting mechanism and treatment for survivors of GBV. Empowerment and skill acquisition in the camps were basically for women. In Malkohi and Fufore camps in Yola, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had organised counselling sessions on psychosocial issues and trained some women who were to serve as trainers to other women in the camp on skill acquisition in tailoring, cap, shoe and soap making. In Benin camp, few women who were trained by an individual tailoring outfit, with the trainees serving as trainers of other women in the camp. In Grafton Amputees camp, IDPs were males, and they live with their families. Most of the IDPs/amputees were beggars, no skill acquisition. They live like outcasts.

On re-integration plans for the IDPs, camp managers in Malkohi, Fufore and NYSC camps stated that government was yet to draw a re-integration road map. Benin IDP camp management had no plans of re-integration for the camp residents since many of them have lost loved ones and have witnessed the destruction of their properties they would have loved to return to their homes. Bakassi residents also had no plan to reintegrate as the houses they occupied were allocated to them by the United Nations and Nigerian government. For Oru and Budumburam refugee camps, UNHCR had relocated some refugees back to their countries, and those remaining on camps were unsure if they will enjoy the re-integration exercise or not. Basically, in all the IDP camps visited, there was no concrete arrangement for IDPs re-integration.

Table 1: Summary of IDP camps visited

S/N	Name of Camp	Location	Population	Nature of displacement
1	Malkohi	Yola, Nigeria	1,416	Boko Haram insurgency victims
2	Fufore	Yola, Nigeria	2,261	Boko Haram insurgency victims
3	NYSC	Yola, Nigeria	2,750	Boko Haram insurgency victims
4	Bakassi	Calabar, Nigeria	400	Bakassi-Pennisula Resettlement
5	ICC Benin	Benin City, Nigeria	2,512	Boko Haram insurgency victims
6.	Budumburam	Accra, Ghana	11,349	Liberian, Sierra Leone, wars,
7.	Oru	Ogun State, Nigeria	700	Liberian, Sierra Leone, wars,
8.	Grafton	Freetown, Sierra Leone	5,000	Amputees (with their families), Sierra Leonean civil war

Stage 2: Construct of a Structural Model to align survival strategies with social needs of IDPs

Formulation of Efficiency Theory in Camp Management

Based on the findings showing lapses in the existing system of management of IDPs in camps in the African countries, researchers developed a 4-phased structural framework to align survival strategies with social needs of IDPs as a means of improving efficiencies in Camp Management. This is in line with the theory of change. The Centre for Theory of Change (2019), described the theory of change the full description and illustration of how and why the desired change is expected to happen in a particular context. It is focused, in particular, on mapping out or “filling in” what has been described as the “missing middle” between what a program or change initiative does (its

activities or interventions) and how these lead to desired goals being achieved; in that activities are linked to a detailed understanding of how change happens.

According to Harries, Hodgson and Noble (2014),

Theory of change is only as useful as its practical application, and we should not get lost in the quest for theoretical perfection. However, taken at face value, as a theory to explain how work is supposed to function. It is at the heart of the strategy. It is the foundation for the development of an impact measurement framework. It should be the cornerstone of attempts to work out whether and how well a mission is achieved. It is the story of how a program is designed and how it is supposed to work.

Discussing how to create a theory of change, TasCoss Library (2020) noted that:

It is best to create a Theory of Change before deciding how a program will be constructed: it starts with the long-term outcome desired and works backwards to work out how it will be achieved. It is a way of designing a new program. The steps comprise of: Identifying the problem to be addressed; Work out what is to be achieved (your long term goal); Walk backwards to get where one is going; Explain the 'assumptions'; Now work out what you will do to achieve the desired outcomes; finally Summarise and explain your Theory of Change.

These are all mapped out in an Outcomes Framework. The Outcomes Framework then provides the basis for identifying what type of activity or intervention will lead to the outcomes identified as preconditions for achieving the long-term goal. This leads to better planning and better evaluation, as it is possible to measure progress towards the achievement of longer-term goals (Harries, Hodgson & Noble, 2014).

Further, the findings of research carried out by the lead author at different times between 2012 and 2016 in different refugees. IDP camps in some West African states are consistent with the findings of previous authors like Olagunju (2006) and the report of Humanitarian Agencies (IOM, NRC, UNHCR) in the Camp Management Toolkit 2015 edition. The management of IDP camps lack structure and therefore, a need to introduce changes in management structure towards better efficiency.

Following the TacCoss guidelines of the theory of change, this study

identified a lack of structured arrangement in the management of IDP camps in Africa as a challenge. The authors worked out the ultimate goal as efficient management of camps, walked backwards to note the lapses in camp management and has proposed a four-phase management strategy (efficiency theory) being- **“After-shock”, “Stabilisation”, “Empowerment” and “Re-integration”**. Explaining that if IDP camps are structured, and in-takes are grouped based on the time of entry and duration of stay in the camp, reflecting their state of mind and social needs at each phase, there will be improvement and efficiency in camp management.

Conceptual Framework

Further to the development of the Efficiency Theory on IDPs camp management, a Conceptual Framework(CF) on its operations was also proposed to illustrate the operations of the four-phase theory. The CF seeks to demonstrate how efficiency will be enhanced in the care of IDPs and the attendant benefits of the model. The CF indicates the entrance of IDPs into the camp and the systematic movement from one phase to the other, based on the length of stay and needs of IDPs, until IDPs exit the camp through a designed re-integration process. See Figure 1




Figure 1: Structural Theory for the Efficient Management of Internally Displaced Persons' Camps

Identified phases that IDPs go through in Camp

“After-shock” (IDP-phase-1); After-shock is the immediate period after the occurrence of an event, characterised by a mixture of the emotion of gratitude for survival, that transit quickly to solitude following consciousness of severe human and material losses. Survivors of violence/disaster are

compounded many times with psychological trauma on the loss of loved ones and valuable properties. They are disconnected from their structured socio-economic lives into unplanned camps where needs may be unmet. Victims at this stage go through psychological and emotional trauma. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, trauma is a psychological disorder resulting from severe mental or emotional stress or physical injury. It is a challenging and unpleasant experience that causes someone to have mental or emotional problems, usually for a long time. Trauma theorist put to light its various sources as intimate partner violence, natural disasters, loss of loved one, sexual assault or any physical or mental wound, rape, female genital mutilation, and the witness of violence; as experienced by many in the recent Boko Haram terrorist acts that subjected many Nigerians to psychological distortion (Abubakar, 2016).

Traumatic events can fundamentally change not only victims' way of life, but also their psychological outlook for people who have faced 'act of god' natural disasters and man-made catastrophes of terrorism and war. It has a range of different cognitive, emotional, physical, and behavioural effects on individuals (Brahm, 2004). In 2011, in a post-election ethnoreligious violent conflict, victims in IDP camp in Kaduna had a high prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Among 258 respondents, identified factors include the destruction of personal property, being evacuated from the town, witnessing violence, reported death of a family member, and suffering ill health were the most frequent psycho-trauma experienced by the IDPs. (Sheikh, Mohammed, Agunbiade, Ike, Ebiti & Adekeye 2011).

In another study among IDPs of Boko Haram insurgency in three camps in Abuja, Nigeria, viz: Oronzo, New Kuchingoro and Old Kuchingoro camps, it was found that their experiences escaping the insurgency is a very traumatic one. The IDPs spoke of how a number of their family members were left behind and killed. Some ran towards the Cameroonian border while others ran up the mountains towards the Nigerian side of the border. As a result of this, many families were split. Families were separated across two countries as a result. The finding showed that they were going through a lot of mental trauma (Nsofor, 2015).

In essence, when IDPs are settled in camps immediately after violent conflict, their experience is termed "after-shock"- they are experiencing trauma from losses, assaults, and stress, among others. Therefore, they require psychosocial interventions for psychological and emotional stability, through

medical, counselling and welfare support to stabilise their health and living conditions. The goal of trauma healing is to give victims a feeling that they have control over their lives again, through three stages that trauma victims move through as part of the healing process: safety, acknowledgement, and reconnection (Herman, 1992).

“Stabilisation” (IDP-phase-2); Stabilisation is the phase of settlement into a camp routine with a predictable system of meeting basic needs, thus, reinforcing the sense of self-belief and potential for recovery. Since time heals, IDPs are expected to stabilise and overcome their trauma after living in the camp for a reasonable period. They become acquainted with regular family routine- wake up, clean up, go to school/trade, eat, pray, play, among others. Many times, IDPs, especially females, face Gender-based violence at this stage. For many, idleness set in as they have nothing to engage them after the daily routine. This period of idleness portends gender-based violence and other vices for camp residents. While men face forced conscription, male massacre and sexual assault (Carpenter, 2006) during conflicts, women and girls are more vulnerable to GBV in camps. Several studies have reported that women and girls were victims of physical and sexual violence in IDP camps. Women are at higher risk of unwanted pregnancies, unsafe abortions, maternal morbidity and mortality (Austin, Guy, Lee-Jones, McGinn & Schlecht, 2008). Marama, Yusuf and Ojeme, (2015) reported that the IDPs in Boko Haram camps in Nigeria were experiencing “incidents of unwanted pregnancies, rape, child labour/trafficking and sexually transmitted diseases” The negative impacts of sexual violence are significant and long term. These may include physical injuries, sexually transmitted infections including HIV, unwanted pregnancies and mental health effects (Austin et al., 2008).

Thus, the needs of IDP at this stage are: economic empowerment to overcome idleness; mechanisms for GBV reporting system to protect survivors of GBV; punitive measures to punish the perpetrators of GBV; medical care to treat survivors of GBV; and supply of food and welfare items mainly to prevent/control forced prostitution for survival and to solve malnutrition and infant mortality in IDP camps. According to The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), there were about 100,000 cases of child malnutrition in northern Nigeria in 2016 (Punch 2016). These numbers bring in to question the efficiency of aids and the effectiveness of the strategies employed in the utilisation of the funds to aid the IDPs in the country (Ojo, 2017).

“Empowerment” (IDP-phase-3); Empowerment phase is the stage of acquisition of vocational and necessary management skills toward the

economic independence of IDPs. At this stage, the IDPs, having settled to normal camp life, get trained and equipped with specific skills/vocation to enable them cater for themselves and their families. According to the empowerment theory propounded by Rappaport (1981), empowerment refers to measures designed to increase the degree of autonomy and self-determination in people and communities in order to enable them to represent their interests in a responsible and self-determined way, acting on their authority. It is the process of becoming stronger and more confident, especially in controlling one's life and claiming one's rights. Empowerment as action refers both to the process of self-empowerment and to professional support of people, which enables them to overcome their sense of powerlessness and lack of influence and to recognise and use their resources. To do work with power.

Robert Adams described empowerment as a process by which people individually and collectively can help themselves and others to maximise the quality of their lives. It is a process of obtaining significant opportunities for marginalised people, either directly by those people, or through the help of non-marginalised others who share their access to these opportunities. Marginalised people who lack self-sufficiency become, at a minimum, dependent on charity, or welfare. They lose their self-confidence because they cannot be fully self-supporting. The opportunities denied them also deprive them of the pride of accomplishment which others, who have those opportunities can develop for themselves (Adams, 2008). Staples (1993) opined that power could be developed, facilitated or "secured" to enable challenged individuals or groups to- increase their resources; improve their self-esteem; build up the ability to act on their own in psychological, sociocultural, political and economic situations. Empowerment also includes encouraging and developing the skills for, self-sufficiency It encourages people to gain the skills and knowledge that will allow them to overcome obstacles in life or work environment and ultimately, help them develop within themselves or in the society.

The IDPs are challenged and marginalised as a result of violent conflict that has uprooted them from their socio-political and economic structure into penury, idleness and cultural disconnection. Thus, in IDP camps, the process of empowerment provides them with the prospect for economic independence. According to Ojo (2017), empowerment is critical to ensure a sustainable action plan that will permanently resolve the issue of internal displacement in Nigeria. One such strategy for a solution to IDP challenges is youth and women empowerment. The reason for the empowerment phase is to ensure that camp

residents are economically independent of catering for themselves and their family members and more importantly, to prepare them for re-integration.

“Re-integration” (Post-IDP-phase); Re-integration is the phase of coordinated exit from the camp and re-integration into the society as self-sustaining individuals. It is a systematic exit of IDPs from camp life instead of creating an IDP conundrum. It is the role of the national government to ensure that there is a concrete plan for IDPs to return to regular lives in society. According to Ojo (2017), since the camp is usually a temporary arrangement, the government need to make a road map of re-integration of camp residents back into society. These programs would set things in motion towards achieving a more prosperous and sustainable recovery process for IDPs in the country.

Re-integration is not without some socio-economic challenges to government and the IDPs. To the government, challenges include the need for increased budgetary allocation, cost of transporting huge population back to their communities, relocation of unaccompanied children and too young children to identify their families and home. For the IDPs, the challenges may include lack of food, economic status and home to return to (especially for those that their homes were burnt during the conflict), destruction of communal and family lives, landmine issues, among others. These challenges can lead to protracted camp lives and a massive security threat to society if not adequately handled. Olukolajo, Ajayi and Ogungbenro (2014) opined that, based on the challenges of re-integration, if IDP crises become protracted, there is a higher likelihood that displaced persons will become involved in political violence and be susceptible to militant recruitment. Usually, three types of re-integration are possible; these are voluntary repatriation (returning to the community of origin), local integration (absorbing into community displaced to) and resettlement (settling in a different(third) community- outside the original community and community displaced to). According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), (2018), assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) is an indispensable part of a comprehensive approach to migration and displaced camps management. It aims at orderly and humane return and reintegration of migrants and displaced persons who are unable or unwilling to remain in camps and wish to return voluntarily to their countries/communities of origin.

Benefits of the Categorisation

The proposed four-phase efficiency in the camp management structure in the care of IDPs has many advantages. It will present an organised camp for easy management. Thus, there is a better-streamlined management structure for efficient coordination and control of the flow of people in the camp by accommodating camp residents in sections and phases, according to their arrival and situations – that is from one stage to the other. Where IDPs are grouped following their arrival in camp into phases, then tracking of IDPs individually or as a group will be easy for the management to engage them for required purposes. Here, camp managers can use the grouping strategy to ascertain which of the phases to engage for available social needs. It reduces the pressure of giving available intervention to all camp population. Instead, only a section that requires particular intervention will be accessed and served. This system will ensure that interventions are administered on a need basis. This will lead to an improvement in planning activities, as only IDPs in the critical phase will be planned for. The fact that the entire IDPs in the camp are not under planning will enhance the effective management of available inadequate resources.

If camp management is compartmentalised, accountability for each section will be easier and less cumbersome. Assistant camp managers can be appointed to be in charge of each phase and then report to the Chief Camp Manager. Through this, each section will have coordinated information about the type of intervention required; this can garner the confidence to be specific on the type of intervention required towards seeking for resource mobilisation. This will also make knowledge sharing easy, relevant and workable. It will improve peer counselling by those in the advance phases to those in the early phases. IDPs in the same phase can also build more robust networks to enhance mutual benefits among themselves.

Above all, successful operation of the four-phase theory can enhance re-integration process of economically empowered IDPs into the society, thereby providing the solution to a protracted camp situation; and also establish best practices in the management of IDP camps for effectiveness.

Conclusion

This study concluded that the IDPs camp management structure was weak generally, there were no streamlined management protocols, all IDPs were clamped together in overcrowded accommodation and given the same

intervention available. Though all the camps have traces of providing some psychosocial help and empowerment programmes, they are weak, and these are not offered on a need basis, leading to overstretched of available inadequate resources and insufficiencies and also inefficiency in camp management. Therefore, adopting the four-phase efficiency theory of –After-shock, stabilization, empowerment and re-integration will improve camp management on needs basis.

Recommendations

It is recommended that IDP camps should be guided by clear protocols – with the proposed four stages of the camp arrangement, this may help to standardise camp practices and structure/coordinate the various support that other organisations may wish to provide. Besides, to promoting efficiency in IDPs camp management, adopting this approach will stem experiences of IDPs in camps such as repeat trauma, idleness, GBV, inequity in the administration of welfare services.

Also, where displaced camps are structured into the proposed phases, it will aid the discharge of duties to ensure that available interventions are aligned with the specific needs of the IDPs. For example, if intervention available is trauma counselling, shock/stress management, treatment of wounds sustained during attacks, only IDPs in the phase of “**After-shock**” will be invited as participants. The IDPs in the stable state will not need such intervention again. This way of deploying interventions based on needs assessment will serve the IDPs better. Also, where the government or humanitarian organisation has brought empowerment intervention to the camp, only IDPs that have stabilised and ready to acquire such skills would be served. New entrants in the “After-shock” phase may not be able to coordinate themselves and concentrate enough because of the healing process they are undergoing. Thus, if only IDPs at “Empowerment Phase” are invited to benefit, the intervention will go a long way to serve their needs, rather than training some group of people who could not learn or use the knowledge of training because of the peculiarity of the phase they belong to. This type of management strategy will make available resources spread and to cover needs better.

More importantly, it recommended that response mechanisms to care for survivors of GBV should be put in place in displaced person camps to serve the IDPs prone to experiencing GBV. This mechanism will consist of a reporting system by victims of GBV so that medical care (for survivors of GBV) and

punitive measures (to punish the perpetrators and to serve as a deterrent to others) can be easily administered. This will go a long way to protect IDPs from various types of GBV and reduce such incidences in the camp.

Moreover, government, civil society organisations and humanitarian agencies are encouraged to deploy interventions of training and extensive empowerment programmes and donation of tools of the trade to IDP camps. Empowering the IDPs will accelerate their re-integration to the larger society. This will reduce the problems of protracted displacement and ensure that reintegrated IDPs are assets rather than a burden to their communities.

Furthermore, formulation of a comprehensive roadmap for reparation, integration and resettlement of IDPs back into the society should be put in place by the national governments in Africa, through the camp management authorities.

Above all, national governments and the camp management should adopt the formulated four phases of camp management strategies for effectiveness in the care of IDPs. For After-shock- IDP-phase-1- psychosocial, moral and spiritual support should be made available to IDPs in this stage. For Stabilisation- IDP-phase-2- stage, family routine/delegation of roles, GBV reporting system should be provided by camp management. Empowerment-IDP-phase-3- requires that formal and vocational education; economic empowerment, training and provision of tools of trade be made available to IDPs as they may need. While, Integration-IDP-phase-4- calls on government to design a roadmap for reparation, integration and resettlement plan, towards the re-integration of IDPs in their communities of origin, host community, or third communities respectively, as affected IDPs may choose. This process is to ensure that IDPs are settled back into communities in any part of the country, to forestall protracted camp situation and its attendant insecurity challenges.

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Women, Marginalisation and Politics in Africa and Asia

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Abstract

The decade of 1990s was very eventful for women's movement in Nigeria and India. There was the second wave of the feminists' struggle and the continents of Africa and Asia were not exceptions. Following the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1993 which Nigeria and India were both signatories, the struggle for the inclusion of women in governance, recognition of the works and gender equality have been in place in women empowerment discourse in these continents. From then, till now, a lot has been achieved but the agendas remained unfinished. Women are still marginalized especially in these priority areas with new forms of marginalization such as women as sexual models and media subjugation emerging.

Using secondary data and applying the radical feminist theory, *Women Marginalization in Nigeria and Asia* investigated women marginalization in Nigeria and India. The chapter comparably uncover various forms of women marginalization in these countries with their similarities to show that women marginalization is everywhere cutting across culture, race and continent. For women marginalization to be eliminated, there is need for well-rounded education for large majority of women in these continents which in the long run can trump the patriarchal entrenchment in these societies.

Introduction

The marginalization of women has been a long-term and universal problem with enormous social and economic implications. Its intensity and consequences vary according to countries and cultures (WEF, 2015). Women comprise approximately half of the world's population yet they remain

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marginalized in most societies (Mofoluwawo 2014). Collins et al., (2015) defines marginalization as an act of prejudice against certain groups in formal and informal settings such as discrimination in job recruitment, promotions, and performance appraisals in organizations and stereotyping in social settings, thereby keeping or placing such people in disempowered positions. The marginalization of women can be attributed to them not being proportionately represented in politics and political organizations of the state. Representation in politics is a vital tool to fight marginalization of any community and group wherein, representation is seen as a step forward towards empowerment and equality. This chapter presents a comparative analysis of women marginalization in politics in Nigeria and India. Both countries are democracies where the constitution recognizes freedom and equality of its citizens (Article 17(1) (2) Nigerian constitution and Article 14-16 Indian Constitution).

Marginalization is “the process by which a group or individual is denied access to vital positions and symbols of economic, religious, or political power in any society (Marshall 1988). Stretching the above definitions it is then not out of place to explain women marginalization as the extant written and unwritten processes, patterns, perceptions and discrimination against access to power and opportunities available to women against those of their male counterparts in the society. To corroborate the definition above, Daniel, Fletcher & Linder (2002) posit that “to be marginalized is to be far away from power and resources that enable self-determination in economic, political, and social settings. Claiming that it is an inherent characteristic of 'those in the margin', that they have poor access to economic and other recourses like education and social services. While the concept of marginalization may vary according to the historical and socio-economical context of societies such as Nigeria and India, its impact on the marginalized remains the same across cultures peoples and continent.

To address this gender imbalance and disparity in opportunities between men and women, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was ratified in 1979. In spite of the triumphs of bringing the concerns to spotlight, its impact has no toga of uniformity across states. This incongruity is, to an extent, elucidated by the postulations among states towards the implementation of the objectives of UN Conventions on women empowerment (Perrone-McGovern et al. 2014). As suggested by Zwingel (2005), inter-governmental dialogues and national programs affect the ideas and application of gender parity and development

enshrined in CEDAW. Women marginalization is predominant in almost all of spheres of the economy. Adegoke, Adegoke, and Oyedele 2016; Anyoba et al. 2015; Sam (2014) all contend that this can be attributed to cultural and structural challenges. Owoyemi & Olusanya (2014), made it known that there are women who continuously face massive inequalities in the labour market. They believe that in working life, women experience higher rates of unemployment, fewer possibilities for a career, and lower wages. Marginalization does not reckon with peoples numerical or qualification status but their position in the political and economic structure of the society. This is why highly educated women or women trying to attain higher education face untold and unwritten difficult processes in their attempt to access power.

Although it is a worldwide phenomenon that is prevalent in economic development and social and political spaces and pervades every society, it is worse and more intense in developing countries (Dormekpor 2015) such as Nigeria and India. United Nations (2014) Women World Survey Report highlights the marginalization of women worldwide and emphasizes on the fact that women's empowerment cannot be accomplished without their economic empowerment and the creation of an enabling environment.

Scholars like Bennett, 2002; Mama, 2003 have argued that women and men experience higher education differently and that social relations within the educational institutions depict inequalities in the operations of power as is evident in the statistics of access, employment, decision-making bodies, welfare, and capacity to access research and professional opportunities (Bennett, 2002; Mama, 2003). Sydhagen and Cunningham (2007) note that gender inequality in the labour force is a significant challenge facing human resource development in sub-Saharan Africa. Underlined with the rational; this chapter titled *Women Marginalization in Africa and Asia* examined the extant state of women marginalization in developing countries cross two equatorial hemispheres of Nigeria and India. Uncovering the inherent epiphany of marginalization of women across the two continents and confirming the works of scholars such as Dormekpor (2015) that women marginalization is more intense in developing countries and the United Nations (2014) Women World Survey Report that says that women marginalization is without borders among nations with Nigeria and India representing the continents of African and Asian examples.

Women Marginalization in Nigeria and India

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multicultural with diverse religions and

creed consequently; the notion of gender equality varies according to the specific socio-cultural environment under review. This perspective confirms the argument of Syed & Van Buren (2014) when they adduced that gender inequality varies due to different cultural and societal practices and ideologies (Syed & Van Buren 2014). India like Nigeria is very diverse in terms of religion, caste, class, languages spoken and culture. The cultural diversity of India is reflected in all spheres of life. The condition of women in India has remained marginalized since independence but it will be wrong to say that there is no change in women status in the last seventy years. Women movement in India got a boost in 1970s with the United Nations declaring the year 1975 as the Year of Women. This phase of women movement was focused more on popular politics and mass movement (Sen 2000, 1).

However, the United Nations (2014) defines gender inequality as a situation whereby different value is credited to men's and women's activities, needs, and ambitions resulting in unequal rights and opportunities generally, such as in the accessibility and control of resources, participation in the economy, and decision-making. The Global Gender Gap Report of the World Economic Forum (WEF 2015) suggests that gender equality or the lack of it has immense implications on economic development and social well-being. According to The Global, Gender Gap Index inequality can be seen in all spheres of life and went further to rank countries through the calculated gender gap between women and men in four areas: health, education, economy, and politics. The Global Gender Gap Report revealed gender disparities in reproductive health, empowerment, and labour market participation, with Nigeria and India ranking 112th and 108 respectively out of 145 countries (World Economic Forum) 2015). The positions of the two countries in the global gender index reveals the extent gender is a factor in shaping the lives of the individual in continents of Africa and Asia.

The World Economic Forum (WEF 2014) also shows that Nigeria had an overall gender gap score of 0.6391 and was ranked 118 out of 142 countries. This also reveals a very high degree of inequality between men and women in health, education, economic, and political domains. Umukoro (2014) believes that gender inequality has been a developmental problem since the creation of Nigeria in 1914 (Umukoro 2014). Umukoro (up.cit) notes that women are poorly represented even in the public sector which is an intermediate body for gender equality and expected to be less biased. As in Nigeria, India, Government Report of the Committee on the Status of Women in India published its report called 'Towards Equality' in 1974 was an eye-opener and

claimed that women's condition in terms of education, health, post-natal and pre-natal health, violence, rape, early marriages and entrenched patriarchy has led to decline in the status of women in India. (Govt. of India Report 1974). This Report recognized the diversity of women and how different sections of women are variedly affected by poverty, violence, illiteracy and malnutrition. There still remain common grounds of marginalization of women in politics, economic activities, education, health sector etc. Due to meagre representation of women and even in the field of agricultural and other daily labourers women's condition is pathetic as they are not paid equally as their male counterparts nor do they have a say in how to spend their hard earned money. India's scores 0.383 in the global gap score in terms of economic opportunities. (WEF 2015, 8).

Stretching this argument further, (Adegoke, Adegoke, & Oyedele (2016); Anyoba et al (2015); Sam (2014), women marginalization in Nigeria is predominant in almost all of spheres of the economy and this can be attributed to cultural and structural challenges. Owoyemi and Olusanya (2014), make it known that there are women who continuously face massive inequalities in the labour market. Submitting that in the work environment and life, women experience higher rates of unemployment, fewer possibilities for a career, and lower wages. Sydhagen and Cunningham (2007) note that gender inequality in the labour force is a significant challenge facing human resource development in sub-Saharan Africa and Nigeria in particular.

Women and men experience higher education differently and that social relations within the educational institutions depict inequalities in the operations of power as is evident in the statistics of access, employment, decision-making bodies, welfare, and capacity to access research and professional opportunities (Bennett, 2002; Mama, 2003). Highly educated women or those trying to attain higher education face marginalization in Nigeria. In a study, Johnson (2014), presents that there are about 15% of women in the academic faculty and they reportedly experience discrimination, harassment, and, in some cases, violence. Similarly, Bakari and Leach (2007; 2009) confirmed that in a Nigerian higher education institutions, women are not just marginalized but are also sexually harassed by male lecturers and staff, and despite the complaints, the authorities took no action. Consequently, women in academics are often become complacent and compliant, scarcely heard and rarely occupy juicy positions in higher educational system. They are therefore content with what the system hands down to them.

The next section we compare India and Nigeria on the basis of six parameters

i.e.

Besides above stated, other specific manifestations of women marginalization in Nigeria can be compared with Asia are: 1. Patriarchy and advocacy; 2. Political representation; 3. Positive discrimination and economic independence; 4. Women education; 5. Government involvement and policy instruments; 6. Customary laws discriminate against women.

Patriarchy and Advocacy: One of the major factors responsible for the subordinated position of women in both societies is patriarchy. Patriarchy is so much embedded and enshrined in the mindset of men starting from childhood through socialization. To dismantle this, there is a need for advocacy and awareness campaign for men to understand the enormous benefits of women empowerment. In India, regardless of caste and religious affinities there remains a huge preference for the male child. Female child is considered a burden due to spending on marriage and dowry. The Economic Survey of India, 2018 reiterated the son meta-preference as interlinked to women development and equal position in India (Economic Survey 2018). This son meta-preference can be defined as “parents continue to have children until they have the desired number of sons” (Economic Survey 2018). This led to skewed sex-ratio in India. Table 1 gives a comparative analysis of sex-ratio in India. We can see that sex ratio has steadily declined over the last century but it has not been able to challenge patriarchy. On the other hand, Nigeria is a strong patriarchal society which subjects women to male dominance and female subservience. Women are seen to belong to the home, and incapable of making sound decisions, Emordi (2016) argues that indigenous conjectural narrative such as *nwanyi si na azu anywu mamiri* (women that urinate from the back) and *(ama onye ozo)* those that belong to another person's compound are used to depict that women have smaller reasoning faculties than men, and are therefore deprived of property rights and inheritance in their father's estate in some communities in Nigeria. This perception of women explains why men often find it incredible and impracticable to women participating in politics. (Iloh and Ikenna 2009, Nda, 2003). After all, women have small brains having them in political leadership positions means deflating their ego by having a women with lesser brain to lead them.

Furthermore, patriarchal mindset and the skewed sex-ratio coupled with son-preference in India has had escalated women marginalization. Crimes against women have witnessed a steep rise over the years. Incidents of rape, molestation, sexual harassment, and dowry deaths, cruelty by husband and

relatives and assaults on women have increased. The worst condition is that even education which should have been empowering has not changed women position in India (Sengupta 2014). Looking at Table 2, in the appendix one may conclude that with the passage of time even though literacy percentage of women have increased from 25.68 in 1981 to 62.98 in 2015 (Statistics Portal, India). This data shows that crimes against women have increased rapidly, even though percentage of women literacy have also increased from 8.86 percent in 1951 (including rural and urban areas) to 64.63 percent in 2011 (Govt. of India 2017, 47). There is a similar situation in Nigeria, i.e. the culture of boy-child preference syndrome. Nigeria values the male child more than the female child. Women are perceived as subordinate to men leading to unequal rights, opportunities, and roles. Supporting this opinion, Okpalaobi (2011) and Perryman, et al., (2016) report that patriarchal cultures tend to frustrate the efforts of women activists who are striving for women's rights. The patriarchal culture limits women's roles to domestic chores. Makama (2013) references the common belief in Nigeria that 'the best place for women is in the kitchen'. Osunde and Olookoba (2014) argue that the Nigerian culture perceives and portrays women as weak and inferior to men and have their roles limited mainly to domestic chores and in most cases are often undervalued and underpaid at work. Collaborating this, Emordi (2016) argues that Nigeria is a patriarchal society with lots of conjectures that depict women as having small brains. Bakari and Leach (2007), contained that similar challenges are evident in the higher education system. According to him, traditional masculine culture is prevalent in Nigerian higher education. Dlamini and Adams (2014) note that the patriarchal system in higher education institutions is evident in the disempowerment of women who are portrayed and treated as inferior to men. According to Johnson (2014) women are confined to studying humanitarian courses and are relegated to care jobs and secretarial support services which are accorded less academic or professional value. A further study carried out by Bakari and Leach (2009), reports an alarming gap between women and men in 'literacy, school enrolments, a share of national income, and participation in the labour market and public offices'. The authors report that the patriarchal system prevails in colleges too because women are perceived as inferior to men and also due to 'the absence of a national or local policy or legal framework on gender equity, and weak enforcement of existing regulations and procedures'.

Women education: women education should be encouraged. The female girl should be properly educated. The education of women and girls need be taken seriously but both parents and government and other stakeholders of women empowerment. Education for women is a very veritable instrument to bridge

inequality of the sexes. Education is power and should be made available for women and girls even for free if the stakeholders must achieve the agenda of gender mainstreaming in all life endeavor. In India, the government started a pilot programme called *Beti Bachao-Beti Padhao* (Educate the daughter-save the daughter scheme) under the Ministry of Women and Child Welfare. This scheme has the twin motive of saving the girl child by legislating against sex-selective abortions and educating the girl child in order to empower them. (Ministry of Women and Child Welfare, India). Grants have also been sanctioned for working women hostels so enable women to move to places of work without facing the difficulties of safe housing and accommodation. Another scheme called the 'Support to Training and Employment Programme for Women (STEP) Scheme' has been functioning since 1986-87 as a 'Central Sector Scheme'. The STEP Scheme aims to provide skills that give employability to women above 16 years of age and to provide competencies and skill that enable women to become self-employed/entrepreneurs.

Government involvement through policy instrument: there is a need for legislation against the marginalization of women in education, employment, marriage politics culture, and religious practices. It will be easy to achieve gender equality and elimination of women marginalization through policy instrument than efforts made without government support.

The decade of 1990s was very eventful for women's movement in India. In 1990, the National Commission for Women was established with a mandate "to investigate and examine all matters relating to safeguards provided to women under the Indian Constitution and other law" (National Commission for Women Act 1990). The Domestic Violence against Women Bill was drafted in 1999 by the Women's Rights Initiative (Ghadially 2007, 22). This bill became an Act after the Indian Parliament passed it in 2005. On the work front, the Sexual harassment of Women in Workplace, Prohibition, Prevention and Redressal Act was passed in 2013. This was after a delay of twenty years as India was a signatory of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against women (CEDAW) in 1993. (Sexual Harassment Act of India, 2013). The passage of this bill saw the initiative of starting gender cells called "Women Development Cell" in colleges and universities to spread awareness among the youth about sexual harassment and how to redress it. Despite the passing of legislations on Domestic Violence 2005, Pre-Natal Diagnostic Technique Act 1994 and Sexual Harassment of women at workplace Act 2013, Indian women still lives life in an environment full of insecurity and violence. In India, it is not the inadequacy of laws but its effective implementation coupled with corrupt

administration and police that forces women in India to live a life of an unequal. The constitution of India guarantees equal rights to men and women but this is only on paper the real situation is far different. (Sengupta 2014, 1-2).

Women marginalization in Nigeria can be seen in different shades depending on the area researcher and stakeholders direct their spotlight of empowerment quest to. However, some of the factors militating against gender equality and women empowerment and gender equity in most communities using Nigeria and India as examples are highlighted below.

Customary laws and cultural practices: there is a need for the elimination and amendment of harsh cultural practices that are against women and their development. Some cultures in Nigeria are made with good intentions to strengthen homes like the female genital mutilation meant to discourage marital infidelity yet they have no social any economic benefits neither does it fulfill the purpose but are therefore hurtful to women. Such practices should be banned through legislation. Olateru-Olagbegi and Afolabi (2011) observe that both customary and religious laws in Nigeria have fallen short of protecting women's rights. For instance, the Islamic Sharia law and Igbo customary law discriminate against women in several ways. Although the issue of female subordination to males was also noted by the Minister for Women Affairs and Social Development in a message in the National Gender Policy FRN (Federal Republic of Nigeria) 2006), there she persists that discrimination in national and state statutes, customary and religious laws. Anyoha, Chikaire, and Nwakwasi (2015) identify cultural and religious customs and norms as causes of gender discrimination that restrict women's ability to develop and utilize their full potential.

Another cause for women marginalization is **early marriage of the girl child in Nigeria and child-marriages in India. Such practices should be discouraged and declared illegal and the** female child should be encouraged to go to school or learn a vocation. Compulsory primary and secondary school education need be encouraged. This period of schooling and learning a vocation will enable the girl child to be matured before being married to a man. Maturity will also help to eliminate the incident of Visco Virginal Fistula (VVF) from immature girls getting married to men like the fathers.

Again, in Nigeria, customs, traditions, sexual stereotyping of social roles and cultural prejudice are barriers to women enjoying their rights and full participation on an equal basis with men counterparts in national development. As earlier stated, cultural traditions and religious ideologies play a significant

role in women marginalization. This is as a result of the patriarchal mindset that promotes female subordination to men and limits their active participation in employment and broader society. Religion in Nigeria is intricately intertwined with the cultural, socio-economic, and political lives of people. Dormekpor (2015) notes that religion is a complex issue that has a strong influence on the behavior of the individual which stems and links to traditional norms, the formulation and enforcement of national and regional laws. In a study of gender equality in Nigeria, Para-Mallam (2010) stressed that Christianity and Islam, the two predominant religious beliefs, penetrate all aspects of the life of the people through social, cultural, and political traditions.

The Interplay of Religion, Politics, and Laws

Megahed (2011) confirms the above aggravate gender discrimination. Morrison and Jutting (2005) stretched that women marginalization also tend to lead to underdevelopment of the women folk. Owoyemi and Olusanya (2014) state that gender segregation and seclusion in Islam or submission to men in Christianity are factors that promote discrimination against women. Both religions define the acceptable roles for women and limit their active participation in society thereby fostering marginalization and inequality, impeding the implementation of CEDAW and women's development.

The Media

The media is another sphere which depicts women marginalization. Oyinate et al. observe that since the inception of Nigerian mainstream media, men have dominated it. Anyanwu (2001) notes that 'in Nigerian newspapers, women are seen, not heard' as media still churn out stereotypical female issues that limit the power of women in society. Also, their voices are not aired or heard on matters like 'politics, economy, technology, commerce, and industry or even crime. Pictures of women found in the Nigerian media, primarily and most times promote their domestic and sexual qualities. For instance, in the print media particularly, in the use of content and placement, women are portrayed as something to be trivialized or sexualized. They are usually presented with negative or inappropriate images. Amobi (2013) argues that Nigerian media is devoid of gender parity, as women are typically ignored or denied and those that strive to be visible; they are confronted with biases and negative stereotypes. They are usually offered 'supportive roles for natural order' with little voice, thereby making them vulnerable. Referring to Fab-Ukozor (2004), Amobi reports that media coverage is gender biased because women are not part of the

group responsible for setting the agenda in Nigerian media.

Military Incursion into Politics

If colonialism kick-started the castration of women's participation in politics, the incursion of the military into political life amplified it. When the military sacked the democratically elected administration of the first republic in the infant hours of 1966, it mutilated all existing democratic structures and swapped them with undemocratic ones. This was accompanied with the suspension of the republican constitution of 1963. As regimes change, nothing was put in place to uplift the position of women and accord them any semblance of recognition. As Okeke (1997) aptly put it, the military, which was patterned after the British, had an inconsequential role for women. During this period, women were victims of a colossal setback as it was the case during the heyday of colonialism. During Babangida's regime, the nominal representation of women was extended to all strata in the socio-economic sectors. During his regime no women held posts in the federal executive council or the Armed Force Ruling Council (AFRC). The highest ruling body under his watch remained exclusive to men. Williams (1997) noted that the rationale behind this was **not recondite: no women** occupied the senior combatant positions in the military top echelon or its equivalent in other branches of the armed forces.

Conclusion/summary

From available literature, women marginalization can be referred to as the extant written and unwritten discriminatory processes, patterns, and perceptions of access to power and opportunities available to women against those of their male counterparts in the society. The processes and patterns are rooted in patriarchy which manifests through culture, customs, and traditions, customary and religious laws, the interplay of religion, politics, and laws, the media and military incursion into politics as in Nigeria. Nigeria and India are countries in different continents with diversity in religion, caste, class, languages spoken and culture. The cultural diversity of India is reflected in all spheres of life. It is imperative to mention that women in India is a highly heterogeneous group belonging to high class and caste, lower castes and Dalits (subordinated caste in the Hindu caste system), there is urban-rural divide among women, educated and uneducated ones. But for the purpose of this chapter we take 'women' as one diverse group. In Nigeria customs, traditions, sexual stereotyping of social roles and cultural prejudice are barriers to women enjoying their rights and full participation on an equal basis with men counterparts in national development. Also, customary and religious laws

Olateru-Olagbegi and Afolabi (2011) observe have fallen short of protecting women's rights. The interplay of religion, politics, and laws was Megahed (2011) posited aggravate gender discrimination. Morrison and Jutting (2005) stretched that they lead to underdevelopment of the womenfolk. The media is another sphere which depicts women marginalization which was observed by Oyinade et al., men has been at the mainstream of Nigerian media since its inception. As Anyanwu (2001) notes that in the Nigerian newspapers, women are seen, not heard' as media still churn out stereotypical female issues that limit the power of women in society and military incursion into politics which was seen to amplified women marginalization especially in politics. Education is seen as an effective tool by many scholars to combat discrimination and violence against women as education enables women to be economically self-dependent. The paper women marginalization in Nigeria and Asia revealed that women marginalization is beyond borders. In all nations and continents and it has no colour but rooted in culture and patriarchy which can be curbed through socialization , advocacy and education However, education is not enough to change and age long tradition. Societal change is necessary to bring in a change in perception about women and her position in society.

Women and Political Representation in India and Nigeria

In the area of Politics; in 2014 and 2015, Nigeria had only 6.7% and 5.6% respectively of women's representation in parliament (World Bank 2016). Statistics as shown in table 1 in the appendix reveals that party politics and governance throughout post-colonial Nigeria has been marked by a striking exclusion and marginalization of women in politics. It is quite paradoxical that the number of women contesting elections has gone up from 45 in 1957 to 668 in 2014 general elections to the Indian Parliament but the winning percentage has declined from 60 percent in 1957 to 9.3 percent in 2014. (Govt. of India 2017, 101). This trend shows that women in decision making position have declined steeply. The scenario is even worse in state assemblies of India. The highest percentage share of women ministers in the state assemblies is 14 percent in Haryana, Rajasthan and Bihar whereas it is least at zero percent in Nagaland, Mizoram and Puducherry where there is not a single women minister and member since the last elections between 2013-2016. (Govt. of India, 2017, 104).

Consequently, the role of women in Nigeria's post-independent politics has not been reflected adequately, concerning appointments in policy-making posts and other political offices. In support of this claim is the statistics released by the World Economic Forum (WEF 2014) which depicts a wide gender gap in

Nigerian politics. The dominance of Patriarchy in political parties is made manifest in godfatherism, indigeneship, intra-party rigging, political violence, thuggery as well as high level of intimidation (INEC, 2006).

Supporting the argument of INEC (2006), Mofoluwawo (2014) notes that women are marginalized in Nigerian politics. According to him, the act of discrimination against women is a waste of human resources as women constitute about half the population of Nigeria and play essential roles in the society. He further laments how in the recent times, the notable roles played by women in pre-colonial and pre-independence Nigerian politics have 'come under severe strain leading to a complete relegation if not total absence in the political sphere in Nigeria'. Oyinade, et al., (2013) maintained that women failed almost woefully in politics as few women have gained access to the highest, male-dominated level of legislative activity in Nigeria' (Oyinade, Daramola, and Lamidi 2013). Despite the massive support given by women to various political parties in colonial and post-colonial Nigeria they were relegated to the background until recently when very few women benefited from political patronage.

Similarly in 1992, Indian Parliament passed the Panchayati Raj and the Municipal Corporation Act. These two Acts implementing grassroot elected offices in rural and urban regions respectively, reserved 33 percent seats for women. This condition of reservation which was initially called a 'pati-raj' (or husband rule) in the name of the wife as she can only stand for elections from seats reserved for women candidates has in the past two decades shown quite positive result, with women finally emerging out of the wings of their male counterparts-husbands, fathers etc, and feeling empowered yet the 'patriarchal constitution of the Indian society' has not been crushed (De Costa 2010, 99). The women wing of almost all political parties, feminist groups, scholars have been struggling to get a 33 percent reservation extend up to the state assemblies and the Indian parliament which will enable at least 33 percent women will be members of Parliament but this bill has been in doldrums with no political party interested in passing the reins of power to women.

In Nigeria, men constitute a large percentage of party membership, which in turn tends to affect women when it comes to selecting or electing candidates for elections. Since men are usually more prominent in the political party hierarchy, they tend to dominate the political hierarchy and are therefore an advantage in influencing the party's internal politics (Leadership, 2010). To maintain the gender gap, the legislature which is dominated by men in 2016,

rejected the gender and equality opportunities bill on the argument and pretext that it was inconsistent with the religious and cultural beliefs of Muslims and Christians. This bill included provisions such as women 'shall not be subjected to inhuman, humiliating or degrading treatment' and 'shall have the right to an equitable share in the inheritance of the property of her husband.' It also affirmed the commitment to women's right to be actively involved in political activities including the right to vote and be eligible for all publicly elected offices without any restrictions (Payton 2016). Arowolo and Aluko (2010), concluded that based on culture and tradition, women face resistance from participating in politics.

However, women seem to acquiesced themselves to the situation by exhibiting the pedagogy of the oppressed and become consenting parties to their marginalization as they police their own marginalization (Emordi 2010). Arowolo and Aluko (2010) also stressed that women believed that politics would prevent them from taking care of their families. The significant reasons preventing them from going into politics were identified as follows; fear of broken homes, breeding irresponsible children and the need to perform their domestic activities. Also, other reasons include violence, thuggery, intimidation, and money politics (Arowolo and Aluko 2010). This is the reason women could need special kind of support and encouragement to overcome the seemingly unsurmountable challenges facing women.

Positive discrimination and economic independence of women: men are early starters long before women were generally enfranchised in Nigeria, to engender gender equality and parity is to positively discriminate women in politics by ensuring that women occupy at least for percent appointive and elective position in leadership and governance. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (2016), between 2010 and 2016, women's unemployment rate was 4.7% compared to men's 5.6% in 2010. In addition to this, in the second quarter of 2016, the rate of unemployment for women was 15.3% compared to 11.5% for men. These statistics explain the steady rise in gender gap for unemployment. To complement this stance, Olaogun, Adebayo, and Oluyemo (2015) decried gender imbalances at both national and regional levels in different professional sectors. Ezeifeka and Osakwe (2013) note that women are generally sidelined on national issues and are not hired in senior posts in government offices. Similarly, Ekpe, Aloba, and John (2014) lament the under-representation of women in the national legislature in Nigeria in addition to their poor economic and social representation. Today, the number of women in the top job is still insignificant.

Although crimes against women have risen by more than 100 percent from 1957 till 2016 in India, the number of women judges in Supreme Court remains insignificant with one women judge out of total 24 permanent judges (Government of India 2017, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation). The situation in the High Courts is slightly better with Delhi and Sikkim having 27 and 33 percent women judges, respectively. In the Indian Administrative Services, the highest civilian office in India, women constitute 838 posts whereas men are occupying 4088 as of 2016 (Department of Personnel and Training India). Hence, not only are women meagre represented in politics but also in judiciary and administrative services. This skewed women representation has a negative impact on women's development. Economic independence is one of the most significant tools for women empowerment but till date women are not provided with the opportunities to rise up and develop. As mentioned earlier, India did introduce women quota i.e one-third seat in the local government mechanisms i.e. panchayati raj and municipal corporations, are reserved for women. But the similar kind of reservation has been stalled for representation in state and centre legislatures. None of the political parties in India have been keen to introduce this bill.

Summary

The chapter; *Women Marginalization in Nigeria and Asia* has shown that factors such as patriarchy, political representation, government involvement, policy instruments; customary laws discriminate against women, Positive discrimination and economic independence as well as types of regime in power affect women empowerment in politics another facets of life endeavor. However, the role of education in the empowerment of women cannot be over emphasized. Education is power and well-rounded education can be seen as a bridge that will connect women to all other areas of power. With good education for majority of women they will be able to form a formidable force against all other forms of women marginalization. Women are easily manipulated by men to succumb to culture, religion, patriarchy and domesticity due to lack of education and awareness. This is why education and awareness cannot be taken lightly in the fight for gender equality. Knowing fully well that women are subordinated in both societies through patriarchy which is so much embedded and enshrined in the mindset of men starting from childhood through socialization. To dismantle this, there is a need for aggressive education, advocacy and awareness campaign for women to take the challenge to educate their girls and educate their boys to respect and treat women with dignity. The men also need to understand the enormous benefits of women empowerment.

This step is urgent because even in India regardless of caste and religious affinities there remains a huge preference for the male child. Female child is considered a burden due to spending on marriage and dowry.

Emordi (2016) argues that indigenous conjectural narrative such as *nwanyi si na azu anywu mamiri* (women that urinate from the back) and *(ama onye ozo)* those that belong to another person's compound are used to depict that women have smaller reasoning faculties than men, and are therefore deprived of property rights and inheritance in their father's estate in some communities in Nigeria. Patriarchal mindset and the skewed sex-ratio coupled with son-preference in India has had escalated women marginalization. Crimes against women have witnessed a steep rise over the years. Incidents of rape, molestation, sexual harassment, and dowry deaths, cruelty by husband and relatives and assaults on women have increased. The worst condition is that even education which should have been empowering has not changed women position in India (Sengupta 2014).

Women education: women education should be encouraged. The female girl should be properly educated. The education of women and girls need be taken seriously but both parents and government and other stakeholders of women empowerment. Education for women is a very veritable instrument to bridge inequality of the sexes. Education is power and should be made available for women and girls even for free if the stakeholders must achieve the agenda of gender mainstreaming in all life endeavor. In India, the government started a pilot programme called *Beti Bachao-Beti Padhao* (Educate the daughter-save the daughter scheme) under the Ministry of Women and Child Welfare. In summary women constitute about 50 percent of the population both in Nigeria and India therefore, marginalizing them in any form is equivalent to missing the veritable contribution they would have brought to the table for the development of their countries, consequently as argued by Emordi 2019 any country that marginalizes women is like an airplane flying on one wing and such aircraft can easily crashed (Emordi 2109)

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Appendix

Tables 1. Gender Distribution in Selected Political Offices in Nigeria (1999 – 2015)

Years	Political Offices					
	Senate		House of Representatives		States of Assemblies	
	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)
	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)
1999	106 (97.2)	3 (1.8)	347 (96.4)	13 (3.6)	966 (98.8)	12 (1.21)
2003	105 (96.3)	4 (3.7)	318 (94.2)	21 (5.8)	912 (96.0)	39 (4.0)
2007	100 (91.7)	9 (8.3)	333 (92.5)	27 (7.5)	936 (94.5)	54 (5.5)
2011	101 (92.7)	8 (7.3)	335 (93.1)	25 (6.9)	922 (93.1)	68 (6.9)
2015	102 (93.6)	7 (6.4)	346 (96.1)	14 (3.9)	NA	NA

Adapted with modification from Aina (2012)

Table 2. Sex ratio in India

Year	Females per 1000 males
1901	972
1911	964
1921	955
1931	950
1941	945
1951	946
1961	941
1971	930
1981	934
1991	927
2001	933

Source: Constructed by the author from Census of India 2001, Statement 18.

Table 3. Crime against women in India 2001-2014

Year	Rape	Kidnapping and abduction	Dowry deaths	Assault on women modesty	Cruelty by husband/relatives	Cases under dowry prohibition	Indecent representation	Total
2001	16075	14645	6822	44098	49237	3222	1052	
2004	18233	15578	7026	44568	58121	3592	1378	
2006	19348	17414	7618	46583	63128	4504	1562	
2010	22172	29795	8391	50574	94041	5182	895	
2014	36735	57311	8455	91970	122877	10050	---	

Source: Constructed by author from National Crime Record Bureau data 2001-2014



Women and Organised Crimes in Africa: A Review

Funmilayo Idowu Agbaje*

Abstract

In Africa, Organised crimes are perceived and mostly generalized as men's preoccupation. Even though scholarly attention has been paid to men as actors in organised crime, there is inadequate data on women's involvement in the vice. Indeed, while the number of African women participating in organised crime had been low in the past, recent participation has been growing and increasing. Despite this trend in criminality, the roles played by women in organised crimes continue to be underrepresented in studies and public policy. Also, investigations and documentation on this subject are limited due to the paucity of data. Thus, this paper examines extant literature to establish the complexity of women's involvement in organized crimes. It further interrogates the perpetual representation of women as victims of crimes rather than as actors. The paper engendered criminality while seeking the attention of scholars and policymakers on the security implications of overlooking women in organised crimes in Africa. It discusses the dual but fluctuating roles played by women in contemporary African crime.

Key Words: Women, Organised Crime, Security, Africa

Introduction

In Africa, the involvement of women in organized crimes has not been given adequate attention in scholarship and public policy discourse. The reason for this oversight is not far-fetched from the male's dominance in several criminal economies in the region. Organised crimes, therefore, are perceived and mostly generalized as men's preoccupation (Langford and MacKinnon, 2000:35). This

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paper seeks to provide a more detailed analysis of organized crimes through a gender lens by providing an understanding of the diverse roles played by women. The paper examines extant literature to establish the complexity of women's involvement in organized crimes. It further interrogates the perpetual representation of women as victims of crimes rather than as actors. Highlights of this review are focused on the existing narratives on women in scholarly works, especially while discussing drug trafficking, arms trafficking, smuggling, human trafficking, kidnapping, and cybercrime among several other vices. The paper also discusses the use of violence by women, a behaviour hitherto attributed to men. This paper will serve as reference materials to scholars and policymakers and will allow for policy development that is sensitive to gender roles in criminality rather than the usual stereotypical and exclusive idea that women are all-time victims and also, mere accomplices to men in committing crimes.

Undoubtedly, organised crime is a major threat confronting many African countries. While the number of women participating in organised crime had been low in the past, recent participation has been growing and increasing. Intense criminal activities have been recorded in countries like South Africa, Nigeria, Uganda, Liberia, and Ethiopia among others with a significant increase in female prisoners (Aldhous, 2008: 2; Badmus, 2009:20). Despite this trend in criminality, the roles played by women in organised crimes continue to be underrepresented in studies and public policy. Also, investigations and documentation on this subject are limited due to the paucity of data. Another reason for the scarcity of information is situated in the over-generalisation and stereotypical categorisation of females' status in society. For example, women are viewed as weak and all naturally good sex when compared to men (Brett, 2002:5) and thus, may lack the propensity for crime and when involved, may do so as an accomplice to a spearheading male figure. In other words, women are perceived as purveyors of sex incapable of making an independent decision to commit a crime. Nevertheless, there is literature (Eagly, 2009:649) on how women are not only victims but also, in some cases, are the active criminal protagonist. This paper discusses the dual but fluctuating roles played by women in contemporary African crime.

Conceptual Clarifications: Organised Crime

Organized crime is a general term used to describe any group or cluster of people who strategically work together to commit fraud, extortion, or other illegal activity (Henry, 2022:1). These groups are driven by moneymaking goals

achieved through power and control. In addition, organised crime has been defined as individuals, groups, clans, and/or networks who intentionally commit illegal acts including cybercrimes; money laundering; human, arms, and drug trafficking; counterfeiting; illegal gambling; and extortion; among many other crimes in an effort to enrich themselves, gain influence (Macionis, G. and John, 2010:206). The dynamics can be local, international, or political in nature. Organised crime, therefore, is a global security threat and engendering the scope of tackling it is not out of place in contemporary Africa. Organised crime can take any form; Racketeering, human organ, drug and arms trafficking, counterfeiting, cybercrime and smuggling among several others.

Gender and Organised Crime

Gender is neither informed by sex or nature but by social construct. In other words, society dictates attributed roles to individuals based on their biological make-up. Thus, gender informs the ways women act and interact in society. These roles are either legal and/or illegal in some cases. Given the age-long discrimination experienced by African women due to the entrenched patriarchal system, it is not out of place to discuss some of the psycho-social underlining issues responsible for women's involvement in a crime. Women have been documented as either a sole-decisive criminals due to poverty, association with criminal gangs (lover, friend or family member) and through conscription. Increasingly, studies attributing women's lesser involvement in crime largely to their assumed lack of courage, piety, maternity, sexuality and limited intelligence are fast becoming a thing of the past. Recent studies are employing gender as a category of analysis rather than sex (Kriegler, 2012:1-2).

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2015:np), the use of an intersectional, gender-based approach in crime analysis allows for more nuanced explanations of the participation of men and women in crime, and the ways their roles are often connected to the long-standing, structural conditions they face. It is the understanding of gender itself and the implication for the society thereof. Engendering crime commission from intersectionality perspectives can further unpack not only the reasons behind criminality but also, how men and women are impacted differently by crime. Periscoping gender norms and their effects on both women and men can create a better understanding of the complex ways through which power relations burden the society. It will further reveal the need for urgent engagement of people in reflections about inequalities and change irrespective of their gender or sex.

In Africa, four types of organised crime have been discovered (Shaw, 2018:1)

thus; gang or mafia -style criminals that tend to use violent methods, subtle but complex criminal networks specialised in moving illicit products and resources, militias or armed groups and cybercriminals. According to Shaw, the four identified categories are all evolving in different ways with some overlap between them. Moreover, they affect the citizens in each country of Africa in different ways. Nevertheless, women, in all these four categories, tend to occupy passive subordinates and also, more active, powerful roles (Selmini, 2020: 339-383). More specifically, Campbell (2016:2) emphasises the need to expand the debate on organised crime to include the depiction of women involved as truly autonomous and thus dangerous women rather than of the prevalent supporting and wilfully blind partner figure. In essence, in the face of global and regional gender emancipation and equality, there is a need to revisit and reconstruct some of the sociological and cultural mind-set on women.

Historically, African women were known as peaceful and associated with pacifist roles. According to scholars (Green, 1964:200; Nnaemeka, 2005:31; McFadden, 1999: 55-80), they tried to restore social equilibrium when anti-social behaviour was on the increase. The changes that occur over time have been associated with an economy driven by an increased quest for personal gains rather than the economy of necessities of the past (Chukuezi, 2006:1-5). For example, in Nigeria, the emergence of private property as a result of the capitalist mode of production encouraged corrupt practices during the First Republic of Nigeria (Turner, 1978:166). The greed to accumulate personal wealth is equated to illegality and crime. Furthermore, Chukuezi (2006:1-5) attributed increased women in organised crime in Africa to growing poverty in the region hence the need for survival may cause a woman to resort to corruption. In other words, an individual's value to society is based on their economic worth (Stanojoska, 2015:1-2). African women have been documented to be increasingly involved in the following crimes.

Human Trafficking

Human trafficking, which can either be domestic or international is one of the areas where female criminals are versatile. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2018:np) describes human trafficking as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, utilizing the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion (including abduction, fraud, deception), abuse of power or a position of vulnerability or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for exploitation (sexual exploitation, forced labour, slavery, organ harvesting etc. Human trafficking, according to Hemmings et al.

(2016:1-10), is a social issue of growing concern across the globe. He gave the estimated number of individuals affected by human trafficking worldwide at 20.9 million people. He further describes it as the fastest-growing organized crime and the third-largest income revenue stream for the systematized crime after narcotics and arms sales.

In Africa, it has been reported that over 9.2 million people are living in modern slavery (Global Slavery Index, 2018). That means, at 40.3 million individuals across the globe, twenty three percent of global human trafficking takes place in Africa. Evidently, human trafficking is a huge problem in Africa. In other words, human trafficking is endemic in the African region. Some of the identified causes of human trafficking are poor economic conditions, violent conflict and territorial displacement and humanitarian and environmental crisis (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2019). Germane to this paper is the fact that fifty percent of traffickers in Africa are females (Obokata, 2019: 530-552). This is interesting as the majority of trafficked persons are females. Scholars have also revealed the involvement of sophisticated criminal groups that further make human trafficking a dangerous enterprise (Obokata, 2006:10; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 2007:684). Countries such as Burundi, Eritrea, Central Africa Republic Mauritania, South Sudan, Nigeria, Ghana, Malawi and some other African nations have been listed as nations involved in modern slavery (African Sisters Education Collaborative, 2022). In addition, Chadwick (2019:1-2) mentions that in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Ghana, girls as young as eight years old are sold out –basically into forced marriages. Also, it is not uncommon for traffickers to have a 'madam' (usually a woman who manages the sexual exploitations of trafficked victims) and a 'bottom' (a female supervisor in charge of trafficked person) or a 'nurse' (a woman who trafficked babies or young girls for procreation) (Sharedhope International, 2022:np). This is in accordance with Siegel and Sylvia de Blank's (2010) position that female traffickers can be divided into three categories thus; supporters, partners and Madams. They maintain that African Madams hold key positions in international human trafficking. Even though human trafficking is a gendered crime and the happenings in society continually point to the fact that women are playing leading roles in human trafficking networks, more research is needed in the area.

Drug Dealing

Just like any organised crime, female drug dealers are often perceived as few, marginalised and victimised in most cases. However, it has been established in the literature that these women, though faced with difficulties and obstacles,

can be very successful in drug dealing (Grundetjern and Sandberg, 2012:630). The success of female drug dealers has been attributed to several strategies. First, the women desexualize the business by avoiding any intimate relationships with male colleagues. They are emotionally detached and often strike a violent posture reinforced by violent language. Also, they are service-minded by being reliable, confident and fast in delivery (Rushforth and Willis, 2003:2-4). This is contrary to early studies' positioning of women as passive members of the drug dealing business (Adler, 1993:170; Covington, 1985:329-352; Steffensmeier and Allan, 1996:459-487). In essence, the women bring to bear, their gendered characteristics as skilful and competent dealers (Anderson, 2005:381). Denton and Malley (1999:513-529) emphasise the importance of skills and orientations associated with familial relations as contrary to some of the violent strategies postulated earlier as key factors in the female drug dealing business. Nevertheless, while African newspapers, magazines and the internet are filled with news of female drug dealers (Face of Malawi, 2018; Africa Press, 2022; Rondganger, 2020:np), there is a scarcity of literature on women as sole proprietors in the drugs business. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (UNODC, 2018), posits that the range of drugs and drug markets is expanding and diversifying beyond the hitherto known dynamics including the males' domination of drug crimes. Against this backdrop, there is a need for more scholarly works on female drug dealing especially in Africa. The statistics of females' involvement, the dynamics and strategies are yet to be properly investigated beyond mere assumptions and news headlines. This paper thus posits that it is insufficient to not only know that more women are engaging in organised crimes such as drug dealing but also, is a need to interrogate the factors responsible, the changing gendered roles and the need to employ gender in analysing crimes by scholars and policymakers.

Cybercrime

Cybercrime is another organised crime gaining prominence in today's world, especially in Africa. The trajectory of documenting actors in this crime has not fully captured the gender narratives to it. Meanwhile, extant studies have extensively discussed the victimisation of women by gender criminals (Halder and Jaishankar, 2012:264; Agbaje, 2021: 140-154; Nixon, 2014:143-158). Some other literature is focused on how women are either not part of or are involved in the securitisation of the web (Nolan, 2021:2; Morgan and DI, 2019:6). However, while scholarly attention has been given to how women are victimised online, the area of women as perpetrators is waiting for adequate attention. For example, Soré (2008:np) discovers that women in Burkina Faso

are as many victims as perpetrators. According to her, this was a phenomenon that affected all towns with an internet connection. In a similar vein, Shaw (2018:2-4) mentions that Cybercrime in today's Africa is, across the board, becoming bolder and more advanced; not only in how victims are targeted but also in the amount of money sought. This includes some of the emerging gender complexities to the vice. For example, it is common to find '*Yahoo boys*' (popular terms for young males involved in cybercrimes) in Africa. In contrast, there is no such popularity for female cyber fraudsters despite their existence on the continent. Meanwhile, a report by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2014) states that cybercrime activities were increasing at a more rapid rate in Africa than anywhere else in the world. Similarly, Rossouw, Mulder and Barkhuysen (2000:885-895) note the detrimental effects of fraud on the economy and how it impacts the profitability and reputability of the affected organizations. One of the reasons for this increase in criminal networks is linked to the weak information and technology infrastructure resulting in the proliferation of threats from ransomware, social media scams and new malware (Shaw, 2018:3). Noteworthy is the fact that the number of female fraudsters has risen in recent years along with the boom in global e-commerce and e-banking systems (Saporta and Soreff, 2019:1). Thus, the trustworthy face of a 'harmless woman' can be highly deceptive in today's changing world. Identifying criminals as criminals irrespective of their sex might yield a more regulated and peaceful society.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper has established the fact that the behaviours of women and men are socially constructed rather than natural or biological. Thus, it has been empirically proven that African females' involvement in organized crime goes beyond victimisation or relational perspectives. Rather, it has been discovered that women can also be active participants and even, the leader of criminal gangs. The majority of identified reasons for women's involvement in organised crime are centred on socio-economic factors arising from poverty and precarious living conditions. Nevertheless, others join due to the existence of family, friends and acquaintances within criminal groups. In much of the scholarly analysis of women and organised crime as reviewed in this paper, it is a widely accepted claim that women make up the minority of criminals in Africa albeit with much less academic and policy attention being paid to the dynamics of gender-disaggregated data necessary support and draw insights from such a conclusion. However, while it is generally acknowledged that the number of women in organised crime in Africa is low as in many countries in the world,

this paper suggests is worth noting that women are also actors in the vice. The conscious acknowledgement of gender parity in organised crime is necessary for its successful reduction and eventual eradication. The challenge lies in the fact that there is very little disaggregated data available that can provide detailed and clear gender maps of involvement in the issue.

In essence, engendering security issues involves incorporating gender equality concerns in programming and policy-making as well as supporting initiatives for men and women to participate in decision making at different levels (Bush, 1995:50). If the goal is to protect vulnerable and disproportionately targeted populations irrespective of their sex, then it is important to understand who composes the aggressors and targeted populations. The inclusion of gender perspectives in the analysis of crime and crime commission in Africa can be beneficial not only to a better understanding of the evolving criminal dynamics but also to the linkages between gender, criminality and security. In addition, a comprehensive gender approach beyond a mere focus on men as sole perpetrators of criminal activities in Africa can allow for more targeted programming in the African security architecture. Finally, understanding the trends in crime commission by using gender as a lens can sharpen the focus of future scholars and researchers, security personnel and policymakers and hence, foster sustainable peace, security and development.

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Perspectives on Ethical Standards in Nigeria's Bureaucratic System

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Abstract

The bureaucracy is the linchpin of government administration. The processes of governance are executed through the bureaucratic machinery; hence, the necessity for ensuring the existence of functional and competent bureaucratic system is paramount for any government. Upon Nigeria's attainment of political independence from Britain in 1960, the political elites found Weberian bureaucratic model suitable for government administration. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of the system have been hampered by both socially-constructed attitudinal and behavioural patterns, and politically-motivated institutional constraints. The consequence is the low ethical standards in the institutional processes, structures and management of the bureaucracy. This development is directly connected with the manifest debased value of Nigeria's public space. The character of the value system impacts sufficiently on the bureaucratic system. In this regard, this article contends that negative societal values have been fed into the bureaucratic system, and have been deep enough to alter the positive direction the bureaucracy was positioned to tread. The article deploys the descriptive method to interrogate the actual and remote causes, and the manifest and latent consequences of the absence of ethical standards in Nigeria's bureaucratic system. In the final analysis, recommendations about social reorientation geared towards overhauling the bureaucratic system for the attainment of optimal performance for the benefits of government are proffered.

Keywords: Bureaucracy; Ethical Standards; Nigeria; Value; Weberian system.

Introduction

A bureaucratic system is embedded in the nature of the society it serves; for the bureaucracy's role is to respond to input from its operational environment. Thus, the culture, norms, and value preferences of the society are reflected in the processes, management, and systems of bureaucracy. In this article, we are poised to interrogate the significance of ethical standards in bureaucracy, within the context of the Nigerian environment. It is therefore apposite to examine the critical variables that bear direct impact on ethical standards within the Nigerian state. For this purpose, we shall highlight the constituents of Nigeria's feature as a post-colonial, and third-world heterogeneous state. The understanding of the post-colonial history and extant realities of the Nigerian state would shed light on the internal workings and output of the Nigerian bureaucracy.

Having established that the social environment (political, cultural, and economic systems) play significant roles in either undermining or elevating the performance of the bureaucracy, we therefore isolate relevant variables within the Nigerian social environment that have impacted on the ethical standards within the bureaucracy. Specifically, this article examines the roles of informal and institutional constraints on bureaucratic processes. Furthermore, the examination of the constraints is juxtaposed against the "Nigerian version" of the Weberian model of bureaucratic practises.

The analysis is driven by the theories of ethics. The theories of ethics provide sufficient grounds for understanding the extent to which ethical standards play important role in the practice and processes of Nigeria's bureaucracy. The article deploys the following; Utilitarian and Deontological theories of ethics for the analysis. The relevance of the theories is drawn from the interconnectedness of individual and group responsibilities in the attainment of ethical standards in any society. In effect, the theories emphasise consequence-based and duty-based pursuits of ethical standards.

The article commences with the introduction, and this is followed by the explanation of the theories of ethics, and their application to the issues of bureaucratic effectiveness and efficiency in Nigeria. The third part examines some of the critical features of the Nigerian state, followed by the structure and processes of Nigeria's bureaucratic system; this part seeks to highlight the direct connection between the society and its bureaucracy. The outcome of the character of the Nigerian state is reflected in both the informal and

constitutional constraints on bureaucracy. Finally, the features of the Weberian model are assessed against Nigeria's realities in order to emphasize the connection between low ethical standards and the poor performance of the bureaucracy. In conclusion, recommendations are made for the proper functioning of the Nigerian bureaucracy.

The Role of Ethics in Society

Both the pre-modern and modern societies are assemblages of humans that organise themselves according to mutually agreed rules and guidelines. Despite the distinction about the communal living of the pre-modern times, and the more individualistic tendencies of the modern times, the societies pursued similar overarching guiding principles of consistently retaining their existence through self-preservation, self-sufficiency, and self-protection. This is achieved by setting rules and standards for both internal moderation of interactions, and the relationships with the external environment.

The internal standards are derivatives of lived customs, conventions, norms, and values that have developed to the state of general principles in the society. The processes of the physical interpretations of the acceptable general principles are based on ethical standards or codes. Ethical codes are therefore basic acceptable standards of behaviour that are generally acceptable to those that live by them, and desire to preserve them. According to Bannister (2018, 31): "Ethics is commonly understood to refer to the values and principles that guide behaviours towards others". The basic role of ethics is to "assign the 'goodness' or 'badness' of sets of particular acts" (Slobodkin, 1993: 339). Despite the acknowledgement that ethics distinguishes between good and bad, ethical codes and standards may not be backed by legislation in the form of reward and punishment, but still be sufficiently weighty to court either the respect or condemnation of the people within the society. In most cases, disrespect for ethical standards may lead to public shaming, such as categorisation of those that break the codes of ethics as delinquents or undesirables. In some other circumstances, disrespect for ethical standards may lead to legal prosecution and eventual appropriate punishment meted to the guilty party. For instance, a part of the ethical codes for professional researchers prohibits plagiarism, and individuals found guilty of the act are liable for prosecution to the full extent of the law.

The philosophy of ethics does not exist in isolation; it is grounded in well-proven and articulate theories that examine its relevance, and also ways by

which ethics can provide collective direction for societies. Essentially, it has its origins in moral philosophy, with great intellectuals like Socrates, Locke and Aristotle articulating the frameworks of the theories that have guided the intellectual tradition of ethics since the ancient times. The theories of ethics are wide and varied; however, Graham (2011) provides pathways for understanding the variations. In the case of the public sphere for instance, attention is drawn to ethical theories that analyse the standard expectations of public officers in the discharge of their official responsibilities. The suitable theories for this research on bureaucracy are; the Utilitarian and the Deontological theories of ethics because they specifically speak to core behavioural patterns and attitudes. While utilitarianism examines the consequences of actions and inactions, deontology examines how duty compels actions and inactions.

John Stuart Mill is widely acknowledged as providing the intellectual basis for the utilitarian theory of ethics. In the authoritative work, "Utilitarianism", Mill (1863, 9-10) explains that "utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness". The utilitarian theory of ethics captures the essence of humanity within the public sphere through a focus on the consequences of rendering services (good or bad) to the greatest number of people. According to Mill (1863, 16):

Utilitarianism, therefore could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefitted by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit.

The utilitarian theory of ethics rests on the notion that our common humanity would be best served if the highest ethical codes are maintained in the course of our professional conduct. As Radek and Singer (2017, xix) assert: "Utilitarianism pushes us to examine the boundaries of our moral thinking, and consider the interests of those we often leave out of our concern". It is explained in a more succinct form thus:

The core precept of utilitarianism is that we should make the world the best place we can. That means that, as far as it is within our power, we should bring about a world in which every individual has the highest possible level of well-being (Radek and Singer, 2017: 1).

Furthermore, utilitarianism posits that there are consequences for the actions we take. Invariably, every good and public-spirited action robs off positively on the society at large, while the consequences of a negative action similarly *writ large*. The utilitarian theory explicates *how* and *why* public officers should operate on high moral grounds and thus be above board in the quest for the attainment of common good.

The deontological theory of ethics is also embedded in moral philosophy. Deontology has its origin in Greek intellectual tradition, with *deon* meaning duty, while *logos* means science. The theory was made popular by Immanuel Kant through his works on public morality. The deontological theory of ethics is focussed on the examination of actions that may be “prohibited, or obligatory, irrespective of the consequences of performing them” (Tannsjo, 2008: 59). Deontological ethics is duty-based, in that it explains moral expectations despite the absence of consequences for actions or inactions. The emphasis is on the realisation of what individuals ought to do, but not necessarily because of the consequences attached to wrongful behaviour. Tannsjo (2008, 60-61) quotes Kant thus:

There is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative and it is this: act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.

The deontological theory of ethics is therefore adequate for interrogating the actions or inactions of public officers according to specific rules of engagement. The emphasis here is that even in the absence of watchdogs, the public officer must be above board in carrying out the responsibilities. As summarised by Stewart (2009, 35), the deontological theory “concentrates on the *nature of the action itself* as well as its *motive* in order to determine whether it is right or wrong”.

The theories above are significant and relevant to the analysis of Nigeria's public sphere in the sense that the attitudes and characters of officials are reflections of the ethical standards of the society. The utilitarian theory is relevant when the consequences of the actions of the bureaucrats in the public service are examined. The question therefore is; what are the consequences and rewards of either negative or positive actions? While officially there are fundamental provisions for rewarding merit, there are also punishment for mediocrity and bad behaviour. The deontological theory is equally relevant to the extent that public servants carry out their duties based on the conditions and

circumstances of the environment in which they operate. In Nigeria, the duties of a public officer are enshrined in the relevant books, this theory helps in explaining the efforts or lack of it, with which these duties are carried out by Nigerian bureaucrats. The relevant sections of the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act (1991) spell out the duties of public officers. The overriding message is that public officers must render service to the people, justly and fairly, by avoiding conflict of interests.

The two theories would provide the platform for analysing the responsiveness of Nigerian bureaucrats to the numerous challenges confronting public service performances in Nigeria. The analysis would only be meaningful with an exposure to the inherent features of the Nigerian state.

Some Critical Features of the Nigerian State

Ethical codes are reflections of the social environment. Meanwhile, the character of the social environment is derived from the reality of the state. Reality in this context refers to the origin and composition; it also includes the sustained attitudinal patterns of the leadership and reactions of the followership to the patterns. The leadership attitudes and the followership responses can be analysed from the perspectives of Nigeria-specific variables. For the purpose of this discourse, the following variables would suffice; the nature of political-economy, the management of segmental cleavages, and the absence of national ideological orientation.

The literature on Nigeria's political economy is robust, and the issues discussed are varied (Ake, 1985; Amuwo, 2009; Lewis, 1996; Utomi, 2000). However, the analysis of Nigeria's political economy is usually constructed around specifics that derive from its origin as a post-colonial state formation that is affected by the burden of its formation process (Odubajo, 2012). The burden reflects in Kalu's (1996, 245) observation that "the Nigerian state remains incapable of providing for the cohesion and unity of the complex social formations inherited at independence". One of the most eloquent testament of the burden of state-formation is the civil service, and by extension, the performance of the bureaucracy. Agboola (2015, 23) poignantly points out that for Nigeria, "the performance records of the public bureaucracy is a catalogue of failed promises and failed development projects". Okotoni (2017) elaborates on the challenges of Nigeria's bureaucracy persuasively thus:

... public bureaucracy in Nigeria has been hounded by colonial legacy, the prolonged military rule, unstable

political environment, economic crisis, social menace, constitutional lapses, unfavourable public policies such as the federal character, bureaucratic bottlenecks, (such as red-tapism, rigidity, centralization, excessive bureaucratic layers), poor conditions of service etc. All of these factors have impeded the effective performance of the Nigerian bureaucracy in several ways.

The burden of state formation equally reflects in the poor management of Nigeria's segmental cleavages. Otakpor (1981, 108) notes that: "In Nigeria segmental cleavages are essentially ethnic, cultural and linguistic". The cleavages have created fault lines that impede the prospects of genuine unity, tolerance and accommodation that are required for the political stability and economic development of a heterogeneous state. Indeed, the fault lines are exploited by the political elites to wreak havoc on the system for their own benefits. In response to the challenges generated by the exacerbation of the fault lines, feeble attempts are made to douse the tension created through the establishment of poorly managed and scandalous proportional representation mechanisms that more often than not sacrifice merit on the altar of mediocrity. As the fault lines continue to exert pressure on the stability of the state, the civil service, as the 'engine room' of government, continues to bear the brunt of the pressures.

The nebulous and unjust manner of managing the segmental cleavages created the fault lines, and the absence of national ideological orientation has elevated the negative effects of the fault lines to 'monstrous' proportions. The value of national ideological orientation cannot be overemphasised, particularly in a heterogeneous post-colonial nation-state, where hitherto autonomous political entities were arbitrarily merged to form nation-states. This notion of national ideological orientation is succinctly captured by Larsen, et al (1995, 166) in this manner:

Therefore, national ideology concerns itself with issues of social norms, laws, constitutions, opinions and the citizen's roles in the larger national entity. The primary functions of national ideology are: to justify national policy (including aggression and war), to boost national morale, and to create and maintain national solidarity. These functions enable society to remain integrative and cohesive.

In the absence of the afore-mentioned criteria for national ideology in Nigeria, “the process of nation-building has been difficult, and more difficult than in other countries that are guided by national ideologies” (Obiukwu, 1987: 242).

National ideology refers to the national willingness to articulate a collective pattern of positive behaviour for a society. The ideology is taught and imbibed, so it becomes the character of the society. This is exactly the mandate of the National Orientation Agency (NOA) as enshrined in the constitution. To most Nigerians, the NOA is moribund and non-existence. The organisation lacks media presence and visibility, and therefore incapable of evolving a national orientation movement. Under this scenario, the societal value orientation lacks direction, and therefore, individuals and groups form their patterns of behaviour and attitudes towards the state or government. One of the concomitants is the general discomfiting attitude that emanates from national bureaucratic institutions.

The necessity for the institutionalisation of national ideological orientation in heterogeneous societies cannot be overemphasised. Although, the dominance of atavistic tendencies within separate ethnic nationalities is not unusual in heterogeneous states, but the tide of negative inclinations that may arise could be stemmed by the existence of a national ideological orientation. The absence of national ideological orientation makes Nigeria an enabling terrain for fierce group contestations, and an arena devoid of national collective agenda for peaceful and harmonious coexistence. In effect, the circumstance has contributed to the impossibility of institutionalising a professional and nationalistic civil service.

It is apparent at this point that an intricate linkage exists between the dominant environmental character and the functioning of the civil service system. Consequently, we shall examine the extent to which the Weberian Bureaucratic Theory can reshape the environmental factors that impact the civil service. A brief on Weber's Bureaucracy Theory is therefore apposite at this point.

Weber's Bureaucratic Theory

Max Weber's work on bureaucracy can be applied to the running of a civil service for the purpose of building an efficient and effective organisation insulated from political manoeuvring in order to achieve the smooth running of government business. A bureaucratic organisation in this sense refers to “an organisation typified by formal processes, standardisation, hierarchic procedures, and written communication” (Schiller, 2008: 7). Blau (1956, 20)

points out that: "In contemporary society bureaucracy has become a dominant institution, indeed, the institution that epitomizes the modern era". Max Weber is of the view that bureaucratic forms of organization are more efficient than other systems of administration. The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization, precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction, and of material and personal costs – these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration, and especially in its monocratic form (Quadri, 2020: 2). Therefore, in Weber's views, a bureaucratic system must parade the following characteristics; Division of Labour, Hierarchy of Authority, Framework of Roles, Impersonality, and Formal Selection.

The Division of Labour component of the model refers to official role distribution among the staffers. This is meant to prevent both under-utilisation and over-utilisation, and trigger the optimal utilisation of the human resource. Under the arrangement, roles and responsibilities are shared on the basis of competence and experience. However, in order to achieve the aims of division of labour, the leadership must be a representation of instituted authority, and this authority must be governed by a system of hierarchy. Hierarchy of authority deals with strict compliance with the official organogram and regimentation in order to ensure smooth running processes for service delivery. Furthermore, it ensures equity, justice and fairness, in supervisor and subordinate relationships.

To emphasise the importance of authority in the civil service, roles are officially assigned to individual staff members. The framework of roles is therefore an official brief that spells out the expected roles and responsibilities of each officer towards the realisation of corporate goals and objectives. Each line member of staff has measured deliverables and outputs. For instance, the process of the execution of a policy commences with a memo that states, among others, a justification. The process passes through the recommendation stage to the approval stage before execution can take place.

A fourth strand in Weber's model for the smooth running of the civil service is the impersonal nature of the processes and systems of the bureaucracy. The emphasis is on objective, rather than subjective handling of all official matters. This is critical for civil service in order to prevent the negative impact of subjective decisions and actions on the processes and systems. The Policy Handbook of the organisation and all other enabling laws and regulations are meant to guide official conduct and prevent subjectivities. Emphasis must be

placed on objective decision-making processes; in other words, the composition of the decision-making organ must reflect professionalism and merit. Finally, Weber emphasises the importance of proper scrutiny of the process of recruitment in the civil service. On this issue, an analysis of the process can be bifurcated; one part of this refers to enactment of laws that would ensure the recruitment of the most qualified individuals into the civil service. The other aspect is ensuring that the laws are properly executed according to laid down principles and conventions. This is meant to negate the tendency towards manipulations in the employment process, particularly in heterogeneous societies where weak institutions expose the susceptibility of the system. In all, bureaucracy thrives on neutrality and anonymity. As Mainzer (1973, 9) intones, the bureaucracy has a permanent life of its own; an existence that outlives the bureaucrats. Mainzer (1973, 9) explains:

Bureaucracy evidently embodies qualities inconsistent with man's fullest dignity, for it seems to require anonymity of each participant, joint participation in every action, compliance with precedent and rules, and hierarchy in relations among members. A position exists in bureaucracy prior to and independent of the personality who fills it at the moment. If the individual officeholder leaves, another takes his place and the work goes on. In this way bureaucracy achieves a sort of immortality but the individual member loses significance.

By and large, Weber's theoretical construct on bureaucracy is suitable for running a professional civil service. In reality however, the theory is not applicable in all situations. The Nigerian civil service is bedevilled by strong environmental factors that undermine the possibilities of constant effective and efficient service delivery. Indeed, the environmental factors have been inimical to the growth and development of the civil service. These factors are bifurcated into; constitutional constraints, and informal social-constraints.

Constraints on Nigeria's Bureaucracy

There are numerous constraints on Nigeria's bureaucracy. Some of these are outlined in Maduabum (2006, 441-445). But broadly speaking, the two major types of constraints preventing Nigeria's bureaucracy from realising the practical expression of Weber's bureaucracy theory are; the Federal Character Principle on the one hand, and aspects of the sociological environment as

expressed in the existential realities of the people on the other. Understandably, some salient constitutional provisions are responses to the heterogeneous nature of the society, but some of these provisions negate the bureaucracy theory, the same way as some of the norms and customs within the society are aberrations for the working of the theory.

Constitutional Constraints

The nature of Nigeria as a post-colonial heterogeneous state has compelled the Nigerian government to continually attempt the processes of inclusion of the nationalities. Thus, the Federal Government of Nigeria is constantly sensitive to the causes of accommodation and representation in order to allay the fears of all nationalities against the feelings of marginalisation and under-representation. The state therefore attempts to adequately accommodate all in the federal compact. A typical example of this inclusion plan is the federal representation in the composition of the Federal Executive Council; the highest decision/policy making organ of the Nigerian government. According to Section 147(3) of the 199 Constitution, "... provided that in giving effect to the provisions aforesaid the President shall appoint at least one Minister from each State, who shall be an indigene of such State". Similarly, the Legislative Arm of Government is also a representation of Nigeria's ethnic nationalities. This measure is stipulated in the relevant section of the Constitution.

This need for accommodation and representation extends to the civil service as a result of its importance as the engine room of government business. The intention is to create the fora for all Nigerians to be included in the government process. The most fundamental representation of this ideal of inclusion, accommodation and representation is the Federal Character Principle as enshrined in Section 14(3) of the 1999 Federal Constitution of Nigeria. It states specifically that, official recruitment must reflect Nigeria's diversity. In other words, there are quotas earmarked for the recruitment of Nigerians into the civil service, and indeed, all federal appointments. The question therefore arises of how the caveat of quota system in the recruitment and appointment processes allow for the adoption of Weber's bureaucracy theory. Can a quota system guarantee professionalism, objectivity, and impersonality? It is therefore safe to surmise that there are sections of the 1999 Constitution that imperil the attainment of a professional, effective and efficient bureaucracy.

Informal/Societal Constraints of Bureaucracy

Deriving from evidence in extant literature, a high percentage of Nigerians do not exhibit requisite commitment to the Nigerian cause, instead, there is a

pervasive air of resentment towards Nigeria and its leadership. The civil service has borne the brunt of this collective attitude of resentment for a long time, and it may continue to suffer the same fate until there is a radical departure from the current state of inertia to a nationalistic and patriotic institution for Nigerians.

As already established in this discourse, the collective attitudes of the society rub off on the work-ethics within the bureaucracy. The lack of ethical standards brings forth unprofessional conducts among the members of staff. Moreover, the control measures in place are incapable of curtailing the professional misdeeds and inefficiency of staff members. Such vices as; corruption, impunity and nepotism, have become regular features of Nigeria's bureaucracy. These features have in turn provided the bulwark for bureaucratic incompetence and inefficiency over the decades. Unfortunately, the system has become receptive of these negativities to the extent that there is no hint of solution in the horizon. A major impediment to reversing this anomaly is the lack of positive national value orientation.

The Delinquent Bureaucracy

The structure of governmental processes in Nigeria is hinged on the bifurcation of political and professional responsibilities. The political responsibilities are bestowed on the Cabinet Ministers who are appointees of the President. They are the political heads of Ministries, Departments, and Agencies of government. The Minister is responsible for the implementation/execution of government policies and provides leadership and direction in ensuring that government's developmental plans are carried out.

The professional/technical arm of the government process is the Civil Service. The “engine room” of any administration is responsible for ensuring that the professionals and career civil servants perform the service delivery functions of government. The civil service is administered by the Head of Service, whose responsibility is to ensure the provision of manpower and, professional and technical know-how for the use of the Minister. By this structure, the civil service reports to the Minister, advises the Minister, and provides all necessary support for implementing and executing government's policies. In effect, the civil service is directly involved in the emergence of articulate policies and the creation of the enabling environment for implementation. By implication therefore, the bureaucracy is critical to the functioning of the government process. Ayeni (2010, 115) explains the Nigerian civil service thus:

However, the Federal Civil Service of Nigeria represents that governmental organ charged with the vitally

important responsibility of formulating and implementing public policies and programmes, especially with the executive capacity of the higher, middle and lower bureaucrats. This exercise entails giving advice to political executives on policy options as well as recommendations of policy initiatives. It also involves putting into effect the approved or accepted policy decisions. By and large, the bureaucrats also help in so many ways in the initiation and implementation of public policies and programmes.

It must be noted that the Nigerian government has always been aware of the critical role of the bureaucratic system in articulating its developmental agenda, hence, the continuous reform processes to improve the performance. For the records, the following reforms were undertaken to reposition the Nigerian civil service system; Adebo Commission (1971), Udoji Public Service Review Commission (1974), Dotun Phillips Civil Service Reform (1988), and the Allison Ayida Committee on Civil Service (1995). Despite these efforts, the fundamental challenges hindering efficiency and professionalism of the civil service remain constant. Some of these challenges include corruption, ineptitude, red-tapism, wasteful manpower among others. These challenges have impaired the possibilities of actualising the Weberian model of a bureaucratic system organised around the following core principles; Division of labour, hierarchy of authority, framework of roles, impersonality, and formal selection.

The principle of division of labour is to bring order and civility so that the bureaucracy can operate a systematised process. Moreover, it would ensure optimal utilisation of labour resources. This theoretical prescription is hardly workable in the Nigerian scenario. To start with, the process of recruitment is not conducive for practising the division of labour principle. The clause on formal selection is meant to organise the recruitment process in an objective manner, such that only qualified people would be employed. The formal selection would sieve merit from mediocrity, through a recruitment process of fairness and equity. Essentially, the recruitment system of the Nigerian public servants most times is tied to the patronage which negates the principle of merit, thus, giving room for over-bloated bureaucracies, thereby creating redundancy among employees. For most employees, qualifications are not consciously matched with needs within the system in terms of job allocation.

Secondly, the principle of Hierarchy of Authority is hardly adhered to. The societal value which thrives on social capital reflects on the relationship among

workers in Nigeria's bureaucracy. Although there are no standards yet to measure this, but the superior/subordinate relationship is not dictated by the formal relationship of the workplace, but rather by the extent of strings each employee can pull. It is not unusual that in some ministries, roles are allocated on the basis of informal power structure in the bureaucracy. The roles are usually manipulated to serve the whims and caprices of powerful individuals, not much less political elites. On this, the Bureaucratic Theory also talks about the issue of impersonality so that there can be fairness, equity and justice in the bureaucratic system. This hardly applies to Nigeria because of the 'man-know-man' syndrome. In the Nigerian environment, the emphasis is on the powers of the 'big man', and not the authority of the institution. Finally, However, the Nigerian process is way different. In so many cases, non-professional considerations and subjective matters form the basis for recruitment.

An uncoordinated system breeds a non-cohesive bureaucratic arrangement. Series of recruitment scandals (*The Nation*, 2019) continue to rock the Nigerian environment with deep negative impact on the bureaucratic system. In the final analysis, a large chunk of Weber's theory of bureaucracy cannot apply to the Nigerian civil service because of institutional and societal constraints. However, a positive national orientation aimed at evolving ethical values could make a difference in the bureaucratic system and consequently policy implementation.

Conclusion

This article attempted a dissection of the Nigerian bureaucracy. The finding is that; the bureaucracy is largely inefficient and unprofessional in its conduct. Essentially, the Nigerian bureaucracy is a 'victim' of its milieu. The civil service that incubates the bureaucracy operates within the Nigerian environment; an environment with a debased value system.

In recognition of the critical role of the bureaucracy in the development of a state, it is therefore imperative to ensure that the systems and processes of the bureaucracy in Nigeria should undergo a radical transformation. In this respect, the agents of socialisation must work in concert to ensure the emergence of a positive national orientation. It must be emphasised that there must be a conscious effort towards collaboration among the agents of socialisation in order to birth a new era of positive national orientation derived from strong ethical standards. In effect, there must be some level of interconnectedness among the family, religious organisations, school system, and the government, in the taught knowledge of individuals.

Finally, the agents of socialisation have their roles 'cut out for them' in this process of radical redemption. The agenda should involve the following; the definition of the national value system, institutionalisation of processes and systems, effective and efficient control mechanisms, adequate reward system, redefinition of the terms of the federal character (with emphasis on merit), sustained and intense war on social vices (among which are, corruption and nepotism). If this agenda is pursued with commitment and dedication, the Nigerian public space would arise from the vagaries of the past into a new era where a patriotic and nationalistic set of professionals can galvanise the public bureaucracy into the classic Weberian model.

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Towards Achieving an Improved Maritime Industry in Nigeria

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Abstract

This paper examined issues and challenges preventing the expansion of the maritime industry in Nigeria. Utilising descriptive research design, the paper argues that improvement in the maritime industry is only possible when the Nigerian government formulate effective laws and policies in line with the recommendations of the international maritime agreements; improve synergy between maritime stakeholders and the Nigerian Navy; and increases collaboration with neighboring maritime countries in sharing information, monitoring, and law enforcement at sea. The paper concludes that obstacles militating against the domestication of international maritime agreements should be removed for an improved maritime industry in Nigeria, while robust synergy between nations as well as national agencies should be ensured.

Background

Nigeria Maritime is considered one of the maritime spaces that have developed globally because of its relatively large kilometers of navigable land and coastal routes. Nigeria's maritime industry is a multi-billion industry that can generate more than 840 million dollars, 10,000 new direct jobs, and 800,000 new jobs with an increase in the volume of shipments of 1.3 million non-oil products (Aluko and Odularu, 2019). At present, Nigeria's maritime authorities are working diligently to create the infrastructure that is possible, encourage private sector investment, and generate more foreign direct investment as a way to increase maritime contributions to the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Akinseye, 2019). Unfortunately, the latest report reveals that Nigeria's maritime industry has not operated efficiently and effectively because the country is losing up to 7 billion dollars annually due to security challenges facing the sector. Thus, Nigeria's Maritime Industry has not

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yet achieved strong economic resilience due to its weak security structure.

Maritime security is concerned with protecting land and maritime territories of the state, and includes other illegal security-related activities, such as smuggling of weapons, drugs, armed robbery, piracy, and human trafficking; illegal fishing, not reported, and not regulated (IUU), and pollution at sea. Nigeria's maritime area has become a demon with cases of piracy, kidnapping of seamen, fuel smuggling, and cases of illegal migration, among others. In the Financial Nigeria Blog report of May 2022, the IMB reported that global piracy cases dropped to the lowest level since 1994. The Gulf of Guinea region recorded 28 incidents of piracy and armed robbery in the first nine months of 2021, in comparison to 46 for the same period in 2020, with the Nigerian area recording four related cases for the same period (Nwanze, 2022). This is different from a report revealing that more than 300 incidents of sea abduction, 200 ship hijackings, and 150 sea robberies, among others, were recorded in Nigerian waters (Steffan, 2017). This security challenge reaches that level kidnappers are now abducting more crew members from merchant ships and demanding longer ransom negotiations of up to 6-8 weeks. In addition, since 2007, the average number of maritime security incidents in West Africa ranged between 80 and 140 per year and Nigerian waters alone accounted for an average of 87 attacks per year (Steffan, 2017). In addition, port security remains inconsistent while cases rise illegally at the docks and at ports causing a large number of incidents (Dirk, 2019).

There are responses to this at the regional and national levels. At the Gulf of Guinea level, countries such as the Republic of Benin and Ghana take action in the form of increasing police force, providing detection and monitoring systems, establishing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capabilities, and acquiring platforms that are important for conquering piracy and reducing maritime insecurity (Ukeje and Ela, 2013). The Governments of Nigeria and the Republic of Benin October 2011, formed a joint maritime patrol of their waters in line with the Maritime Organization's Coastguard Function Network Initiative in West Africa (MOWCA). While at the regional level, measures to improve maritime security have come in the form of joint exercises among the Navy of the Gulf states of Guinea.

At the national level, the Nigerian government implements a multi-agency response to maritime security, which involves the Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Sea Police, Nigerian Civil Security and Defense Corps (NSCDC), Nigerian Army (NA), Nigerian Port Authority (NPA), Administrative Agency and Nigerian Maritime Safety (NIMASA) to combat marine insecurity in the

country (Onuoha, 2012). Therefore, a joint task force named Operation Pulo Shield was established by the Nigerian Navy to eliminate, inter alia, pipe vandalism, theft of crude oil, illegal oil refining, piracy, and all forms of marine criminality within its area of responsibility. The multi-agency approach used by the government is based on a broader understanding of maritime security that requires broader involvement of various actors, but with national coordination (James and Raul, 2013).

However, despite efforts by various government agencies, maritime security threats such as piracy, sea robbery, smuggling of petroleum products, and theft of crude oil among others in Nigeria continue. The main argument of this paper is that improved maritime business in Nigeria depends on achieving security resilience in this sector. Thus, this study is proposing three main issues as solutions to this:

- a. How to formulate effective laws and policies by international maritime agreements?
- b. How to improve synergy between maritime stakeholders and the Nigerian Navy?
- c. How to increase collaboration with neighboring maritime countries in sharing information, monitoring, and law enforcement at sea?

Method

This paper utilizes descriptive qualitative methods, relying on desk review and literature study which allows the description of the causes of maritime insecurity and measures used so far to solve the challenges. This method emphasizes the collection and analysis of data and facts based on literature study from secondary data. This study uses a multidisciplinary approach and perspective to analyze national interests from a strategic environment (ideology, political, socio-cultural, environmental, economic analysis), theoretical framework, and literature review. this study. The paper proceeds with the results and discussion where a review of the existing policies and laws, among which are the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); International Maritime Organization (IMO); Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy were carried out and followed with analysis and discussions on the subject matter of concern to this paper.

Result and Discussion

Laws and regulations

The maritime industry is blessed with a large number of international laws, agreements and regulations that regulate the maritime industry. One of them is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS); International Maritime Organization; Africa's Integrated Maritime Strategy

a. UNCLOS UN Sea Law Convention 82

Specifically, part 3 of the United Nations Sea Law Convention emphasises the Innocent PASSAGE IN SEA TERRITORIALS needed for international trade in the sea. *In Article 21, the laws and regulations of coastal States relating to innocent travel, the convention states that:* Coastal countries may adopt laws and regulations, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other international legal rules, relating to innocent travel by territorial sea, with respect to all or any of the following: Navigation security and maritime traffic regulation; Conservation of marine biological resources; Prevention of violations of laws and regulations of coastal State fisheries; Prevention of violations of laws and regulations on customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitation of coastal States. Furthermore, Article 25 discusses the protection rights of coastal states, which states that coastal state can take the necessary steps in their territorial seas to prevent innocent paths from passing.

b. International Maritime Organization Law on Maritime Security.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the governing body of the United Nations which was formed to coordinate the safety of life at sea and the protection of the environment through the use of conventions and regulations since it emerged in 1959. One of the mechanisms put in place by the International Maritime Organization for effective management of the maritime industry is the International Ship and Port Facility Code (ISPS). This was done to reduce tensions on the issue of ship, cargo, and passenger vulnerability and port personnel and the use of shipping as a vector of terrorist activity.

c. African Maritime Security- The Yaounde Code of Ethics

The map displays the maritime zones of ECOWAS and related organizations in West and Central Africa. The zones are outlined in orange for ECOWAS and blue for ECCAS. Headquarters locations are marked with orange and blue dots. The map includes labels for various zones and organizations, as well as letters A, D*, E, F, and G indicating specific regions.

Legend:

- Orange outline: ECOWAS and related maritime zones
- Blue outline: ECCAS and related maritime zones
- Orange dot: Headquarters (ECOWAS)
- Blue dot: Headquarters (ECCAS)

Key Locations and Zones:

- ECOWAS (Abuja):** ECOWAS Zone E (Kotonou), ECOWAS Zone F (Accra), ECOWAS Zone D (Douala)
- ECCAS (Libreville):** ECCAS Zone D (Douala), ECCAS Zone F (Accra)
- Other Organizations:** CRESMAD (Abidjan), ICC (Younde), CRESMAC (Pointe-Noire), GGC (Luanda)

Figure 1: ICC and CMC lines of the Gulf of Guinea with ECOWAS, ECCAS, and related maritime zones.

d. Current Regulatory Framework and Ongoing Initiatives in Africa

The various national and international regulatory frameworks and ongoing marine initiatives in Africa, including, and not limited to are as follows:

- 1) MoU West and Central African Maritime Organization (MOWCA) concerning the Establishment of an Integrated Coast Guard Function Network.
- 2) Sea Power for Africa Symposium (SPAS), a regular meeting of African Navy and Coast Guard Chiefs.
- 3) Zone "D" Multinational Center for Coordination of Regional Centers for Maritime Security of Central African States (CRESMAC).

e. 2003 Coastal and Land Shipping Law (Cabotage)

The Cabotage Act was enacted in response to the increasing demand of Nigerian Maritime stakeholders in the maritime industry for legislative intervention to stimulate Nigerian participation in its domestic coastal trade. The Cabotage Act limits the use of foreign vessels in domestic coastal trade (including transportation of goods and passengers in Nigerian waters), promotes the development of original tonnages, and establishes funding for cabotage vessels. Specifically, the Cabotage Act prevents a ship other than a ship that is wholly owned and manned by a Nigerian citizen, built and registered in Nigeria from involvement in the transportation of domestic cargo and passengers in coastal territorial inland waters, or at any point in the waters of the economic zone exclusive Nigeria.

f. Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) Act: The NPA Act empowers the NPA to maintain, enhance and regulate port use; ensure efficient management of port operations; provide and operate port facilities; Form, build, or merge subsidiaries or affiliated companies with other people or organizations for the purpose of carrying out their functions. And the Merchant Shipping Act, 2007: This law regulates shipping merchants in Nigeria and only allows registered Nigerian vessels to operate commercially in Nigeria by excluding others except for cases that are excluded under the law.

Theoretical Frameworks

There are various theories and approaches that describe maritime security.

a. Realist theory of maritime security

Realist schools of thought view maritime security from a perspective of sea power and sea command, where sea power considers the ability of countries to secure the oceans for smooth transportation and trade through the sea, and to attack any institution or navy that wishes to hamper smooth running water transportation (Geoffrey, 2018). Realists thus see maritime security as "Protection of the country's land and maritime territory, infrastructure, economy, environment, and society from all dangerous actions that occur at sea" (Klein, 2011). Thus, maritime security is classified into 'soft' and 'hard' security, where 'hard' maritime security includes maritime security or sea dominance by all forces and 'soft' maritime security is about managing threats that affect 'the sea', resources, transportation and trade, and information exchange. However, this view has been criticized by the US Naval Operation Concept because they allege that the realist approach does not show how maritime security must be prioritised, its relationship, and relation to other issues such as drug trafficking, transnational crime, environmental destruction among others (Bueger, 2015).

b. Liberalist Approach to Maritime Security.

Liberal approaches to maritime security emphasize regulation of maritime territories to achieve a "stable sea order that is subject to the rule of law at sea" (James and Raul, 2013). Thus, the liberal approach believes international law must be allowed to change the ways countries secure their seas especially as long as the naval states work together to achieve common goals. This approach has been criticized for being limited to the operationalisation of international law, without overcoming internal challenges and problems with government maritime security aspects that usually go beyond legal regulations (Bueger and Timothy, 2017). This has been disproved as myopic because a regional agreement between governments is needed to achieve good order at sea, even with countries that have a different focus (Siebel, 2020).

c. A constructivist approach to Maritime Security.

A constructivist approach to maritime security believes maritime security is a socially constructed concept that addresses relationships and how maritime insecurity occurs and is managed as a result of the actions, interactions and perceptions of stakeholders (Aradau; Huysman,; Andrew;

Voelkner, eds, 2015). Especially the role political interests and normative understanding play in maritime security. Constructivist theorist, Christian Bueger, further explains the approach by using three frameworks: maritime security matrices that help conceptualize relationships, a securitization framework that looks at maritime security claims, and practical theory that analyzes what is being done on maritime security (Bueger, 2015).

The maritime security matrix focuses on the relationship between marine concepts and maritime security issues. Bueger, related marine environment or sea safety for economic development (blue economy), national security (use of sea power), and human security, especially human trafficking, and drug traffic, among others (Bueger, 2016). The Securitization Framework was developed by Ole Weaver and Barry Buzan, focusing on how extreme actions should be taken and what their short-term reactions will be. The emphasis is on how and means 'maritime' becomes securitization and how issues in securitization become part of the security agenda (Bueger and Timothy, 2017).

Theory of Practice is concerned with the analysis of the types of activities that are actually carried out in the name of security. This theory is related to actions and activities that lead to the implementation of maritime security measures (Bueger and Timothy, 2017). Such as Maritime Domain Awareness, activities at sea (e.g. patrol, inspection, training), law enforcement activities (e.g. arrest, trial, and prosecution), coordination activities (eg forums, conferences, harmonization of the legal framework,) and naval diplomacy (e.g.. capacity building, war). This is an activity carried out every day as a routine by maritime security actors (Parfomak, and Fritelli, 2007).

Strategic Analysis of Nigeria Maritime Environment

Global strategic security in the last five decades was marked by economic warfare, technological and biomedical warfare, and other mechanism carried out by international organisations, the United States of America, the European Union, the African Union, and others, to ensure survival and mutual safety. Some of these measures include military actions and diplomatic agreements and conventions on various interconnected issues in the world that can affect survival. Such as economic power, ethnic, religious, and ideological conflicts, trade and economic conflicts, energy supplies, science and technology, food, and threats to human security and state stability (Buzen and Weaver, 1998).

Globalisation engendered by western countries helps to ensure the availability of resources and goods that is not domiciled in demanding countries via global transportation services. This is what was obtained in the 1950s, when crude oil was refined at its source and transported to the market in a number of small tankers [measuring between 12,000 and 30,000 tonnage deadweight (dwt)] (Transportation Statistics, 2007). But with economies of scale that immediately dictate that oil companies will generate more profits if they ship larger amounts of crude oil from distant locations to refineries that are closer to the product market. The product was then distributed more efficiently to places of consumption using a number of 7 modes of transportation. This led to the emergence of large tankers (for example, more than 200,000 tons of deadweight) and reduced costs per unit of intercontinental energy transportation.

As a result, dry bulk cargo ships designed to deliver cargoes in raw or semi-raw condition from where they are planted to processing facilities (e.g., factories and bakeries) that are closer to the final market, emerged. Along with containers and advances in cargo handling and ship technology, these measures reduce crew size and labor requirements along the coast and led to reduction in the cost per unit of sea cargo transportation. Globalisation aided identification of labor markets abroad that encourage the transportation of semi-raw materials and semi-finished products where production costs are lower. With low-cost petroleum energy for ship drivers, facilitated by the economies of scale of ships, the cost per unit of semi-finished and retail products is minimized by multi-continent supply chains.

In a global economy, containerization offers the advantage of integrated goods transportation in all modes.




Figure 1. Effects of globalization on unified cargo

Data showing the effect of globalization on cargo units is shown in Figure 1, where the increase in container shipments represents a significant increase in global transportation of finished and semi-finished products from regions with cheap skilled labor to the consumer market. The fact that containerized cargo has exceeded other bulk loads is evidence of the impact of global trade involving international consumer and labor products (not just raw materials) (Corbett and Winebrake, 2008).

Regionally, Africa is one of the continents in the world, consisting of 54 countries, and has the largest number of landlocked countries in any region. Historically, the colonial legacy and the Cold War had an impact on the dynamics of African government and this influenced the response to maritime development. Until three decades ago, the African nation system began to develop stronger regional connections. As such, Africa's strategic environment is characterized by its dependence on foreign partners and investment in natural resources for their income and business. This is despite the existence of an important global sea route that passes through the African continent from the Cape of Good Hope between the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, through the Red Sea, and east-west through the Mediterranean Sea (Saggia, 2017). Also, Africa is home to one of the largest shipping registrants in the world, the Liberian Registry which covers 11 percent of the world's oceangoing fleet.

Africa relies on international treaties for marine management in Africa and hence there are four regional agreements throughout Africa that collectively seek to protect, manage and develop the marine and coastal environment of Africa and the West Indian Ocean. These include the International Maritime Organization (IMO) which addresses environmental issues such as marine pollution, oil spills and emissions from the shipping industry and paves the way for African coast states, registration of shipping and ports to innovate and meet the challenges of sustainable development (Husseini, 2019). Consequently, Africa has used maritime for 2.7 percent of its contribution to global trade, although less than 1 percent of African exports are in the form of manufactured goods (UNCTAD, 2009).

However, the ports of the territories of African countries are currently the most inefficient in the world, because there is not one African port that ranks seventy most productive in the world. The movement of twenty-five containers per hour is the norm in most African ports, because many ports in Africa cannot handle ships of average size, while the world shipping industry is modernizing its fleet, replacing older and smaller vessels with "megacarriers". This calls for African countries to make major improvements in their port

infrastructure through expansion, maintenance, and efficiency improvements to attract leading shipping companies; and prevent "some coastal countries in West and Central Africa from being de facto" landlocked (Palsson, Harding and Raballand, 2020)." In addition, many bureaucracies are still involved in the maritime trade of the African government with all the tendencies of inefficiency and corruption, requiring coordinated to revolutionize the African maritime sector to improve safety and security, governance, as well as port infrastructure and efficiency.

The Nigeria strategic environment is characterized with geography that varies with mangrove forests and swamps on the south coast, and hardwood forests further inland. The Niger and Benue River valleys form the largest area in Nigeria, creating a 'Y' shape when emptying water into the Atlantic Ocean. The Nigerian maritime consists of a coastal state that stretches beyond its land area and internal waters to the adjacent sea belt, up to 12 nautical miles. It also includes an Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 nautical miles and a continental shelf with a depth of 200 m or up to the depth of exploitation (CIA, 2019). Nigeria is a country of around 200 million people, living in an area of 923,768 km² (356,669 square miles). This is one of the most populous and largest populations in Africa, seventh largest population in the world (CIA, 2019). Nigeria has almost 250 ethnic groups, 500 languages, with a wide variety of cultures and traditions. The three largest ethnic groups are Hausa-Fulani 27.4% of the population; Yoruba 21% and Igbo 22.1%. The Efik, Ibibio, Annang, and Ijaw are found in the Southeastern population while Urhobo, Isoko, Edo and Itsekiri are in the Midwest (Akinyemi, 2014). Most of the population is young, with 42 - 54% between the ages of 0-14 (Lysonski, 2013) with a very high state dependency ratio at 88.2 dependents per 100 non-dependents occasioned by rapid population over the past 5 decades - a 3.2 percent growth rate leading to the projected population.

Most of the people who live on the coastline of Nigeria are mostly involved in Artisanal fishing (or traditional / subsistence fishing) are various small-scale, low-tech, low-capital fishing practices carried out by individual fishing households (not commercial companies). Many of these households are coastal or island ethnic groups. This household takes a short fishing trip close to the beach. Its production is usually not processed and mainly for local consumption. Fishing can be done for commercial and subsistence reasons. This contrasts with modern large-scale fishing practices that is less wasteful and less pressing on fish populations.

Nigeria has a variety of renewable and non-renewable resources. Solar energy, is the most widespread of underutilized renewable resources. The most economically valuable mineral is crude oil, natural gas, coal, lead and columbite (an iron-containing mineral that accompanies lead). Petroleum, which was first discovered in land fields in Niger delta in 1956 was the most important source of government revenue and foreign exchange. There is an oil refinery in Kaduna, Port and Warri. Nigerian marine resources include biodiversity, fish and seafood supplies, oil and gas, minerals, sand and gravel, renewable energy resources, tourism potential, and unique ecosystems such as coral reefs. Nigeria has not been able to explore this potential sustainably, requiring serious attention by the government.

At the moment, Nigeria has only one natural port in Lagos, but has developed another port on the east side of the country. Historically, Nigeria's port administration and maritime business in Nigeria until the mid-1950s saw Nigeria take advantage of the duality of control and the many authorities in maritime business management and security. First, ports and maritime businesses are controlled by personal interests such as the United African Company (UAC) and foreign shipping lines, in particular, the Elder Dempster Shipping Line, controlling certain activities in certain ports. Second, there are many authorities at the port, especially large ones such as Lagos and Port Harcourt. Among these are Railroad, Customs, Port and Marine Engineering, each of which handles specific aspects of port operations, such as collecting tariffs, transportation, pilotage, and port work. These government departments witness inter-departmental competition, which results in ineffective coordination of port services and operations (Olukoju, 1992).

The Nigerian Port Authority (NPA) was later established in the mid-1950s to place maritime business coordination, but was unable to manage maritime administration in Nigeria because it eventually added to competing authority which impeded the efficient operation and administration of the port. For instance, under the Port Law 1954 (Cap 55) of the Law of the Nigerian Federation, the Port Authority of Nigeria was established as the sole authority in controlling Nigerian ports, with jurisdiction over cargo handling operations; port maintenance, improvement and regulation and approach; dredging, pilotage services, lighting and navigation aids, and related services. With the NPA initiating an indigenization program ('Nigerianisation') and the construction of a dock extension at Apapa and port work in Port Harcourt (Olukoju, 1996b), it operates as the leading agency on maritime.

Nigeria's Maritime Administration and Security Agency (NIMASA) was established to ease tensions at sea due to piracy, theft of crude oil, and other maritime security issues. Furthermore, there are increasing participation of the Nigerian Navy (NN), Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corp (NSCDC) and the Nigerian Marine Police to deal appropriately with increasing security challenges at sea. However, NIMASA did this assignment in collaboration with the Nigerian Navy, Joint Military Task Force (JTF) and Nigerian Sea Police. This has led NIMASA to reach the level of Zero piracy attacks in the Lagos Pilotage district through strict vigilance. Also, the Joint Military Task Force (JTF), was formed to combat militancy in the Niger Delta region, and continue to minimize incidents of piracy in the Niger Delta region through its ongoing vigilance. The Marine Police have obtained about 80 armored patrol vessels in the last 3 years to respond to incidents of piracy and police functions.

However, there is absence of appropriate legal and policy responses to regional maritime security in West Africa and Africa, especially prioritizing maritime security issues in the context of governance in Africa, in the form of initiating maritime security sector reform is a challenge. There is a need to overcome the problem of weaknesses in infrastructure and capacity in this sector; lack of maritime awareness and the absence of a comprehensive policy framework and limited national capacity for strong operational projections. Other problems like interference in security and intelligence management interventions needs to be addressed; while strong synergies need to be built, so as to consolidate and improve security operations and intelligence gathering that have long been a challenge in maritime security. Finally, efforts to build capacity in security agencies, burdened with the responsibility of securing Nigerian waterways, need to be addressed elsewhere to prepare and professionally mandate better service delivery.

Analysis of Solution to Maritime Security in Nigeria

This discussion to improve Nigeria's Maritime Industry and achieve security resilience was carried out in the context of the theory highlighted, strategic environment and legal perspective. Specifically, this section analyse existing rules and regulations as well as the government's approach to maritime business and how new laws, regulations, approaches can help. It also contains an analysis of existing synergies between maritime stakeholders and encourage possible implications of enhanced synergy between maritime stakeholders and the maritime industry. Finally, it analyse collaborative steps between maritime industry, law enforcement, and neighboring countries and

the steps that need to be taken to improve them.

A. Legal Formulation and Maritime Policy

In an attempt to formulate maritime laws and policies, this study examined the existing maritime laws, rules and regulations in the country. Efforts have been made to look deeply into the vision, mission, mandate and practice of each institution that manages the maritime industry in Nigeria to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT).

i. Analysis of Existing Maritime Framework

Maritime law is a legal entity, convention and agreement that is applied for the smooth management of marine business and other maritime issues, such as shipping, violations that occur at sea or ocean. National maritime law is expected to borrow or be domesticated from international maritime law, which is a regulation that regulates the use of the sea and oceans. As noted in the rules and regulations section in chapter two, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is a UN-recognized body responsible for developing international maritime conventions, new agreements for regulates all aspects of sea trade and transportation. Three major conventions form the core of the IMO convention and they expect all signatories to the convention to maintain and implement: International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships; and International Conventions on Training, Certification and Safeguard Standards for Seafarers.

To operationalise these conventions, treaties and agreements, the state enforces Ministries, Agencies and Departments to regulate, manage and enforce rules and regulations on maritime affairs in Nigeria. The Nigerian Government places the Ministry of Transportation as an over-arching policy making body for sustainable transportation management in the country. The Nigerian Ministry of Transportation aims to build a world-class safe, efficient and affordable world-class inter-capital transportation system and follow global best practices for socio-economic development and improvement of the quality of people's lives. As a result, in relation to the maritime industry, four specialized institutions and one special academic institution are placed under the Ministry of Transportation in Nigeria. They are the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA); Nigeria Ports Authority (NPA); Nigeria Shippers Council (NSC); Forwarding Regulatory Board in Nigeria and Nigerian Maritime Academy, (MAN), Oron.

Specifically, the Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) was established as a top regulatory maritime body with responsibility for regulating the maritime industry in Nigeria under the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Administration Act, 2007; Merchant Shipping Act, 2007 and Coastal and Inland Shipping (Cabotage) Act, 2003. Therefore, NIMASA focus on achieving effective Maritime Safety Administration, Maritime Manpower Regulation, Prevention and Control of Marine Pollution, Searching and Rescuing, Cabotage Enforcement, Ship Shipment Development and Registration, Seafarers Training and Certification, and Maritime Capacity Development using modern tools for efficiency and effectiveness, while developing the capacity of indigenous peoples and removing all barriers to maritime business. In an effort to carry out its maritime safety administration, NIMASA is expected to manage flagged state administration, Port State Oversight, Surveys and Inspections, navigation systems, hydrographic services, search and rescue, investigation of sea casualties and ship security, among others.

The Nigerian Port Authority is also an agent of the Federal Ministry of Transportation which deals with the management of Port operations in Nigeria. NPA has undergone reform and restructuring to the extent that part of its responsibilities is partly handled by the private sector. At present, NPA government responsibilities include ownership and management of land and water within port boundaries; planning and developing port operational infrastructure; undertake port infrastructure leasing and concessions and set benchmarks for the tariff structure. Other responsibilities include marine and port operations and hydrographic surveys; managing marine incidents and pollution; maintenance of safety and security in the general user area; enact port regulations and articles of association and enforce port regulations. The private sector handles cargo, loading and unloading, warehousing and shipping; obtaining cargo handling and operating related equipment; develop and maintain port superstructures, maintain safety and security in terminals and engage in towing, mooring, bunkering, shipbuilding and ship repair.

With this responsibility, NPA conducts marine services that include conservation, bunkering, rescue and rescue monitoring, mid-stream operations and oil contribution terminals etc.; and hydrographic services (licenses for piping, etc.) and Environmental, Health and Safety services especially prevention and control of incidents and marine pollution. NPA also carry out Sea patrols the NPA and the Marine Police. The Nigerian Shipping Council is a body formed to moderate the availability, quality, cost and efficiency

in the transportation sector as a way to influence the competitiveness of exported goods on the international market as well as the cost of imported goods. NSC relies on the 1997 Nigerian Shipping Board (Local Shipping Fee) Regulations; Nigerian Shipper Board (Land Container Depot) Regulations 2007 and Nigerian Shipper Board (Container Transport Station) Regulations 2007 for their operations. According to the law, the Nigerian Shipping Council performs the main function of providing a forum to protect the interests of the sender of goods in matters affecting the delivery of imports and exports to and from Nigeria. They are equally carrying out the functions of the Port Economy Regulator, especially the provision of guidance on regulating tariffs to guide against arbitrariness; promotion of efficiency in providing port services; monitor and ensure compliance by all parties with the provisions of the Port Concession Agreement (NSB, 2019).

The above highlights reveal that there is excessive responsibility between these institutions. For example, NIMASA does Maritime Safety Administration, Marine Pollution Prevention and Control, Search and Rescue, while NPA also managing marine incidents and pollution; maintenance of safety and security in the general user area; developing and maintaining port superstructure, maintaining safety and security in the terminal; and the NSC performs the function of the Port Economy Regulator by providing guidance on tariff arrangements to guide against arbitrariness; promotion of efficiency in providing port services; monitor and ensure compliance by all parties with the provisions of the Port Concession Agreement. These overlapping issues are responsible for inter-agency competition which prevents inter-agency collaboration needed to smoothly manage marine business in Nigeria.

This is a clear contradiction with the IMO convention that has identified top agencies and subsidiaries in the maritime sector and what should be the agency's responsibility. As such, overlapping problems should not exist if the Convention and IMO agreements are strictly adhered to. Therefore, there is a need to review this difference from the Agency Act for smooth business in the maritime sector. At present, these overlapping challenges and competition between institutions is responsible for many challenges in this sector. Some of them include inadequate berths which are prevented by each institution's suspicion and the inability of the government agency responsible for advocating for this; and the inability to undergo dredging of space to allow the arrival of large ships. Even challenges of insecurity such as sea piracy, illegal fishing, sea robbery continue to occur because of gaps in the administration of maritime business. At present, ports in Nigeria are challenged by silting and reduction of

channel width; the problem of continuous dockworkers; problems with ship delays due to congestion; inadequate function of plant and port equipment; inadequate maintenance of existing facilities; reduced financial and funding for port operations, especially in the field of port infrastructure; deterioration in service quality which causes severe congestion; further proliferation of government agencies in port activities; operational and procedural delays and inefficiencies (Obed, Oke, Samuel, 2017). All of this is expected to be corrected by these agencies and the Ministry of Transportation as a whole through a review of the Acts that formed these Agencies.

However, the Ministry of Transportation is burdened with the general problem of a bureaucratic civil service system where her staff are transferred by the Head of the Federation Service. This is in pure disregard to the professionalism expected of the workers of this specialized agency. The direct implication of this is that non-specialized workforce is placed in specialised departments, contrary to performance-driven systems expected of this specialised MDA. This incompetent officer is allegedly unable to push the expected changes in this sector. To overcome the challenge of workforce development, the Ministry of Transport and its subordinate bodies created and support the Nigerian Maritime Academy alongside other universities in the country taking Transportation Management as a course, to train university graduates and mid-level officer on the requirements and skills of the Maritime Transportation industry. However, the absorption rate of these Academy and University graduates in civil service in general and the Ministry of Transportation in particular has not been encouraging (Abiodun, 2020).

Not only that, the formulation of effective marine policies and laws is hampered by a number of other problems. These issues that will be highlighted are expected to be addressed and incorporated into new laws and policies. They: an inhospitable operating environment in which investors, users and stakeholders operate under highly competitive policies that negatively impact the growth, operational modalities and development of the maritime industry. Growing port tariffs that is frightening importers and exporters, manipulation of the system, such as dishonesty in goods declarations, invoices concealment, and over-billing leading to capital flight, have serious negative implications for the economy.

The challenges created by the absence of a holistic institutional framework from the Ministry of Transportation have also been identified as important difficulties for achieving optimal benefits from the maritime

industry. The Ministry of Transportation seems confused between the need for a comprehensive policy for the Transportation System in Nigeria and the need for a Holistic Maritime Business Act for the country. While the Comprehensive Transportation Policy in Nigeria provides a comprehensive direction on Transportation Policy, which will consist of Maritime, Road, Railroad and Air Transportation, the Comprehensive Maritime Industry Policy will discuss the specific Maritime aspects of transportation on the one hand taking into account the Shipping Law and the Maritime Industry Policy work the same as the policy holders in this country.

Not only is the National Maritime Policy lacking in the nation's maritime environment, operational shipping policies are also reported to be lacking (Obed, et al., 2017). The lack of an operational dispatch policy framework has provided space for violations of the law among operators, shareholders, ship owners, ship agents, and senders of goods in the face of the International Maritime Convention. A comprehensive maritime policy framework is needed to provide an operational road map for the industry and reduce mismanagement and corruption in the maritime sector.

Finally, the frequent shifts in the direction of government policy on issues concerning shipping, tariffs, expected agencies in port management, and security management at sea over the years, are serious problems that hamper the growth and development of the maritime industry. A case is a cargo palletisation policy that is put in place to replace the use of a scanner on handle inspection of goods. Despite the fact that the palletisation policy is a direct violation (IPPC) (ISPMP) No. 15 international conventions on palletised, wood, dunnage that carry invasive insects, pallet policy is the wrong alternative for the scanner because it will increase the number of scanners, empty containers and increase freight payments. Whereas what is expected is the Federal Government to improve the scanner to remove the mandatory provisions of palletized goods in containers on Nigerian shipments. In addition, palletization will increase capital flight and increase shipping costs to the country. This policy has been proposed to be developed without input from relevant maritime industry stakeholders. Several other failed policies were enacted, such as Pre-Shipment Inspection Policy (PSI), Destination Inspection Policy (DI), policies on Professional Import Duty Administrators (PIDA), Cargo Scan Services through Service Providers, National Automotive Policy, Cargo Tracking Records, Information Systems Advanced Cargo (ACIS), and several others (Editor, 2019).

Apart from NIMASA, the NPA and the Shipping Board involved in the management of Ocean and Sea security in Nigeria, the Nigerian Navy, the

Nigerian Marine Police and the National Security and Defense Corps are also involved in managing security issues at Sea. This confusion can only foster laziness and provide space for the spread of rumors that corrupt-minded people can exploit regularly. Perhaps this could be the reason why security challenges are higher in the Nigerian Sea and have a major impact on the resilience of the Nigerian Maritime Industry.

The import of the analysis so far is that there is a need to address the problem of overlapping responsibilities by reviewing the laws that make up these institutions. Unfortunately, the workforce expected to do this does not do it, despite the political will to implement it. Thus, for the formulation of effective policies and legislation for the Nigerian Maritime Industry, it is necessary to first overcome the challenges of labor in this sector by combining specialization in the marine system, building trust in the native shipping industry, reviewing security agencies in the sector, empowering development workforce skills and ensuring discipline and fighting corruption.

B. Synergy between maritime stakeholders

The maritime industry, as one of the profitable sectors of the world economy, has many practitioners operating in sectors. These stakeholders work in maritime industry, from safety and security, to financial administration, marine health, and maritime labor relations to achieve coordinated solutions, prevent maritime vulnerability in the maritime region of the Gulf of Guinea and successful maritime business. The importance of synergy is to achieve effective maritime industry regulation. Synergy is expected in institutions at the core Ministry of Transportation such as the Nigerian Shippers Council (NSC), the Nigerian Port Authority (NPA), the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), the Nigerian Waterway Authority (NIWA) and the Nigerian Maritime Academy (MAN), Oron; and other agencies relating with them outside the Ministry of Transportation, such as Federal Inland Revenue, Nigerian Customs Services, Nigerian Standards Organization, Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Security and Defense Corps, Nigerian Sea Police and other professional bodies.

Synergy in the national maritime industry is expected to drive the sustainability agenda which is the key to efforts to advance the maritime industry. The strength of synergy is the achievement of effective program delivery or issues such as the possibility of 24-hour port operations; quick resolution of legal issues; port process digitalization, transactions to reach the contact less port, paperless port, mainly achieving 98 percent of the port

digitalization plan (Eromosele, 2020). Furthermore, this synergy between institutions and parastatals will reduce intermediate contacts, long time records or correspondence management which usually takes months before attention, thus hampering open and transparent processes that can help quick decision making for competing countries. This synergy also helped in streamlining the evacuation and delivery of cargo to the port, which until now had relied on a single mode of transportation, with the consequence of slow processing due to non-utilization of inland waterways, trains.

The synergy will be enhanced by regular meetings of various bodies which will lead to sharing ideas and information among stakeholders to increase operational opportunities in the maritime industry. The adoption of digitization process will ensure that decisions that were used to take months to reach through correspondence will now take days therefore aiding quick decision making. One important area of synergy is the problem of removing shipwrecks, where three institutions have overlapping responsibilities on: for example, NIMASA, NIWA and NPA have overlapping functions on issues based on agency law. This usually leads to a delay due to the inability to ascertain who is responsible for what and ultimately nothing is done.

In another dimension, NPA and NIMASA can collaborate in security management against external attacks at ports or at sea. So also NIMASA, NIWA and even Nigeria Customs Services can collaborate in revenue collection, dredging of the port dredged and the management of berths. This synergy is expected to drive the national maritime industry to achieve 2.5 percent growth and the maritime sector contributes to at least 10 percent of Nigeria's GDP, as well as generating around 65-67 percent of cargo throughput in West Africa, and 65 percent of all cargo going to the region Sub-Saharan Africa ends up in the Nigerian market. Synergy too will guarantee investors participation and encourage special intervention funds, special interest rates and other incentives that can encourage optimal performance in the sector. This synergy is expected to be enhanced by the large investments made by the Nigerian Maritime Academy and Universities in Nigeria in developing human capacity in this sector so that more Nigerians are involved in shipping, shipping operations, and others (Ochai, 2019).

In terms of inter-institutional synergy within the national maritime industry and outside agencies, the contribution of security agents in working together to achieve synergistic benefits from joint efforts for the security of the nation's maritime sector cannot be overemphasized. Although the Nigerian Navy (NN) has primary responsibility for the protection of sea and sea security,

NN has been able to work hand in hand with NIMASA and NPA in preventing security at sea and on ships. Another agency collaborating with NPA, NIMASA and NSC is the Nigerian Customs Service which has a focus on examining goods and services that enter the country as well as generating revenue for government cash. The creation of an environment that allows for ease of doing business at the port and for effective cargo clearing is the responsibility of the NCS but they need the NPA to facilitate this. As such, the NPA while playing a regulatory and financial function for the government collaborates with NCS in actualizing the ease of doing business for impressive business experiences and generating revenue. NPA, NIMASA and NSC also collaborate with Customs in promoting transit trade, Nigerian Customs Services, on the other hand, rely on the NPA for the supply and processing of manifest paper for clearing of goods at ports, especially with increasing cases of document forgery and misrepresentation of goods (Foster Obi, 2016).

One institution that works closely with NPA, NIMASA and NSC is the Ministry of Public Works (Ministry of Public Works) specifically in providing access roads and removing all obstacles to the smooth transportation of cargo at the port. The Ministry of Works collaborates in investments in large-scale infrastructure development, in the form of roads leading to ports and railways to ports and waterways. For the supply of trains to the port, NPA, NIMASA, and NSC are working with the Nigerian Railway Corporation to facilitate the movement of cargo by train. Collaboration between ministries bodies also helps in smoothing the articulation of value chains and helps with ongoing consultations with private sector operators and all other stakeholders in government such as the Nigerian Railway Company (NRC),

However, one area of synergy that must be avoided by all stakeholders is the assignment of maritime security responsibilities to private companies as carried out by the Nigerian Port Authority when Maritime security services was given to a private company, Ocean Marine Solutions Limited (OMSL) for vessels management at the port of Lagos regardless of the legal role of the NIMASA and the Nigerian Navy. OMSL happens to be a private security company owned and provide security services to foreign ships berthing at Apapa and Tin Can Island Ports in Lagos at a price of \$ 2,000 per day on the first day and a subsequent fee of \$ 1,500 daily in an area called the Secure Anchorage Area. The company said it was working in partnership with the Nigerian Navy, which also licensed it to operate since 2014, and maintain that its services provide much-needed security for ships contacting the port of Nigeria at no cost to the Nigerian government.

This synergy is contrary to the legal responsibilities of the Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Marine Police and NIMASA, and is only possible when a clear security gap in Nigerian waters is identified (Samson, 2019). Thus, to achieve successful synergy in the maritime sector, three main issues that must be strengthened by the Nigerian government in line with the recommendations of the Safe Seas Best Toolkit. The first problem is the need for clear Interagency Coordination of Business and Maritime Security at the political and technical level. This will require the establishment of a High-Level Political Committee, the National Maritime Business Committee at the ministerial level at the highest ministerial level, and an Inter-Institutional Technical Committee or Task Force to manage maritime business and security at the institutional level. This is important because maritime business and security revolves around various ministries and institutions such as interior, justice, security and defense, environment, fisheries and tourism. Achieving openness and management of interests that differ from an institutional and professional perspective is the responsibility of the committee, which is able to lead to the achievement of resilience in the maritime sector.

The second problem that can strengthen synergies in the maritime sector is the need to overcome sea distrust with broad public awareness about the importance of the sea or the sea. This becomes necessary because there is observed communication gap on the risks and opportunities of the oceans. Synergy can be broadened when maritime security and business are broadcast, special attention paid to global maritime celebrations, such as Africa Ocean and Ocean Day which is usually held on July 25, World Ocean Day on June 6 and IMO World Maritime Day in the month September at various levels of educational programs.

Third, synergy is strengthened by the existence of the Maritime Domain Awareness Center (MDA-C) which can synchronize information and data about maritime activities and analyze them for quick decision making. MDA can help build trust between institutions and help in overcoming problems with daily interactions between institutions. MDA Centers are usually high-tech centers that will have integrated sensors such as radar stations, databases and anomaly detection algorithms, or visualize data with human staff seconded from each institution, analyzing data collected from sensors, both from informants from more maritime large communities such as fishermen, or public sources such as social media or news. This high-tech system is expensive, and requires high maintenance costs that can be handled well by all institutions, not from one institution. Inter-Institutional Technical Committees and Institutions in the maritime sector are expected to rely on MDA-C to share

information, integrate search and rescue functions, fisheries observation and fishing activities, among others. The earlier the MDA Center is established, it will determine the extent to which maritime security trends, national and regional anomalies will be examined and responded to. MDA, if established, will increase the effectiveness of maritime operations, support patrols and preventive inspections, and increase responsiveness to maritime environmental disasters or search and rescue situations. To prevent, or ensure the timely capture of maritime crime suspects. integration of search and rescue functions, observing fisheries and fishing activities, among others. The earlier the MDA Center is established, it will determine the extent to which maritime security trends, national and regional anomalies will be examined and responded to. The MDA, if established, will increase the effectiveness of maritime operations, support patrols and preventive inspections, and improve responsiveness to maritime environmental disasters or search and rescue situations, to prevent, or ensure the timely capture of maritime crime suspects. integration of search and rescue functions, observation of fishing and fishing activities, among others.

Another major consideration is the aspect of collaboration with our neighboring countries. This is the key to increasing and building resilience in Nigeria's maritime industry to attract more business into the economy. Nigeria sits in the middle of the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and shares a sea border with the Republic of Benin in the west and Cameroon on the east side. Unfortunately, Nigeria does not enjoy good economic relations with its neighbors. It is important to note that there is still considerable room for improvement in terms of establishing and expanding the scope for collaborative trans-regional maritime collective security arrangements in West and Central Africa. This can begin, for example, by recognizing that the perimeter of adjacent waters in the Economic Community of Central African States (Zone D ECCAS) overlaps with boundaries adjacent to West African countries in Nigeria and Benin, where threats maritime security is also very pronounced. This underlines the importance of cooperation with ECOWAS and with major players such as Nigeria. Therefore, it is no coincidence that ECOWAS has adopted key aspects of the ECCAS model, for example by indicating a greater commitment to encourage information sharing, asset coordination, and integration. by recognizing that the perimeter of the area of adjacent waters within the Economic Community of Central African States (Zone D ECCAS) overlaps with boundaries adjacent to West African countries in Nigeria and Benin, where the threat of maritime security is also very clear. This underlines the importance of cooperation with ECOWAS and with major players such as Nigeria.

In 2012, ECOWAS created its first operational zone, named 'Zone E' which involved Nigeria, Niger, Benin and Togo. Furthermore, an agreement on maritime surveillance in adjacent waters was signed in May 2009 followed by the creation of an inventory of naval assets and joint patrols capable of helping weaker navies in the zone to pool their shared resources in an effective and efficient manner. It is also partly in response to the awareness that the maritime security challenges facing West and Central Africa are very similar that ECOWAS has recently made much effort to improve itself with ECCAS in terms of understanding the maritime dimension of its regional dilemmas. Before now, ECOWAS's focus was primarily on land security. Even though it is a much more developed REC, its maritime strategy was only first discussed by the Defense Chief of Staff Committee (CCDS) at a meeting held in Cotonou in April 2010 when the idea was still in its infancy.

Another area to consider is the issue of illegal fishing that is not reported and reported (IUU) from neighboring countries as well as from China. As a relatively poor country with a relatively rich sea, Nigeria is also vulnerable to illegal fishing by foreign vessels, especially from China. The government's fisheries department has no services patrol boat currently to monitor licensed vessels. In March 2018, the Nigerian navy noted that the country lost estimates US \$ 70 million every year due to illegal fishing. This threat adds to the looming disaster in food security, especially given the report that half of fish species in the waters of West Africa have been over exploited.

Conclusion and Recommendation

This paper relied on the constructivist approach of maritime security and advocate for the stakeholder collaboration, vertically and horizontally; putting up security framework and utilisation of practical approach in solving maritime security measures and achieving robust maritime industry in Nigeria. This paper concludes that despite presence of conventions, treaties and agreements, the maritime insecurity was on the increase in Africa and specifically in Nigeria due to absence of maritime policy, challenges of overlapping responsibilities, inadequate national and international synergy towards implementation and enforcement of the law of the sea.

The paper advocate for collaboration with neighbouring countries on achieving Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capability to enhance tracking and early response to illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing activities during poaching. This will be possible when all African countries has

integrated coastal radar for proper MDA workings. Efforts however need to be geared to changing of old suspicions and prejudices between nations. Nigeria and Cameroon, for instance has capacity to track and intercept suspect vessels at the border between Zone E and Zone D, however Cameroon does not grant Nigeria the right of hot pursuit into her territorial waters. This is also applicable between Ghana and Nigeria where the formation of an “information-sharing coalition” was set up between Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin, without co-opting Nigeria. Thus, challenges still exist in sharing information with Nigeria and this has been capitalized upon by the criminal networks. On the tactical level, even though there is an absence of formalised and trained procedures for Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) and poor communications equipment, efforts at enhancing tactical skills for boat handling, boarding and close-quarter including room-clearing as well as command procedures should be sustained. There is need to make more effort at possession of VHF radio to communicate with the ship and securing the crime scene and preservation and collection of evidence.

Thus, in line with the constructivist approach to maritime security, there are need for critical measures to assist in achieve security resilience in the Nigeria Maritime industry. The first of it is the domestication of international maritime laws. This will assist in the push for regional cooperation to combat piracy, customary international law as most of the countries in Africa is still requires domestic legislation to prosecute the crime. In Nigeria, the mode for domestication of international treaties is provided for in the constitution. Section 12(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 provides that; "No treaty between the federation and other country shall have the force of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly." Treaty such as the UNCLOS and SUA conventions can only have the force of law in Nigeria when the Nigerian National Assembly must enact the treaty into law. It is then Nigeria will domesticate these conventions into national law. The lack of compliance with the conventions, exemplified by non-domestication has prevented prosecution of some cases involving piracy and armed robbery at sea before any court of law in Nigeria, nor can violators of the conventions be held accountable for any breach.

There is need to address legislative lacuna occasioned by some of the MDA inability to prosecute maritime culprits - pirates to court as there is no appropriate offence under the national law to charge the persons involved. This is likely to result in catch and release situations, thereby giving a free pass to the suspected persons to continue their acts. From the above points, it could be

concluded that the inability of Nigeria to enact specific laws on piracy and armed robbery at sea is a contributing factor to the limited number of maritime security related trials in national courts. Also, for effective law enforcement against maritime insecurity activities, there needs to be have a robust capacity with respect to surveillance, response and enforcement. In Nigeria, surveillance has improved tremendously due to the existence of the FALCON EYE surveillance system which monitors the Nigerian maritime zones up to 200nm. However, the vessels available for use by the Nigerian Navy and NIMASA for patrols and rescue duties are inadequate. This has a major effect on response time to distress calls on piracy attacks and also on other enforcement measures such as in situations of hot pursuit of a vessel involved in piracy. The Nigerian Navy finds it very difficult to navigate into such creeks because the vessels it deploys for the operations are not built for such waters. Most times, local pilots are employed for patrol operations to ensure the vessels are navigated through the right channels. Furthermore, there is need to address the limited inter-agency cooperation as a result of the proliferation of agencies in the maritime sector of Nigeria. The law establishing some of these agencies need to clearly delineate their respective duties and functions. Measures to ensure maritime dispute over sovereignty of countries need to be addressed.

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Think Tanks and Nigeria's National Development: The Implications for NIPSS at the Next Level

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Introduction

The twenty-first century is clearly the age of think tanks all across the world. And their significance is clearly accentuated by the axiomatic significance of democratic governance, and the compelling need to modernize the policy architecture of the developmental states in a VUCA-ized new world in ways that make for policy intelligence and strategic implementations. In other words, think tanks emerged as a necessity that stand between democratic governments that are concerned with increasing the quality of life of their citizens, the imperative policy intelligence and active research required to make such an objective possible and realized. And this fundamental inaugurating objective of the think tank is even more critical within a post-colonial context like Nigeria where democratic governance is confronted by a host of daily deepening challenges, from unemployment to bad governance and policy abortions of all sorts.

The emergence of think tanks on the continent came late, but has become a vibrant incidence that has already started impacting on the understanding of governance matters, and especially the conception of the African state as a developmental agent that can facilitate strategic policy implementation for the sake of improving the social contract between the government and the governed. Post-independence dynamics for most African states has been fraught with so many challenges having to do, especially in Nigeria, with national integration and national development. To concede, most African countries have been very active in efforts, especially in terms of institutional, governance and policy reforms to articulate a definite path to democratic governance. One of such reform efforts has to do either with some concrete engagement with think tanks on policy intelligence or the

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establishment of government think tanks that are charged with executive education and policy researches the government can draw on for governance purposes. This is the case with Nigeria, and the establishment of the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS).

In this essay, I will be pursuing a critical and conceptual analysis to situate NIPSS within both an internalist and externalist framework of understanding, relative to Nigeria's search for an enabling democratic governance and development. I will be examining the inaugurating objective of NIPSS in the light of recent conceptual and practical developments in think tanking, and recommending fundamental reform changes that can bring the think tank experiment in tune with contemporary realities and challenges.

Statement of the problem

NIPSS is lacking in critical scholarly engagement, as a significant dimension or manifestation of the think tank experiment. By this statement, I mean to say that there are precious few scholarly interrogations of its nature (as a government think tank), *modus operandi*, objectives, successes, hindrances and possibilities. This lack of scholarly focus might be due to the fact that the think tank idea is essentially a private one. There is what Juliana Hauck (2017) has called a “conceptual gap” in any attempt to unravel the meaning and nature of think tanks that will cover the diverse contexts within which they operate across the world, and the challenges they face. Hartwig Pautz argues that

While there is a significant body of literature on think-tanks and their role for policy change and continuity, debate on the definition of what actually constitutes a think-tank, how it does what it does and what its role is, has somewhat come to a standstill. Most research relies on definitions and typologies devised in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the changing nature of the policy advice landscape requires revisiting the think-tank phenomenon: external policy advice to governments is being offered by an increasing variety of organizations and in particular the boundaries between think-tanks, university institutes and management consultancies have become ever more blurred – if, indeed, they were ever as clear-cut as typologies and organizations' self-descriptions seem to imply (2011: 420).

Indeed, we can conveniently say that almost every essay on think tanks have something significant to say about their nature.

Since the idea of the think tank emerged as an Anglo-Saxon concept, its nature and function has been conditioned by the circumstances of its context of development. The implications of different regional and national contexts on the understanding of the nature and functions of think tanks have since began emerging in the literature (Kimenyi and Datta 2011). However, the origin of their emergence and conception in the West has led to their understanding as a significant of the emerging “knowledge regimes” in the world (Campbell and Pietersen 2008). However, the literature is not heavy on the discussion of think tanks not only as knowledge configurations but also as development regimes, especially within a postcolonial context like Nigeria. Think tanks, outside of their status as development partners in liberal societies, play an even more development role in Africa. And this is even more accentuated when a government, willing to transform its development capability, inaugurate a think tank for its own development use. This is the case in Nigeria, and with the constitution of the NIPSS. I hope this essay can address this lacuna in the literature.

Objective of the study

The fundamental objective of this essay is to critically situate NIPSS as a foremost think tank within the Nigerian policy space within the development and governance requirements of the Nigerian state. The think tank idea is not a new one in the Nigerian political and policy space. However, all the efforts that commenced very early in the post-independence life of the Nigerian state culminated in the emergence of NIPSS. And from the 1970s, NIPSS has become the preeminent think tank assisting the successive governments in the onerous task of fashioning a governance and development blueprint that will make the government stay true to its social contract with Nigerians. This raises what we can call a capacitation and efficiency question: Is NIPSS as presently constituted and adequately configured to meet the demand of a twenty-first century think tank operating within a postcolonial context?

Methodology

This essay deploys the quantitative and qualitative methodology. The qualitative method allows for the theoretical unpacking of the critical concepts, especially “think tank” and “development” within the African continent, and the determination of the role of NIPSS in the understanding of the two. The quantitative dimension of the methodology is more evidence-based, as it details specific empirical information that relates especially to the emergence and development of NIPSS as a government think tank in Nigeria.

Clarification of Concepts and Theoretical Framework

In policy and development literature, the idea of a think tank has become one of the most difficult ones to unravel. Its very nature is complicated by the several contexts and circumstances that contributed to its evolution. The literature on the think tank agrees that they are uniquely an American creation. The concept of the “think tank” itself derives from a military term used during the Second World War to denote a secure place where strategies and planning for the war could be carried out. However, from the 1960s, its meaning began to gradually change within the context of the United States and its political system which favors the private over the public. Think tank began to emerge with a unique meaning that refers to private and nongovernmental research organisations existing for policy advice. However, while the United State contributed immensely to our understanding of the evolution of think tanks, the first think tank in history is often regarded as the Fabian Society, the socialist organisation that was in existence in the United Kingdom in the late nineteenth century. Its objective was essentially to influence Britain's public policy. For McGann (2007), the explosion of think tanks in the twentieth and the twenty first centuries are due to the following reasons:

- Information and technological revolution
- End of national governments' monopoly on information
- Increasing complexity and technical nature of policy problems
- Increasing size of government
- Crisis of confidence in governments and elected officials
- Globalization and the growth of state and non-state actors
- Need for timely and concise information and analysis that is “in the right form, in the right hands, at the right time

Think tanks and their evolution have been attributed to the contexts and dynamics of policymaking. All governments and political systems are supposed to be motivated by the complexities of governance to generate policy conversations and deliberations that will inform policy solutions and resolutions. Unfortunately, the nature of government and political institutions are such that do not automatically facilitate these deliberations. According to Fraussen and Halpin,

Existing political institutions do not often encourage these discussions and in fact foster disincentives for engaging in strategic policy debates. More generally, governance

arrangements, and the way in which interactions between policymakers and other societal actors are structured, can constrain the capacity of governments to identify and address key policy problems and lead to the persistence of policy failures... This lack of capacity may be most apparent with respect to major systemic issues, such as social inequality or climate change, as governance success in these areas requires "more than simply hitting a narrow target and may require more comprehensive consideration within and across policy domains"... Compared to economic markets, processes of learning and competition are considered less effective in politics, where both short time horizons and the strong status quo bias of existing institutions reinforce path-dependent patterns (2017: 106)

In other words, the dynamics of politics and political institutions are motivated by short-term results which stand contrary to what the think tank offers. Think tanks are supposedly located outside the electoral concerns of politicians to facilitate fresh and innovative ideas and insights about a range of significant issues—poverty, employment, foreign policy, environment, gender, trade, economy, education, health and healthcare, etc.

Essentially therefore, think tanks emerged to provide a significant link between knowledge and policy conception. This implies injecting thorough knowledge, derived from significant research into the considerations of policy and policy options. Other critical functions include:

- mediating between the government and the public;
- building confidence in public institutions;
- serving as an informed and independent voice in policy debates;
- identifying, articulating, and evaluating policy issues, proposals, and programs;
- transforming ideas and emerging problems into policy issues;
- interpreting issues, events, and policies for the electronic and print media, thus facilitating public understanding of domestic and international policy issues;
- providing a constructive forum for the exchange of ideas and information between key stakeholders in the policy formulation

process;

- facilitating the construction of “issue networks”;
- providing a supply of informed personnel for the legislative and executive branches of government;
- challenging the conventional wisdom, standard operating procedures, and “business as usual” of bureaucrats and elected officials (McGann, 2007: 5-6).

However, the definition of what makes any organisation a “think tank” is not as clear as the dynamics that brought the think tanks into global relevance, or how they interfere in the policymaking trajectory. The terminological trouble over what constitutes a think tank derives from the organisational similarities between a think tank, a non-governmental organisations, management consultancies, or university institutes.

With the entirety of the literature dedicated to illuminating the meaning of what a think tank is, and does, it is no longer a worthwhile conceptual effort to keep beating the terminological and conceptual bush in search of a perfect and all-encompassing definition and characterization. But just one definition suffices. According to McGann,

Think tanks are public-policy research analysis and engagement organizations that generate policy-oriented research, analysis, and advice on domestic and international issues, thereby enabling policy makers and the public to make informed decisions about public policy. Think tanks may be affiliated or independent institutions that are structured as permanent bodies, not ad hoc commissions. These institutions often act as a bridge between the academic and policymaking communities and between states and civil society, serving in the public interest as independent voices that translate applied and basic research into a language that is understandable, reliable, and accessible for policy makers and the public (2019: 12).

This definition provides three key concepts by which we can begin to make sense of what think tanks means and what they do. These concepts are: public policy, research analysis and engagement. Essentially, think tank justify their existence by the need to interject knowledge in the public policy process. Just as we noted earlier, this becomes critical in the light of the possibility of politics

undermining the knowledge component of public policy. Thus, the objective of the think tank is not only to inform the policy process but also to influence it. And this leads to the second concept. What justifies the think tank argument for informing and influencing public policy concerns the depth of research and the professionalism that goes into the policy analysis and the alternative policy options that derive from the research dynamics. And lastly, engagement is a concept that insists on bringing the results and the possible consequences of the alternative policy scenarios to the attention of the government, and demanding at least that attention be paid to them.

Think tanks are generally denoted as being non-governmental. While this is a critical feature of think tanks, it does not exhaust all other possibilities, especially the fact that government often set up think tanks and fund them. Government think tanks come in handy when governments across the world set governance objectives which needed specialized knowledge and policy research to realize. These think tanks could be presidential or ministerial think tanks located within a particular department or ministry, advisory groups, ad hoc directorates that lack permanence and are resident in research units, or stand-alone think tanks that report directly to the presidency. They are unique because

- (i) they have a primary audience of government policy makers for their work; (ii) their funding and leadership usually rests in the hands of the state; and (iii) they are often staffed with government employees and subject to rules of government bureaucracy (Mackenzie et al, 2015: 4).

And their functions are specific: “undertaking high-quality research, interpreting government's needs, and tailoring responses to actual policies and programs (rather than academic inquiries), as well as an advocacy and brokering role” (ibid.).

Of course, the idea of a government affiliated think tank immediately raises the red flag of organisational monitoring that poses a fundamental threat to the characteristics of independence and autonomy that capacitate think tanks to achieve their goals. Compared to other nongovernmental and independent think tanks, government affiliated think tanks face critical limitations:

- Inability to be critical of the government if retribution is feared through reporting lines.
- A tendency to become administrative support hubs that produce short-

term briefings and do not contribute to real analysis, policy change and strategy.

- Overlap with existing government functions (such as performance audit, line ministry analysis and evaluation roles).
- Duplication with existing external think tanks that could perform this function rather than creating a new institution within government.
- Without a clear role or reporting line they can be unclear on what they are expected to produce and for whom, given the enormity of government coverage.
- They can supplant domestic research organisations, and redirect much needed funding (Mackenzie et al., 2015: 5).

These limitations must however not be allowed to undermine the significant advantages and strengths of government think tanks vis-à-vis all other think tanks. These merits include;

- A strong understanding of government programs and priorities, so advice is tailored to actual needs.
- An awareness of the actual timeframes and entry points for advice which leads to it having real impact, and actual uptake in the system.
- Longevity and ability to attract high-quality staff due to long-term secured funding.
- Prestige, with leadership and access that goes to the highest levels of government.
- A practical understanding of the policymaking process.
- An ability to secure strong networks and international input given the government endorsement of the institution.
- Being seen by policymakers as “one of us” rather than “one of them”.
- An ability to provide frank and critical advice privately without needing to criticise the government using public channels or forums.
- An ability to coordinate across government departments in a way that external think tanks could not (ibid.).

The significance of government think tanks is further concretized by the challenges of a postcolonial context where the most fundamental challenges

range from national integration and national development. This makes the postcolonial context more daunting than an average Western liberal state. And makes the most important case for any government making the effort to make a developmental difference in the lives of her citizens. This critical perspective—of situating think tanks in their postcolonial context and the development objectives they are confronted with—recommends postcolonialism as the most appropriate theoretical framework for understanding the nature and characteristics of government think tanks, and the postcolonial complexities they are enmeshed in. Postcoloniality emphasizes “the economic, material and cultural conditions that determine the global system in which the postcolonial nation is required to operate – one heavily weighted towards the interests of international capital and the G7 powers” (Young 2016: 57). But the concept also denotes the local autonomy and the resistance which it generates against the global system that seeks to undermine the development efforts of postcolonial states. On the other hand, postcolonialism posits

a theoretical and political position which embodies an active concept of intervention within such oppressive circumstances. It combines the epistemological cultural innovations of the postcolonial moment with a political critique of the conditions of postcoloniality. In that sense, the 'post' of postcolonialism, or postcolonial critique, marks the historical moment of the theorized introduction of new tricontinental forms and strategies of critical analysis and practice (ibid.: 57-58)

Think tanks, in this context, serve a strategic function in getting the state into an effective development mode through policy research that transform the policy architecture of the state. In a postcolonial context, think tanks, and especially the government affiliated ones, become a significant ingredient in the aspiration of the democratic African state to be developmental. This is where NIPSS makes its appearance in Nigeria's postcolonial predicament of underdevelopment. The National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS) emerged out of a specifically constructed vision of an institution that is meant to take up some unique responsibilities borne out of the predicaments of the newly emerged Nigerian state. The emergence of the African think tanks constituted a more reliable organisational structure whose

context of emergence approximate the sum of the colonial and post-independence circumstances that any African state could draw upon for effective governance. However, the birth of these African think tanks was already constrained by various international and global actors and agencies whose interventions in their operational frameworks ensured that issues of independence and autonomy would be subordinated to the subtle interplay between funding that comes from the donor agencies and the ideological demands of those agencies for the operations of the think tanks. The African think tanks therefore became too dependent and unstable to impact the development challenges of the new African states, equally caught in the neocolonial machinations of the former colonial overlords.

It therefore became imperative for any government that needed to transform the governance and policy architecture of the newly emerged Nigerian state to reflect beyond the knowledge limitation constituted by the existing think tanks configuration. Thus, there was no choice left for a conscientious government than the creation of a national think tank that would be outfitted with specific objectives demanded by the challenges of making the postcolonial state work contrary to the expectations of the colonial masters. In his inaugurating speech, Obasanjo was very specific with outlining the vision of what the nascent think tank was meant to achieve:

As the highest institution in our land, the National Institute should, with information and inputs from both public and private organisations, be in a position to advise on the best policy options in the overall interest of our nation. Again, its research goals should be nation-oriented, perceptive and independent, such that it would be capable of giving reasoned opinion to the government and public on short and long term issues.

The founding objective of the Institute, as stated clearly in the NIPSS founding act, is simple and straightforward:

The Institute shall serve as high level centre of reflection, research, and dialogue where academics of intellectual excellence, policy initiators and executors and other citizens with high level of practical experience and wisdom drawn from different sectors of national life in Nigeria would meet to reflect and exchange ideas on the great issues of society, particularly as they relate to Nigeria and Africa, in the context

of the dynamics of a constantly changing world.

In aspiring to being the apex center of policy and research, the Institute's vision, NIPSS launched itself around six founding objectives:

- a. to conduct courses for top level policy makers and executors drawn from different sectors of the national polity with a view to expanding their outlook and perspective and stretching their conceptual capacity and qualities of discernment and analysis and thereby helping to improve their overall performance in their different fields of action;
- b. to award certificates of attendance to those who participate in a sufficient and satisfactory manner in any of its courses;
- c. to conduct seminars, workshops and other action-oriented programmes whether on a continuing or ad hoc basis for leaders in the public services (including the armed forces and other disciplined forces), the private sector, political organisations, professional and other groups with a view to promoting and defining, and enhancing appreciation for, long range national plans and objectives;
- d. to identify, encourage, stimulate, assemble, organise and help deploy to the best national advantage the country's intellectual talents and experienced policy analysts who are likely to make positive contributions to the treatment of complex policy problems;
- e. to organise and carry out, on an inter-disciplinary basis in intellectual support of those charged with making and implementing policy for Nigeria, research in depth into the social, economic, political, security, scientific, cultural and other problems facing the country and to formulate and present, in usable form, the available options of their solution;
- f. to disseminate by way of publication of books, records, reports or otherwise, information about any part of its activities, to the extent deemed justified by the Board in the interest of the nation, and generally as a contribution towards knowledge and for better national and international understanding; and
- g. to promote or undertake any other activity that in the opinion of the Board is calculated to help achieve the purposes of the Institute.

NIPSS came into existence in 1979, and it has been forty-three solid years since it has been operating within the development context of the Nigerian state. The critical question is: how has NIPSS made the crucial transition from the twentieth to the twenty-first century as a national think tank confronted with the myriads of global and continental best practices that think tanks have to deal with? And furthermore: how has NIPSS weather the storm of politics and internal governance within the charged atmosphere of the Nigerian polity and its many faux pas? And finally, how has NIPSS managed the very process of institutionalization that would have made it easier for her goals and objectives to be realizable? Answering these questions definitely goes beyond the scope of this essay. However, in the rest of the essay, I will make significant gestures in placing NIPSS in proper institutional reform perspective that will provide a basis for future investigation of the institutional progress and capacity readiness of Nigeria's foremost think tank.

From Thinking to Thinking-and-Doing

The Developmental State Paradigm (DSP) emerged as a solid ideological alternative to the neoliberal capitalist idea and its framework of Washington Consensus. The Washington Consensus not only undermined the possibility of state intervention in the economy, but actively promote “trade liberalization, financial market liberalization, foreign capital liberalization (eliminating barriers to FDI), privatization of production, deregulation of legal framework, secure property rights, unified and competitive exchange rate, diminished public spending (fiscal discipline), tax reforms (broadening the tax base, cutting marginal tax rates, less progressive tax), a social safety net (narrowly targeted selective transfer for the needy) and flexible labour markets as the only sustainable path to economic growth” (Ezema and Ogujuiba 2012: 101). This market orientation, fundamental to capitalism, is founded on a binary understanding that makes it mutually exclusive to state actions and intervention in market dynamics. However, the East Asian experiment, as well as the development stories of the Scandinavian countries demonstrate how states can motivate developmental progress.

The idea of the DSP is therefore founded on the functionality of a strong state that has the capacity of getting institutions and policies right in ways that can adequately intervene in and regulate the market processes and failures. Such a state is oriented by the objective of good governance, hinged around “stable property rights, effective rule of law, zero or low corruption, democratic accountability of government, effective service delivery capacities, absence of political violence and free market without privileges (rent) for any

sector” (ibid.). The DSP is an attempt at correlating the relationship between the state and the structures it requires for development to happen. It facilitates the emergence of strong, democratic and developmental states. The developmental states are

countries which have the ability to prioritize property rights to transform or protect with the greatest developmental impact. Developmental state is not the same as the welfare state given that in the welfare state, dependency is profound.... The argument is that a developmental state has what it takes for industrial take-off and should therefore develop enough capacity to engineer growth and development. The state should be able to mobilize its resources for rapid industrialization. It should be able to coordinate expectations for specific targets (ibid: 101-102).

Apart from solid institutions, the DSP requires a viable policy architecture that can provide the direction towards good governance. This is significant because a developmental state does not guarantee economic progress or active development profile.

This is the context that recommends think tanks as viable partners in development to any aspiring developmental state in Africa. And it is essentially the marching order that brings NIPSS to existence. The DSP is far from being realized in Nigeria. One major reason is not only Nigeria's dismal economic performance but also the functional fixation of the Nigerian state to the Washington Consensus and the neoliberal agenda. And this implies that the task of NIPSS is already cut out, plain and dry: to facilitate policy research that will instigate development impulses and options for successive Nigerian governments to choose from. Most think tanks in Africa, like NIPSS, therefore emerged as the government's response to the development challenge, and how to deploy knowledge and the modernization of the policymaking dynamics to making development and democratic governance possible in increasing the well-being of Africans. The first African Think Tank Summit, in 2014, outlined several fundamental questions regarding how African think tanks can serve as agents of transformation on the continent:

What role do think tanks have in defining public policy in Africa?

How can think tanks best give policy advice, without being co-opted by governments and institutions?

What is the role of private consultancies in an environment of increasing competition for funding?

What constitutes effective media communication, and how can you own your message?

How can think tanks move faster and connect better in a digital era?

How can think tanks and pan-African institutions work together against censorship and government control?

The first crucial thought is that since NIPSS was inaugurated in the early period of the twentieth century, it is confronted most urgently by a modernizing imperative to speak to institutional reform of its modus operandi. As a government affiliated think tank, NIPSS is modeled after other specialist, ideological, not-for-profit think tanks and government think tanks, from The Aspen Institute (US) to the Royal College of Defense Studies (UK), and from the IBM International Education Center (Belgium) to the Philippine Institute for Development Studies (The Philippines). However, the idea of think tanking has since evolved beyond the original conception. Most of these think tanks have evolved far beyond their initial vision. One fundamental point that places NIPSS on a solid foundation is that it was conceived on a governance philosophy that sees the Nigerian state as occupying the commanding height of the economy and of politics. This was one of the demonstrated seriousness of the first-generation African leadership that, according to Thandika Mkandawire, signals that the DSP is not strange to the African continent. It is from such examples, like that of the Nigerian state of the immediate post-independence period, that Mkandawire argues that

Africa has had examples of countries whose ideological inclination was clearly “developmentalist” and that pursued policies that produced fairly high rates of growth and significant social gains and accumulation of human capital in the post-colonial era. moreover, in a significant number of countries, the political elite was able to reach arrangements that that provided peace and stability. And, so clearly, “developmental states” are not totally alien to Africa (2001: 310).

And this argument speaks clearly to a significant issue: since there are lessons to learn from this argument of the early orientation of African states to the DSP, then we need critical mass of reforms and options that provide “the

opportunity to think creatively of modes of social organisation at both macro and micro level that can extricate African countries from the crises they confront" (ibid.). And this tells us immediately that even though NIPSS was conceived within the context of a developmental state orientation, it needs to be positioned to reorient the Nigerian state and government to the path of development and good governance. This demands that it must itself be transformed radically. And one current way to do this is to rethink its *modus operandi* as a think-and-do tank. And this is all the more so because since independence, Nigeria has consistently decline in terms of all indicators and indices of human development. Thus, in concretely and efficiently navigating the research-policy nexus, there is a need for a significant overhauling of NIPSS' structure, and especially its directorate of research in terms of its capability to instigate research initiatives, outputs and knowledge production.

Apart from injecting significant and researched knowledge into the policy considerations, think tanks now have more to do. Mendizabal calls attention to some other significant objectives of think tanks that can enable us to shift attention to their capacity to achieve more. He identifies four:

"Think tanks are training grounds for future policymakers. Their staff have the chance to develop strong analytical skills, a good balance between academic rigour and political relevance, and the necessary competencies to develop and communicate convincing public policy arguments. Think tanks also help senior policymakers to critically reflect on their experiences, develop new ideas, and launch new efforts to bring about change.

"They are also well placed for creating and nurturing spaces for policy debate in which new relationships may be forged and strengthened.

"Think tanks are increasingly paying attention to efforts to educate the public; beyond the elites. Their communications efforts do not need to be entirely focused on decision-makers in government but can in fact turn towards helping to inform public discussions and empower hitherto excluded parties to participate in policy debates. They can do so by communicating their evidence and arguments directly to the public, supporting the development of the media and other intermediary institutions, and striving to explain the problems we all face just as much as the solutions they offer.

"Finally, think tanks can offer a reliable and neutral voice. In countries where the political debate is poorly informed and where the public has

little of no trust in their governments, think tanks can emerge as a lifeline. Even in the UK, where by-and-large the public does not expect government bodies to outright lie about the claims made of the budget every year, the Institute for Fiscal Studies has emerged as a fact checker on budget day and economic policy more generally. The media rely on its analysis to balance the government's own; and so do all political parties, ruling or in opposition. Imagine, then, the powerful impact that a think tank of its calibre could have for political, social and economic stability in Peru, Uganda or Pakistan” (Mendizabal, 2017).

All these signals the transition from think tanks to think-and-do tanks. This development says that *thinking* is not enough for development purpose, especially in Africa. There are two types of objections against the traditional think tank—they are either rigorous but unstrategic; or when they are strategic, they are too ideological. This characterization becomes very apt for government affiliated think tanks that are eventually turned into a “briefing machine” for generating evidence-based data that the government might or might not consider useful.

In the words of Barry Saide and Nicholas Diaz, the challenge for government affiliated think tank, like NIPSS, is that of moving from “a think tank that creates potentially great ideas without follow up into a 'do tank' that supports a creative culture of ideation, balanced with a hearty dose of fortitude, sustenance, and long-range planning?” (2016). This question of transition devolves into five strategic question that moderate the transition into a think-and-do tank: (a) What does the organization want to achieve? (b) What does the organization do that makes a unique contribution? (c) What are the organization's key audiences and how does it reach them? (d) What resources does the organization need and how can it develop them? (e) How does the organization evaluate impact and learn from its experience? (Seele 2013: 13)

NIPSS and the Future of the Nigerian State

NIPSS was conceived as a traditional think tank. While this cannot be taken as a criticism, it directs our focus to what is needed to transform its operational capacity away from its bureaucratic to a more efficient business model. Being a think tank operating through a bureaucratic business model therefore shields NIPSS away from the significant organizational benefits that managerialism projects for any organization that must be efficient and result-oriented. Take funding as a critical instance. As a government institution, budgetary allocations are never enough, and yet the institution cannot look for funding

elsewhere. Section 8 of the NIPSS Act limits its funding sources to the government, internally generated revenue and philanthropy. Finally, what ought to have been a significant advantage that all government-owned think tanks have over others is their capacity to reach into government policy reflections and requirements, and generate policy research accordingly. But this is only if the government is ever willing to allow it generate such research through funding and patronage. If both are lacking, then the think tank is left without its justification as a *think* tank.

There have been four major reform effort to get NIPSS on track for her twenty-first century policy responsibility:

The proposal to restructure the Institute initiated by the then Director-General, Professor Justin Tseayo in November 1981;

The Budget Review Committee which was set up on 5 June 1984 following a directive of the Board of Governors;

The Director-General's re-organisation committee set up by Major-General C. B. Ndiomu, mni, on 4 December, 1986;

The review of the National Institute Decree No. 20 of 1979 initiated by the Director-General, Major-General C. B. Ndiomu, in 1986; and

The National Institute Appraisal Committee [1991] set up by the Board of Governors during the tenure of retired Major-General Paul U. Omu as Director-General (Adeyemi, 1996: 75).

Most recently in 2020, the immediate past Director-General of NIPSS, the late Professor Habu S. Galadima, initiated a SWOT analysis of the Institute. By leveraging insights and analysis contained in existing documents—the NIPSS Strategic Plan, the Obudu Declaration and the Resolutions reached at the October 2019 NIPSS Stakeholders Conference in Abuja—the SWOT meeting was able to outline the strengths and weaknesses of NIPSS. The summation is simple: even as a traditional think tank, NIPSS is significantly constrained to achieve the core of its objectives. And the limitations are inherent in the NIPSS Act, the internal inadequacies of NIPSS' research capacity readiness, and inadequate funding which all combine to limit the deliverables of the Institute as an efficient think tank.

Recommendations and Implementation Strategies

From all the above, it should not be a surprise that NIPSS is conspicuously missing in almost all the major global and regional ranking of think tanks. To

redress this situation, it takes little reflection that most of the reform efforts must come from the Nigerian government that established NIPSS in the first place. In other words, the most significant effort consists in the radical reflection on, deep rethinking and renegotiation of, the NIPSS Act to embody the current and widespread transformation in the understanding of what think tanks are, what they do and how they do them. The Act is already forty-three years out of date with current development in think tanking, and the emerging knowledge society and democratic governance imperative.

This leads to the next significant transformational issue that must be addressed in reconstructing NIPSS. This has to do with its administrative business model which requires a transition from the bureaucratic to the managerial model. Managerialism insists that it is better management, rather than better constitutional dynamics, technologies or policies, that is needed to make governance and material progress. Being a bureaucratic think tank means that NIPSS is not able to benefit from the managerialism's objective of a lean, small and efficient organization that can perform effectively and achieve productivity. This implies that attention must be paid to the governance structure and capacity of NIPSS in terms of the quality of its leadership, from the chief executive to the governing council. One of the first responsibility of the governing council is to facilitate a standard operating process (SOP) as an institutional and organizational manual that standardize the core operations and responsibilities of NIPSS in terms of a mutually reinforcing relationship between its directorates of studies, research, administration, and the consultancy services.

NIPSS, to become a thinking and doing tank, needs a critical mass of staff that would not be recruited based on political appointment and neopatrimonialism. This speaks to the ability of the governing council, for instance, to put together a team of highly skilled, competent, experienced and productive scholars, intellectuals, experts and researchers who are the cutting edge of their fields. This automatically rebound on the quality of executive education and research output that NIPSS would be expected to turn out, as well as the quality of the policy analysis, recommendations and options that will emerge.

In this regard, and as a correlation, NIPSS significantly need to put in place a performance management system that will condition its productivity profile. This will be a means of modifying its bureaucratic operational business model. This also has a deep implication for the human resources management dynamics that will make it possible to recruit a workforce that can drive its objective of being an excellent think-and-do tank. For instance, such a

performance management framework will affect NIPSS faculty capacity building effort in ways that will rebound on the delivery of his executive education programmes. This is critical since the research capacity of any think tank is what constitutes its impact on policy and social philanthropy. A performance management system has the capacity to transform the range of consultancies that NIPSS has to offer, the broad framework of partnerships that it could enter into, and most fundamentally, the funding it could generate because of the resultant impact of its policy research and consultancy services. Through the adoption of a model of public-private partnership, NIPSS could reposition itself on its core competencies while outsourcing the non-core responsibilities. The idea of productivity inherent in the performance management dynamics also speaks to the need for a culture change programme that could reprofile the work-life balance of the members of staff, especially through leisure and recreational activities.

The last element of institutional reform—the list is not exhaustive—requires that even as a government affiliated think tank, NIPSS has to renew its capacity to integrate itself into strategic partnership and networks. This puts NIPSS right into the very center of the African think tank network that allows it to rub minds and strategies with other think tanks on the continent on development matters. Such a partnership also brings NIPSS into a critical research relationship with universities in Nigeria, and more importantly, NIPSS is drawn into a more rewarding relationship with MDAs in the sense of the establishment of joint research and working groups that co-relate ideas and technical assistances.

Conclusion

The National Institute for Policy and Strategy Studies was established forty-three years ago. However, it now operates within a postcolonial context that makes it urgently imperative for it to modernize and institutionally reform its *modus operandi* if it would still become relevant to Nigeria's objective of becoming a developmental state with the critical governance and policy architecture that would facilitate policy research, proposal and options, researches and knowledge production that the Nigerian government can depend on to make critical decisions that will benefit Nigerians. In this essay, therefore, I have outlined the critical steps that the government and the NIPSS governing council must take to drag NIPSS into the twenty-first century of thinking and doing tanking. The first act is that the NIPSS Act must be renegotiated in the light of contemporary think tank global best practices.

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Youth Unemployment and Violent Crimes in Jos North Local Government Area of Plateau State, Nigeria

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Abstract

Plateau State is one of the volatile states in Nigeria. It is known for its age-old security challenges as manifested through violent conflicts, armed robbery and other violent crimes. Scholars and policy makers have blamed the security challenges majorly on eco-violence and identity crises. This study looks at the situation differently. The study adopts Jos North Local Government Area (LGA) as a case study to examine the relationship between youth unemployment and violent crime rate in Plateau State. Over 40% of the population of Plateau State are youths that are within the age bracket of 15-29 years who are mostly unemployed and underemployed. The study is important because it proffers solution towards the amelioration of youth unemployment and violent crime in Jos North LGA of Plateau State thereby reducing the complexity of understanding the longstanding insecurity in Plateau State, Nigeria. The study employed mixed methods for data collection. The data was gathered through clustered sampling using structured questionnaires and semi structured Key Informant Interviews (KII) with 100 respondents recruited through purposive sampling. The result was analysed using spearman correlation coefficient and interpreted findings revealed significant statistical correlation between youth unemployment and violent crime rate in Jos North LGA. The study recommends the need to create an enabling environment, investment in research and planning, re-organization of government and private businesses to adequately generate jobs and absorb youths and the resuscitation of technical and vocational schools to promote self-reliance and discourage over-dependent on government as measures to engage youths and curtail violent crime rate in the city.

Keywords: Youth Unemployment, Violent crime, Plateau State, Jos North, Nigeria

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Background

Plateau State especially Jos North LGA is known for longstanding violent conflicts and violent crimes because of the recurring clashes between herders and farmers, ethno-religious confrontations, robbery, kidnapping and various crimes. Previous studies have focused on eco-violence as well as identity conflicts yet, attention on youth unemployment and crime rates are underexamined regardless the ever-growing youth population. According to Nigeria's official statistic as indicated by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), unemployment rate of Nigerian youths is estimated at 53.40 per cent as of fourth quarter (Q2) of 2020 was much lower than the Q4 of 2020 (Adesina, 2022).

The unemployment rate is derived from the levels of unemployment across all Nigerian states including Plateau State. The NBS data on unemployment for Q4 2020 reveal that Plateau State has a total working-age population of 2,690,344 individuals with the youth representing about 1,284,574 of the labour force. Among the youth population, 26.59% are unemployed while 26.15% are under-employed (Nanlong, 2022). Plateau State experience great number of crimes yet the statistics of the crime rate are not comprehensively accounted for. However, previous studies have provided ample evidence of threats to the lives and properties of civilians. Hence, this study assesses the nexus between unemployment and violent crime in Jos North which is the most volatile area of Plateau State.

Youth unemployment and violent crime has been a common observable phenomenon virtually in every country particularly, the developing countries like Nigeria. Youth unemployment is a grievous social problem which constitutes a threat to any nation. The loss is not only just economic, but socio-psychological since unemployment promotes tension and sense of hopelessness in human societies (Oyebade, 2008).

It poses serious impediments to social progress and (Akinboyo in Agbidike 2007) causes welfare lost in terms of lower output thereby leading to lower income and wellbeing of the people meaning unemployment has a negative effect on the society, which includes rise in crime activities in a country. Sociologist, look at unemployment rate as being a driver of crime (Britt, 1994 in Melick, 2003) This suggests that as unemployment increases crime increases. This is because people are disengaged in economic activities and source of livelihood. Thus, in the absence of regular income and means of livelihood to ensure life sustenance, the frustration of unemployed youths could be transformed into criminality in the society.

According to, Egunjob (2017, in Alabi, 2014). Many social problems such as robbery, domestic violence, suicide, civil unrest, are consequences of severe unemployment. There is said to be a nexus between unemployment and violent crime, where people cannot earn legitimate income they resort to illegal means. The upsurge of criminal activities posed a question on who will lead the next generation since, the youth are now jobless and significant percentage of them is into crime? Youth employment is the key to economic and social development in the modern societies, employment determines the productivity of an active youth. The prevailing intensity of youth unemployment and upsurge of criminality have not been adequately documented in Nigeria. Previous studies have predominantly focused on the effect of general unemployment on the nation's economy.

The aim of this research is to evaluate the relationship between youth unemployment and violent crime in Jos North LGA of Plateau state, Nigeria. The study seeks to investigate the nature of the relationship between these variables and proffer recommendations towards addressing the deleterious consequences of the nexus between unemployment and crime.

The scope of the study is limited to Jos North LGA, Plateau state. The work was conducted in Q2 2022. Jos North LGA is chosen for this work because the city has in the recent years been losing its occupational context from a tin city that serves as an international mining centre to a tourist world that attracts millions of people from all part of the world in the past, to a city that has gradually lost its glory as a result of past tragedies like that of 2004 that led to the burning down of the famous Jos ultra-modern market which serves as a great source of employment for the city. Also, the frequent violent ethno-religious crises consumed lives and properties as well as drove away employment and investments from the city.

The mining industries are less functional and the business of tourism has since decline. Today the city is densely populated by virtually every tribe domicile in Nigeria as the old tin city provided golden opportunity for employment in the past. The Jos town features a unique picture of an urban city with every possible social challenges, attitudes and interest, this and other reasons characterized the city with high observable multitudes of unemployed youths and frequent crime occurrence and violence.

This study is significant because, youth unemployment and crime pose great challenge to policy makers in Nigeria at all levels especially now that Nigeria's economy is recovering from a deep recession. It is also important because

youths are important stakeholder in the society and constitute a major part of the labour force and through their creative and innovative capacity, they can either promote national development or intensify instability and insecurity (Awogbenle & Iwuamadi, 2010).

Research Hypotheses

In order to achieve the objectives of this study, the following hypotheses are posed:

Ho: There is no significant relationship between youth unemployment and violent crime in Jos North LGA, Plateau state.

H1: There is significant relationship between youth unemployment and violent crime in Jos North LGA, Plateau state.

Research Methodology

The study is a survey that employs mixed methods including quantitative and qualitative primary and secondary data. The primary data is obtained through structured questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with community key stakeholders to study the relationship between youth unemployment and violent crime. Secondary data employed, include books, papers, reputable journal, newspaper, periodical reports, different articles, websites and statistical data were taking into account for this research study.

The study was conducted in Jos North, the capital city of Plateau State located in Northcentral Nigeria. There are 429,330 estimated populations living in Jos North according to the 2006 Census and a projected population of 643,300 people (City Population, n.d.). The study randomly selects the research clusters among all other homogeneous clusters that are geographically divided already as federal; electoral wards and purposively select samples of the population that have direct relevance to the study as the research respondents. The wards selected for this study are Naraguta A, Naraguta B and Kabong/Tudun Wada electoral wards.

In terms of the youth population, currently there is no official records of the youth population in Jos North LGA, but it is estimated as 41% (City population, n.d.). The research considered segment of the cluster population that suit the research variables at random to administer questionnaire to them and KII were purposefully conducted on religious leaders, community leaders, member of Boys Brigade, youth leader, vigilante groups and police force within the research areas.

The sampling techniques adopted by the researchers are the mixed sampling methods; the probability and non-probability sampling techniques are engaged. A cluster probability method is used to divide the population into geographical cluster and randomly selected three (3) research clusters using fish bowl techniques, the advantage of this is making sure that the cluster selection for the research sample is based on randomization and every element has equal chance of being part of the sample.

Cluster sampling signifies that instead of sampling all in a target homogeneous population, clusters are selected at random. In cluster sampling, first we divide the population into clusters usually along geographic boundaries. Then we randomly select some clusters from all the clusters as sample clusters. Here, we engaged two-stage cluster sample design where a random sample of clusters is selected and within each cluster a random sample of participants will be selected. Furthermore, the two-stage design can be expanded into a multi-stage one, in which samples of clusters are selected within previously selected clusters. Also, the non-probability sampling technique of purposive sampling is used on the selected population elements that suit the purpose of the study; the researcher has been selective based on his own judgment to obtained data from the respondents. In terms of the sampling procedure, 90 questionnaires, 30 in each cluster sample area and 10 key informant interviews where necessary.

At the completion of the data collection, all generated responses will be analyses using frequency, simple percentage and charts. This helps to show at a glance the trend of the data and related variables for this study, the simple percentages tool of data analysis also, help us to present the trend of data gotten as questionnaire responses from the respective respondents, the analyses is carried out base on research questions posed, moreover, the methods used statistics is consider suitable in order to explore the relationship between the research variables. A 95% confidence level and 5% (0.05) level of significance was taken as probability of committing type one error. Qualitative data generated from key informant interview responses are transcribed and analysed via the content analytical method. Finally, statistical tool for correlation analyses is used to test the hypotheses of the study.

The correlation statistical package analyses the generated data and arrived at the research findings. The researchers choose to use correlation because it determines the relationship between two continuous variables like unemployment and violent crime. Correlation method is a type of non-experiment methods that describes the relationship between two variables, if they are related in a sufficient way for proven causality and prediction from one

variable to another, we can predict from one variable to the other with a degree of accuracy. Correlation result vary in their magnitudes, the strength of the relationship can be weak, moderate, strong or nonexistence. The result of correlation studies is presented graphically in a scatter plot or scatter gram. The correlation coefficient expresses quantitatively the magnitude and direction of the relationship in our research variables. (Pegano, 2013).

Theoretical Framework: Relative Deprivation

This classical theory explains why people engage in violence (riots, rebellion, coups, criminal activities etc.). It examines the psychological causes involving frustration and as the primary source of human capacity for violent crime. Gurr postulate that frustration is neither necessary nor sufficiently leads to violence but greed may drive to violence. Frustration is a much stronger motivating force and prolonged frustration may cause greater probability for aggression. Relative deprivation is the discrepancy between what people think they deserve and what they actually think they can get (Gurr, 1970). However, Gurr explain that; if there is a significant discrepancy between what they think they deserve and what they think they will get, there is a likelihood for rebellion. Also, Gurr posits this to be the case because there is a feeling that their expectation cannot be met if the current statuesque is maintained. The first situation may be a desperate one, and the second will be frustrating. So, frustration produces aggression at individual, group and societal levels. This theory could be used as link rising number of unemployed youths and crimes in Nigeria. A country that produces millions of jobless youths that relatively engaged in crime. Absent of commensurate employment opportunities may be creating a fertile ground for a feeling of frustration among these unemployed youths; schooled or unschooled, formal and informal. Naturally, there is a feeling of joy and great expectations whenever a person attains a peak in achieving an effort like educational, craft or artisan graduation, these expectations gradually fades away and is replaced by feeling of frustration after some years of joblessness caused by little or no opportunity the society offers this youths. As the frustration prolongs and the feeling of deprivation of what that is expected increases, there is a greater probability that the individual or people especially the youths can resort to illegitimate activities in order to actualize their expectations in the society. The recent trend in violent crimes (robbery, kidnapping, thuggery, etc) committed by youths is a sign of “gap” in the society. The society already has expectations for individuals and established means of achieving them. When the means are limited and there is youth unemployment and crime then become inevitable in our society thus, persons are forced to

achieve their goals through illegal means to fulfil societal expectations. Today, kidnappings are increasingly on the rise across Nigeria and the unemployed youths view the business lucrative. The unemployed youths are available multitudes for recruitment by politicians and other wicked organization. In the Northern part, they are recruited both by politicians, ethnic militias and dissident groups like bandits and Boko Haram to be used in terrorism. In the South and Western part of Nigeria, they find easy employment in petty and serious criminal activities like 419, yahoo-boys, robbery etc.

Key Terms

This section attempts to clarify and narrow the key concepts employed in this study. These concepts include unemployment and violence/ violent crime. It highlights the various commonalities in the definition of unemployment. It also identifies the various types of unemployment with the aim of reveal the most prevailing types of unemployment in Jos North, Plateau State in order to provide policy makers with the evidenced based information for better policy decisions. The section also highlights what constitutes violence and its typologies

Unemployment

The International Labour Office (ILO) defines the unemployment as a situation where persons without work, who are currently available for work and seeking for work (ILO, 2015). Work refers to the task and individual perform for wage or salary or personal income. There are several definitions on unemployment but regardless of these definitions, there are commonalities in the definition as identified in the extant literature of unemployment. Scholars indicate three elements in the definition, these include; 'a situation when a person is not working,' 'availability for work' and, 'actively seeking for work' (Azolibe et al., 2022; Amadeo, 2022). These elements in the definition suggest that for an individual to be unemployed, they must not be working, ready and busy looking for work. Different types of unemployment have been identified by scholars in the field of social science to include the followings:

Structural Unemployment: Structural unemployment occurs when there is a change in the structure of an industry or the economic activities of the country. This may be because people's tastes have changed or it may be because technology has out model and the product or service is no longer in demand. It is mostly to be found in the developing countries of Asia and Africa. This type of unemployment is due to the deficiency of capital resources in relation to their demand. In other words, structural unemployment results from a mismatch

between the demand for labour, and the ability of the workers (Fajana, 2000).

Seasonal Unemployment: This type of unemployment occurs due to seasonal variations in the activities of particular industries caused by climatic changes, changes in fashions or by the inherent nature of such industries. In the tropical region, ice factories are less active in rainy season because demand for ice is low. Seasonal oriented industries are bound to give rise to seasonal unemployment (Fajana, 2000).

Frictional Unemployment: According to Jhingan (2009), frictional unemployment exists when there is lack of adjustment between demand for and supply for labour. This may be due to lack of knowledge on the part of employers about the availability of workers or on the part of workers that employment is available. This is caused by industrial friction in which jobs may exist, yet the workers may be unable to fill them either because they do not possess the necessary skill, or because they are not aware of the existence of such jobs. The employable may remain unemployed on account of shortage of raw materials, or mechanical defects in the working of plants. Therefore, the better the economy is doing, the lower this type of unemployment is likely to occur (Alao, 2005).

Cyclical Unemployment: Cyclical Unemployment also known as Keynesian unemployment or the demand deficient unemployment is due to the operation of the business cycle. This arises at a time when the aggregate effective community demand becomes deficient in relation to the productive capacity of the country. In other words, when the aggregate demand falls below the full employment level, it is not sufficient to purchase the full employment level of output (Alao, 2005).

Residual Unemployment: This simply refers to the type unemployment caused by personal factors such as old age, physical or mental disability, poor work attitudes and inadequate training.

Technological Unemployment: Technological Unemployment is caused by changes in the techniques of production. Technological changes are taking place constantly, leading to the increased mechanization of the production process. This naturally results in the displacement of labour and finally causing unemployment (Oladele, 2011).

Disguised Unemployment: This is the same as under-unemployment (Anyanwuocha, 1998). According to Ogboru (2010), disguised unemployment is caused by over population. Unemployment can be disguised because it is not

immediately obvious to the casual observer that the under-employed individual is partially unemployed.

This study will therefore, attempt to look at the influence the various types of unemployment on violence crime in Plateau State Nigeria. Table 4 below reveal the nature of unemployment in Plateau State and indicate the most prevalent. This categorization of unemployment is important as it will equip policy makers with evidence-based information for effective policy decisions.

Violence and Violent Crime

Crime refers to an act (offence) committed by individual, group or organization which has legal implications with such offences being motivated by psychological, biological, sociological, and environmental influences (Vito et al., 2006; Rafter, 2008; Rothe, 2009). This suggest that crimes are acts that are indeed against established law. This implies that for an act to be criminal, it must be prescribed by an established law. Crime are regarded as those transgression which are detrimental to the society and the common good (Vito, 2006).

Previous studies conceptualize violent crimes as the intentional and calculated use of violence against a person or group of persons which contravenes the criminal law of a country (Alvarez and Bachman 2008; Krug, et al., 2002). Violence as a concept is broader in scope and has remain a subject of several debates in the social sciences. Regardless of the lack of clear-cut definition of violence, criminologists have attempted to narrow the definitions of violence by focusing on 'physical harm' or 'threats.' This implies the intentional behaviours by individuals targeted to threaten or inflict physical harm on others. Scholars agree that this violent behaviour can be manifested through diverse behaviours such as murder, assault, robbery and rape (Heitmeyer and Hagan, 2003; Riedel and Welsh, 2008).

Debates on Violent Crime and Youth Unemployment

The majority of the study in the extant literature suggest that unemployment entails the alienation of youth from legitimate income pushes individuals into crime. Previous studies posit that unemployment is a major driver of grievances-induced violence. Studies have argued that unemployment is a great source of group collective action as it mobilises and recruit individuals to engage in violent groups, gangs and it motivates extremism (Cramer, 2015; Ali, 2014; Alabi, 2014). Ali (2014) argued further by positing that youth without economic opportunities are susceptible to violence, gangs, drug trafficking and other unlawful activities because of the physical and psychological gratifications.

Scholars suggest that the gratifications are often needed especially because unemployment constraints the transitional phase of young people and deny them of their goals and erode their expectations in their transition to adulthood (Hilker and Fraser, 2009). For instance, youth who are delayed from getting married, owning houses, cars and other necessities would want to strive by hook or by crook to achieve their goals and to assume certain social status.

To further establish the nexus between youth unemployment and violent crime, a number of empirical studies have been conducted across social backgrounds. Mercy Corps (2015) reveals that unemployed youth without opportunities to earn a living legally, are established pool of recruits for violent groups such as al-Shabab in Somalia, armed groups in Columbia and Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). Similarly, Anjide (2018) also identified that Boko Haram in Nigeria draw mass following from unemployed young people by creating illicit opportunities and propagating narratives that will generate grievances against the Nigerian state.

Another literature that has extensively connects youth unemployment to crime is the literature on youth bulge. Studies on youth bulges indicate that developing countries including Nigeria have great and increasing proportions of youth (aged 15–24 years) more than ever in history (McLean Hilker, 2009). Studies argue that while this may stand as 'demographic dividend' and advantageous to developing countries, the absence of education and employment opportunities pose great threat to peace and stability (Beehner, 2007;).

Events in the last decade (2009–2022) suggest that Nigeria is grappling with the adverse effect of youth bulge this is evident in the different security threats posed by different violent groups across the country with young people as the major perpetrators such as the Boko Haram insurgents, Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), dissident group and various gangs of bandits and robbers. Previous studies suggest that these groups attract young able-bodied men as their members and mobilize them towards collective violence (Anjide and Okoli, 2017; Anjide, 2018; Oshita et al., 2020). Therefore, this study seeks to highlight the influence of youth unemployment on violent crimes in Plateau State Nigeria.

Data Presentation and Analyses

Data were collected using structured interview questionnaire administered and triangulated by key informant interviews in the cluster community within the sampled wards of Naraguta A, Naraguta B and Kabong/Tudun Wada federal

electoral wards in Jos North. In carrying out our analysis the data were analysed using frequency table, charts, scatter plot, simple percentage (%) and correlation statistics via social science statistical package (SPSS) the result interpreted before conclusions were drawn based on the findings of the study.

This helps to show at a glance the trend of the data and related variables for this study, the simple percentages tool of data analysis also, helped us to present the trend of data gotten as questionnaire responses from the respective respondents, the analyses is carried out based on research questions posed and the correlation analyses was applied to test the hypotheses of the study.

Table 1

Frequency of retrieved questionnaire by sampled federal electoral wards					
		Issued	Retrieved		Cumulative
		questionnaire	questionnaire	%	
Valid	Naraguta A	30	29	35.4	35.4
	Naraguta B	30	25	30.5	65.9
	Kabong/Tudun Wada	30	28	34.1	100.0
	Total	90	82	100.0	

Table 1 shows the number of issued questionnaires to the respondents in various sampled federal electoral wards in Jos North, Plateau state, by percentage. Total of 90 questionnaires were given out of which 82 were returned, Naraguta A has (35.4%) response rate, Kabong/Tudun Wada (34.1%) and Naraguta B (30.5%). Only 8% of the total questionnaire were not retrieved due to logistical issues. However, it can be established that the questionnaires retrieved covered a sufficient number of the sample population to ensure the data needed to enable the study reach a logical conclusion.




Figure 1: Response Rate of Administered Questionnaires

Figure 1 above illustrates the percentage of questionnaires retrieved; it shows that there are deficiency of 8 unreturned questionnaire among the sum 90 questionnaires administered




Figure 2: Gender of the respondents

Figure 2 illustrate the gender group of the respondents; it shows that 50 males representing (61.0%) response rate and 32 females representing (39.0%) which show that male are the majority respondent. The above proportion across the sample space had no negative impact on the survey's outcome as females were not excluded.




Figure 3 Age of the respondents

Figure 3, illustrate the graphic representation on the age distribution of the work respondents in percentage with maximum of (11%) representing 23years of age and minimum of (1.25%) representing 18, 34 years respectively.

Table 2

Frequency of respondent employed status					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Employed	1	1.2	1.2	1.2
	unemployed	81	98.8	98.8	100.0
	Total	82	100.0	100.0	

The table above shows the employment level of the research respondents in percentage, as the unemployed youth represent (98.8%) of the sampled respondents.

Table 3

Frequency of respondent views on how long they have been unemployed and actively looking for job?					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	2 weeks	1	1.2	1.2	1.2
	4 weeks	13	15.9	15.9	17.1
	more than 4 weeks	68	82.9	82.9	100.0
	Total	82	100.0	100.0	

It is evident from the above table, that most of the unemployed youth that respond to this study were unemployed for longer period of time, more than 4 weeks as they represent (82.9%) of the total respondents. Thus, implying full unemployment

Table 4

Respondent views on what are the types of unemployment which they think are common among youth in Jos North					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Structural unemployment	44	53.7	53.7	53.7
	seasonal	15	18.3	18.3	72.0

unemployment				
frictional	7	8.5	8.5	80.5
unemployment				
cyclical	10	12.2	12.2	92.7
unemployment				
residual	3	3.7	3.7	96.3
unemployment				
technological	1	1.2	1.2	97.6
unemployment				
disguise	2	2.4	2.4	100.0
unemployment				
Total	82	100.0	100.0	

The above table evidently shows that, all types of unemployment are present in Jos North but, the most common among youth is structural unemployment as represented by (53.7%). Then (18.3%) by seasonal unemployment, (12.2%) cyclical unemployment.

Table 5

Respondent views on the causes of unemployment among youth in Jos North

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	The youth are lazy	8	9.8	9.8	9.8
	the youth are uneducated	7	8.5	8.5	18.3
	The youth have no relevant employable skills	13	15.9	15.9	34.1
	Government policies	54	65.9	65.9	100.0
	Total	82	100.0	100.0	

The above table shows evidently the major cause of unemployment among youth is the government policies, as it represents (65.9%) of the total analyses. All the participant confirmed that there are great expectations on government regarding to job creation. Moreover, two Participants argue that government policies contribute to both lack of skills and laziness in youth unemployment. Participant 1 (Youth leader, Naraguta A) posited that;

Nigeria's education system is really faulty. I spent almost my entire life

in school, right from my nursery days till this moment without learning a special skill. I am lucky because I can fend for myself, I am a fashion designer, thanks to my uncle. There are a lot of graduates roaming the street without skills and opportunities like me. I am of the strong opinion that all the entrepreneurial courses taught in our schools should expose students to practicals and incentives should be given to students that are imbued with hard work and entrepreneurial spirit.

Similarly, Participant 3 (Community leader, Kabong) revealed that;

Government policies have contributed a lot. In spite of the shortage of jobs, The Federal Government has initiated temporary measures through the Social Investment Programme. I do not find the programme adequate and sustainable. The NIRSAL Microfinance Bank has been disbursed several times to our youth. Instead of them to use it judiciously, you will find them buying motorcycles and enjoying life with the money. I am not happy with such kind of policy where you give money to someone with poor entrepreneurial spirit. Moreover, this becomes worst without proper guidance and monitoring.

These participants lament the inability of government to adequately entrench a system of education that will equip the youth with the skill-sets to be self-reliant, they are also concerned about the attitude some youth towards maximising the soft loans provided to them by the government.

Table 6

Respondent views on the problem of youth unemployment in Jos North

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Not a problem	1	1.2	1.2	1.2
	Minor problem	2	2.4	2.4	3.7
	Moderate problem	9	11.0	11.0	14.6
	A problem	17	20.7	20.7	35.4
	A serious problem	53	64.6	64.6	100.0
Total		82	100.0	100.0	

Table 7

Respondent views that Youth are the largely class in terms of committing violent crime in Jos North

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly disagree	2	2.4	2.4	2.4
	Disagree	12	14.6	14.6	17.1
	Neutral	17	20.7	20.7	37.8
	Agree	29	35.4	35.4	73.2
	strongly agree	22	26.8	26.8	100.0
	Total	82	100.0	100.0	

The above table shows that youth are at the fore front of committing crime as (35.4%) respondents agree and (26.8%) strongly agreed. Additionally, all participants agree to the fact the major perpetrators of crime are the youth. Participant 2 (Police Officer, Naraguta B) and Participant 1 (Youth leader, Naraguta A) believe that the youth may not be entirely the perpetrators because they are sometimes influenced by criminal entrepreneurs who are largely not from the youth demography.

Table 8

Respondents' views on rating the type of violent crime that is prevalent among youth in Jos North

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Assault	2	2.4	2.5	2.5
	arm robbery	2	2.4	2.5	4.9
	violent crime	3	3.7	3.7	8.6
	drug related crime	20	24.4	24.7	33.3
	all of the above	54	65.9	66.7	100.0
	Total	81	98.8	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.2		
Total		82	100.0		

The above table shows that all of the above listed crimes are prevalent among youth. 54 respondents representing (65.9%) of the total respondent views agreed. Additionally, Participant 3 (Community leader, Kabong), Participant 6 (Member of vigilante group, Tudun Wada) and Participant 4 (Member of Boys Brigade, Kabong) opined that as long as the youth are unemployed, they will utilise all opportunities to commit any kind of crime. This indicate that the propensity of the youth to commit crime is largely based on opportunity.

Table 9

Respondents views on Government doing enough to curtail youth unemployment and crime in Jos North

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly disagree	12	14.6	14.6	14.6
	Disagree	32	39.0	39.0	53.7
	Neutral	11	13.4	13.4	67.1
	Agree	19	23.2	23.2	90.2
	strongly agree	8	9.8	9.8	100.0
	Total	82	100.0	100.0	

This table suggests that government is not doing enough to curtail youth unemployment and violent crime in Jos North as (39%) disagree that government is doing enough to end unemployment and crime.

Table 10

Respondents views on which sex group are likely to engage crime than the other in Jos North

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	78	95.1	95.1	95.1
	Female	4	4.9	4.9	100.0
	Total	82	100.0	100.0	

The table evidently shows the male sex group are the most likely group to commits crime than their opposite sex, 78 respondents present us with (95.1%). The majority of the KII participants confirm this assertion. Participant 6 (Member of vigilante group, Tudun Wada) and Participant 2 strongly agree that when compared to females, males are the bravest to commit heinous crime and that they have more tenacity to withstand they difficulty to plan and execute crimes. Participant 3 (Community leader, Kabong) further adds that the males are predisposed to commit crimes because of the societal pressure on them. The Participant opined that;

They are jobless and at the same time expected to achieve everything before 40 years of age; that is why the jump at every opportunity positive or negative.

Respondents opinion on whether any form of employment will prevent youth from committing violent crime in Jos North

Table 10		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	strongly disagree	1	1.2	1.2	1.2
	disagree	7	8.5	8.6	9.9
	neutral	2	2.4	2.5	12.3
	agree	35	42.7	43.2	55.6
	strongly agree	36	43.9	44.4	100.0
	Total	81	98.8	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.2		
Total		82	100.0		

The above table shows that any form of employment for the youth can prevent them from committing crime, 36 respondents representing (43.9%) strongly agree and 35 respondents representing (42.7%) also agreed. All the KII participants agree that regardless the kind of job what the youth need is jobs with regular income and that the lack of the regular has been the major motivation to commit crimes.

Table 14

			UNEMPLOY	CRIME
			MENT	
Spearman's rho	UNEMPLOYME	Correlation	1.000	.523**
	NT	Coefficient		
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000
		N	82	82
	CRIME	Correlation	.523**	1.000
		Coefficient		
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.
		N	82	82

The correlation table above shows that, there are statistically significant, positive correlation between unemployment and crime in Jos North, the correlation coefficient = $\rho_{N(82)} = .523 = .000$. Hence, the association between youth unemployment and violent crime is statistically significant, moderate and positive.

Correlation between Unemployment and Crime

CRIME

UNEMPLOYMENT

$y = 2.5 + 0.39 * x$

$R^2 = 0.72$

UNEMPLOYMENT	CRIME
1	1
1	2
1	3
1	4
1	5
2	3
3	3
3	4
3	5
4	2
4	3
4	4
4	5
5	1
5	2
5	3
5	4
5	5

Discussion of Findings

The aim of this research was to evaluate the variables and establish findings, if there exist a relationship between youth unemployment and violent crime in Jos north or not, as hypothesized earlier. After collecting field data and systematically analyzing it, the finding revealed that is a statistically significant, moderate, positive association between youth unemployment and violent crime; meaning that unemployed youth are likely commits crime in the society. Therefore, our null hypotheses H_0 : is rejected and our alternative hypotheses H_1 : is accepted.

The result findings established that unemployment among youth is largely cause by the government policies that seized to provide the enabling ground and opportunities for the youth in the society, most of the youth are able, educated to some level and actively looking for job to live happily, but the opportunities are limited; this has to do with government lack of proper policy planning and implementation, the conversion of the city's rich farmland and mining sites that have in the past attracts the whole world to residential areas in the city.

Again the findings revealed that, the most prevalent type of joblessness among youth in Jos North is the structural unemployment due to change in the economic structure of the country that largely affects formal and informal sectors of the economy, thereby resulting downward in economic activities and raised in unemployment that push the youth to engage in crime like theft, burglary, violent crime, arm robbery, drug related crime and to some extent connives to create insecurity along sectarian division like religion and ethnic crises.

Furthermore, the result finds out that there are no gender disparities in committing crime among youth in Jos North. But the male sex group are the most likely group to commits crime than the opposite female sex group, in all the key informant interview conducted with police, member of the vigilante, Senior member of Boys Brigade and religious leaders confirmed to the views that, the male sex group are more into violent crime than the female sex group

Finally, the research also found out that, any form of employment opportunity will curtail youth involvement in violent crime that has made the neighbourhood unsecure and the city which was known to be the home of peace and tourism to a very volatile town

Summary

Youth unemployment is a global problem affecting virtually every country in the world. No government can achieve meaningful development and stability that will enhance human, political, socio-economic and security development, when the youth are unemployed and largely involved in criminal activities, many countries around the world have done well on research and policy solution. But the efforts of the Nigerian authorities need to be amplified because significant percentage of the youth are engaged in criminal activities. Having examined the relationship between unemployment and crime in Jos North, we can confidently state that, the association will not yield any positive result to the future of any society that neglects its responsibility towards the future generation as the magnitude of the relationship is manifesting in anti-social behaviours' like Boko-haram, banditry, yahoo boys, gangsterism, kidnapping, ethnic/religious crises etc.

Conclusion

Youth unemployment and violent crime is one of the most serious problem facing the world and Nigeria in particular that demands serious attention from all angles. The relationship between youth unemployment and violent crime is never good for any society; the manifestation of such association can be seen clearly in the presence of anti-social behaviours like robbery, burglary, violent crime, drug addiction among the youth. The work explores the association and its magnitudes among youth as a time bomb that can destroy the future of any nation if neglected. Additionally, committing crime is done virtually by all demography but; the youth are at the larger percentage because of their level of joblessness. The structure of the economy has largely contributed to rising unemployment and crime especially in the last seven years (2015) where Nigeria experienced deep economic recession. The study also highlighted the inadequacy of government policies to reduce the menace.

Policy Recommendation

Findings have rate youth unemployment as a serious problem in Jos North, therefore the following is suggested:

1. **Enabling environment:** The authorities should direct more effort in combating all criminal activities within and outside the city by tracing, profiling, apprehending, demolishing criminal clusters (jungles) and dismantling all networks of drug cartels in the city, more security presence in the city's domain should equally be seen regularly on patrol.

2. **Research and Job creations:** political authorities should engage in research and planning for the future of the city and its youth who are leaders of tomorrow, there should be a comprehensive document for the development of the city and the state as well, government at all level should be able to create more jobs
3. **Re-organization of government and private business:** the authorities should re-establish it present in the city's market, parks and transportation sector, by organizing this areas in such a way that revenue will be adequately generated and more youth will be employed, also the private should be given more incentives as a condition for absorbing more youth off the street.
4. **Resuscitating technical and vocational schools:** policies should be centred around establishing new and reconstructing the abandon technical schools that in the past has effectively train many youths in acquisitions of employable skills like plumbing, carpentry, electronics, building, mechanical etc this will definitely bring back self-reliance and discourage criminal activities and over-dependent on government for job among youths
5. **Economic diversification:** authorities should reconsider over depending on the centre for oil revenue alone; they should be able to re-engage the Jos North economy in extractive mining industry and tourism development, which the old native Jos town was known for throughout the world. This will generate more employments to the youth and curtail crime rate in the city.

Way Forward

Unemployment and violent crime is a global phenomenon that no country can escape but the authorities should put in place policies that are simple and workable in addressing youth problems of unemployment and crime or that have worked in other places, the policies made should be credible and produce proper research findings. This will go a lot in helping the government to achieve employment objectives.

The youth should also strive to create more job for themselves by been innovative and creative thereby shunning joblessness. Moreover, it is important that the youth should not rely on government rather they should be more innovative, hardworking, resilient to earn a living through legal means.

Notes

The table below describes all participants. As the identities of the participants remain anonymous, it is important to describe the participants to highlight their relevance to this research.

S/N	CODE	DISCRIPTION AND LOCATION	DATE
1	Participant 1	Youth leader, Naraguta A	June, 2022
2	Participant 2	Police Officer, Naraguta B	June, 2022
3	Participant 3	Community leader, Kabong	June, 2022
4	Participant 4	Member of Boys Brigade, Kabong	July, 2022
5	Participant 5	Community leader, Naraguta A	July, 2022
6	Participant 6	Member of vigilante group, Tudun Wada	July, 2022

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